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ABSTRACT 
FROM A LOCAL PROTEST TO AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT MASS 
MOVEMENT:  
A DISCURSIVE ANALYSIS OF GEZI PARK PROTESTS 
 
Enginar, Cahide Zeynep 
MA, Department of Sociology 
Supervisor: Prof. Mesut Yeğen 
March 2016, 92 pages 
 
This study aims to analyze the extent to which the Gezi Park protests achieved 
to become hegemonic. The protests commenced locally with a group of protesters who 
opposed to the project of reconstructing an old barrack which had existed in the Gezi 
Park in the past. However, the protests turned into an anti-government mass movement 
with an unprecedented heterogeneity thanks to the participation of groups with 
different demands and identities and they mobilized people for several weeks. This 
study uses discourse analytical theory of Laclau and Mouffe to analyze the Gezi Park 
protests as a political struggle. Based on the interviews conducted with the Gezi Park 
protesters from different identity groups, the study seeks to understand how so many 
diverse and opposing groups having different demands came together, how they 
managed to stay together in the park and what they proposed to transform social 
relations through their struggle. The study investigates the protesters’ reasons for 
participation, the conflicts among different groups of protesters which undermined 
their unity, how these conflicts were managed, the protesters’ problems with the 
government and the demands of the protesters. The study concludes that the Gezi Park 
protests displayed an antagonistic relation with the government. This, it is argued, 
made it possible for the protests to bring together a wide range of groups having 
different demands. However, despite its initial success in mobilizing people having 
different demands, this study argues, the protests failed to produce a collective identity 
out of its heterogeneous fabric and this was due to the fact that the act of naming the 
protests was not achieved. The protests, it is concluded, failed to initiate a hegemonic 
construction which would aim to change social relations in Turkey. 
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ÖZ 
YEREL BİR PROTESTODAN HÜKÛMET KARŞITI KİTLESEL HAREKETE: 
GEZİ PARKI PROTESTOLARININ SÖYLEMSEL ANALİZİ 
 
Enginar, Cahide Zeynep 
MA, Sosyoloji Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Mesut Yeğen 
Mart 2016, 92 sayfa 
 
Bu çalışma Gezi Parkı protestolarının ne ölçüde hegemonik olabildiğini analiz 
etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Protestolar Gezi Parkı’na Topçu Kışlası’nın yeniden inşa 
edilmesi projesine karşı çıkan bir grup eylemciyle başladı. Fakat Protestolar farklı 
kimlik ve taleplere sahip grupların katılımı sayesinde Türkiye tarihinde benzeri 
görülmemiş bir heterojenlik arz eden hükûmet karşıtı kitlesel bir harekete dönüştü ve 
haftalarca insanları sokağa döktü. Bu çalışma Gezi Parkı protestolarının siyasi bir 
mücadele olarak analizinde Laclau ve Mouffe tarafından geliştirilmiş olan söylem 
kuramını kullanmaktadır. Çalışma, Gezi Parkı protestolarına katılmış çeşitli 
gruplardan eylemcilerle gerçekleştirilen mülakatlar üzerinden karşıt grupların nasıl bir 
araya geldiklerini, haftalarca parkta birlikte kalmayı nasıl başardıklarını ve bu siyasi 
mücadeleleriyle sosyal ilişkileri dönüştürmek için ne önerdiklerini anlamaya 
çalışmaktadır. Bu amaçla eylemcilerin katılma sebepleri, farklı gruplar arasındaki 
eylemlerdeki birliği zayıflatacak çelişki ve çatışmalar, bu çelişkilerin nasıl idare 
edildiği, eylemcilerin AK Parti hükûmetiyle olan sorunları ve eylemcilerin talepleri 
araştırılmıştır. Çalışmada Gezi Parkı protestolarının hükûmetle antagonistik bir ilişki 
sergilediği sonucu çıkarılmıştır. Bu durumun protestoların farklı taleplere sahip çok 
sayıda grubu bir araya getirmesini mümkün kıldığı iddia edilmektedir. Fakat 
protestoların farklı kimlik ve taleplere sahip insanları harekete geçirmekteki başarısına 
rağmen, bu heterojen dokudan bir kolektif kimlik üretmeyi başaramadığı ve bunun 
protestoların adını koyma eyleminin gerçekleştirilememesine bağlı olduğu öne 
sürülmektedir. Protestoların Türkiye’deki sosyal ilişkileri değiştirmeyi amaçlayan bir 
hegemonik inşa başlatmakta başarısız olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality had been planning the Taksim Square 
Pedestrianization Project, which included building of tunnels in order to direct traffic 
into subterranean and to keep the square open to only pedestrians since 2007 (IBB, 
2007).  The pedestrianization project was widened in 2011 so as to reconstruct the 
Topcu Barrack1 which once existed in today’s Gezi Park.2 The plan of reconstructing 
Topcu Barrack on Gezi Park was criticized and opposed since the very inception of 
the plan on the ground that this would destroy the green public area.  The Istanbul 
Chamber of Architects and the Istanbul Chamber of Urban Planners, for instance, 
brought lawsuits against the municipality and the preservation board to prevent 
building of the old barrack (TMMOB - Chamber of Architects Istanbul Buyukkent 
Branch, n.d.). On 3 February 2012, a lot of academics from Architecture and Urban 
Planning departments of several universities applied to the Preservation Board for the 
registration of Gezi Park as cultural property to be protected (“‘Taksim Gezi Parki 
Korunsun!’ Basvurusu,” 2012). In the meantime, initiatives of Taksim Solidarity and 
Taksim Platform3 were established, both of which were aiming to protect Gezi Park. 
                                                          
1 The 19th-century Ottoman Artillery Barrack. Topcu Barrack was built in 1806 during Selim III. After 
1921, Topcu Barrack was used as stadium. The barrack was demolished in 1940 in order to turn the 
area into an urban park i.e. Gezi Park according to the plan of Henri Prost, a French planner who aimed 
at modernizing Istanbul (Birsel, 2011). Nearby Armenian cemetery was destroyed in 1939 and a part of 
it included in Gezi Park according to Prost’s plan. 
2 On 9 February 2011, the first decision about Topcu Barrack, also referred as Taksim Barrack, was 
taken by the Istanbul’s number II Cultural and Natural Heritage Preservation Board, a board of the 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism (Istanbul Cultural and Natural Heritage Preservation Board II, 2011). 
The board registered the barrack as cultural property to be protected and decided reconstruction of the 
barrack in integration with urban design projects regarding Taksim Square. On 1 June 2011, Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that Topcu Barrack, which is demolished by single-party 
government of CHP (Republican People's Party) without considering its historical value, will be 
reconstructed (“Erdogan Istanbul, Izmir ve Diyarbakir projelerini acikladi,” 2011). On 16 September 
2011, the Istanbul Municipal Council approved the change in master plan to reconstruct the barrack by 
unanimous vote (IBB, 2011). On 14 February 2012, the Municipality declared the new master plan 
regarding the Taksim Square Pedestrianization Project. On 23 August 2012 Kalyon Building got the 
tender of the project. (Ayata et al., 2013, p. 3) On 5 November 2012 first construction works started in 
Taksim Square (IBB, 2012). 
3 Taksim Platform was established in early 2012, and its first press meeting was held on 17 January 
2012 (“Taksim'i Yayalastirma(ma) Projesi,” 2012). Taksim Solidarity was established on 2 March 2012 
upon call of the Chamber of Architects Istanbul Buyukkent Branch to protect Taksim square and Gezi 
Park (TMMOB - Chamber of Architecs Istanbul Buyukkent Branch, 2012). It was an initiative with 
many components including Taksim Platform, political parties (CHP, BDP (Peace and Democracy 
Party), TKP (Communist Party of Turkey), Workers’ Party), Istanbul’s chambers of professionals 
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These two initiatives organized many activities including petitions, protests, marches 
and press briefings after they were established.  This was followed by the inception of 
the Stand Up for Taksim Gezi Park campaign organized by Taksim Gezi Parki 
Dernegi4 in March 2013. The campaigners interviewed with celebrities, journalists and 
writers who opposed demolishing the Gezi Park and broadcasted their videos on 
Youtube (Taksim Gezi Parki Dernegi, 2013). On 13 April 2013, the campaigners 
organized a festival with shows and concerts in Gezi Park to protect the park (“Taksim 
Gezi icin Ayaga Kalktilar,” 2013). 
However, construction vehicles entered Gezi Park on 27 May 2013 to cut down 
the trees in the park in order to start the reconstruction of the old barrack. A group of 
protesters with environmentalist concerns staged a sit-in and prevented the vehicles 
from operating. Afterwards, protesters set up tents and started guarding the park. On 
28 May 2013, BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) deputy Sirri Sureyya Onder and 
CHP’s (Republican People’s Party) vice president Gursel Tekin visited the park and 
announced their support for the protests.  
On the 28 of May, the police used tear gas to disperse the protesters in Gezi 
Park yet the sit-in continued and more protesters participated into the protests day by 
day (“Gezi Parki'nda direnise polis mudahalesi,” 2013).  On 31 May 2013, the protest 
movement spreaded outside the Gezi Park. In many districts of Istanbul and in other 
cities in Turkey, protests and marches were organized to support the Gezi Park 
protests. Turkey witnessed one of the largest protest movements in its history that 
continued for months and challenged the political authority. During the protests many 
people injured and six people, including a police, were killed.5 
First, the protesters were environmentalists and members of organizations that 
are against the building of Topcu Barrack in Gezi Park. Later, the protests went beyond 
a local protest and turned into a general political protest against government with the 
engagement of parliament members, academics, celebrities, students, ethnic groups, 
gender based activists, political groups and fans of football teams. Different and even 
opposite groups, which do not compromise in general, came together and stayed 
                                                          
(architects, city planners, doctors, and engineers), different labor unions, different environmentalist, 
feminist, and queer organizations, and many regional associations  
4 This association is also referred as Taksim Gezi Parki Koruma ve Guzellestirme Dernegi. It was 
established in early 2013. 
5 Ethem Sarisuluk, Mehmet Ayvalitas, Abdullah Comert, Ali Ismail Korkmaz, Mustafa Sari (Police 
officer), Berkin Elvan (Died on 11 March 2014 after 269 days in coma) 
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together in Gezi Park. In the end, the Gezi Park protests turned into a political carnival, 
i.e. a ‘new social movement’ with an unprecedented heterogeneous social 
composition.  
 
1.1. The Gezi Park protests: a radical democratic imaginary? 
The protests, starting with a small group with environmentalist concerns, have 
gone beyond a local protest against building up of the old barrack in Gezi Park and 
turned into massive anti-governmental protest. The groups that one would think would 
never come together actually came together in the Gezi Park. Kurds, Alevis, feminists, 
queer groups, socialists, liberals, Kemalist nationalists, football fans and anti-capitalist 
Muslims were all present in the protests. What is said to be impossible happened in 
Gezi Park. Groups that have very fundamental antagonisms stayed together such as 
the Kemalist nationalists and Kurdish movement members, feminists and football fans 
who use a sexist language, the bourgeois and the workers, liberals and socialists. 
Although there was a multiplicity of the groups in Gezi Park, it cannot be said that all 
the segments of the society joined the protest. Those who did not join the protests were 
mainly the AK Party supporters. Considering that the majority of the AK Party 
supporters are conservatives, they did not join the protests while people from almost 
all other sectors of society joined. It is true that the anti-capitalist Muslims joined the 
Gezi Park protests. However, they were far from representing the main body of 
conservatives in Turkey.  
In the Gezi Park protests, in addition to plurality of the participants there was 
a plurality of the forms of participation. Some protesters joined the sit-in in Gezi Park 
and stayed in the park peacefully. There were organizations in the park and they set up 
their stands, distributed leaflets introducing themselves. Many of the protesters in the 
park were unorganized and they stayed in the park creating a solidarity with each other. 
In addition, there happened protests, sit-ins and marches outside the Gezi Park in many 
districts of Istanbul and in other cities. Some participated in the protests using social 
media and some others participated by banging pots and pans to make noise. On the 
other hand, there were also some protesters who were more aggressive and often 
clashed with the police and they marched towards Prime Minister’s Office in 
Dolmabahce with an aim to occupy it.  
After Gezi Park was evacuated, another form of participation emerged in the 
forums that were organized in other parks of Istanbul and in other cities. Forums were 
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the places that participants discussed their ideas to map out a route to maintain the 
protests. Although Gezi Park was evacuated and closed to the protesters after twenty 
days, protests and different reactions continued in other places for months. The Gezi 
Park protests stayed in the country’s agenda for months.  
It is evident that the Gezi Park protests may be registered as one of the rare 
instances of recent Turkish political history. The protests started with a small group 
willing to protect Gezi Park but turned into massive movement challenging the 
political authority. That the Gezi Park protests included protesters having quite diverse 
and opposing political identities and that protesters developed some unseen forms of 
resistance also make the protests unprecedented.  
This research aims to examine the Gezi Park protests to understand both its 
successes and failures. I will mainly try to search the hegemonic capacity of the 
protests to understand how so many diverse groups with such different backgrounds 
and aims came and stayed together for a couple of weeks on the streets of many cities 
in Turkey. I will also try explain how Gezi Park protests, which started as a local 
protest with some limited demands first turned to become an anti-government mass 
movement shaking the whole country with participation of millions and then 
disappeared in a few months. 
As a theoretical approach, I benefit from social movement theories in general 
in their conceptualization of new forms of political identities as ‘new social 
movement’ and their discussions of different movements under this name. The concept 
of new social movement is used to denote struggles that are distinct from being 
working class oriented and revolutionary. (Cohen, 1985; Habermas, 1981; Touraine, 
1985; Offe, 1985; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). New social movements group together 
diverse range of struggles: peace, feminist, queer, ecological, anti-racist, ethnic, 
regional, student and anti-authoritarian movements. Instead of forming unions or 
political parties, new social movements form collective identity and targets “civil 
society” (Cohen, 1985; Offe, 1985; Touraine, 1985; Melucci, 1994). Despite new 
social movements appear outside the institutional politics, they take place in the 
political space and conduct a political struggle that demands from the authority. 
Specifically I preferred to use the theories of Laclau and Mouffe to understand the 
Gezi Park events. This is because, the discursive approach of Laclau and Mouffe 
avoids essentialism by analyzing the social field as a discourse. 
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According to Laclau and Mouffe, discourse is the terrain in which every 
‘object’ is constituted (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 107).  By the discourse they do 
not simply mean what is said or written but something which refers to all practices, 
institutions and social relations (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 109). Discourse is a 
system of meaning, wherein elements are positioned differentially. It is argued that 
discourse is cannot be a sutured totality because all differences within the discourse 
are contingent and they all are subject to change (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 111). 
The final suture of any discourse is impossible, Laclau and Mouffe argue, because any 
and every discourse is characterized by an antagonism, that is, failure of difference 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 125). However antagonism threatens and affirms the 
existence of a discourse at the same time (Laclau, 1990, p. 27). It becomes a condition 
for the constitution of a discourse by showing exclusively what it is not. As such, 
antagonism, in Laclau and Mouffe’s approach is that which both establishes the limits 
of a discourse by reference to something negative yet threatens the very existence of a 
discourse by showing its contingency.  
Applying this logic to the social field, Laclau and Mouffe mainly deal with the 
ontology of the social and investigate the construction of meanings and identities 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). According to them, the social is constituted through 
political struggles. They analyze the social movements as political struggles that have 
capacity to constitute the social field and transform social relations (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985). In the social movements, groups with different unsatisfied demands 
get together and establish an equivalential link (Laclau, 2005, p. 93). In this 
aggregation of different groups, there is an internal antagonism that eliminates their 
differences by equating them and threatens their existence as a unity by showing their 
contingency, conflicts and contradictions. Frontiers of a social movement, they claim, 
are drawn according to what is included in the equivalential link i.e. ‘we’ and what is 
excluded i.e. ‘other’. Laclau set forth that during the social movements the power is 
constructed as an antagonistic force (Laclau, 2005, p. 74).  However, this negative 
formation of the frontier is not sufficient to change social relations. Hegemony can be 
achieved only if positive construction follows from the negativity. This positive 
construction corresponds to unifying of these groups around a name i.e. collective 
identity. It is only after this unification, new relations and differences among them is 
established and social relations can be transformed (Laclau, 1990). 
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Laclau and Mouffe consider social relations as power relations (Laclau, 1990) 
and they see an emancipatory possibility in the political struggles because they can 
transform existing social relations (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).  Political struggles can 
aggregate diversity of democratic demands including that of the underdogs who do not 
have a representation in the existing power relations. They define and offer this as a 
radical democratic imaginary. However according to them political struggles are not 
always emancipatory, they might lead to fascist ways too. This depends on the 
hegemonic struggle given in the process and how the frontiers of ‘we’ and ‘other’ is 
defined (Mouffe, 2005). 
In this regard, I will try to investigate what kind of political struggle is 
conducted during the Gezi Park protests. For each participant group, unsatisfied 
demands within the existing social relations in Turkey will be analyzed. How these 
separate and contrary groups stayed together in the park will be scrutinized. What were 
the protesters struggling against and how was the constitutive other of the protests was 
defined will be discussed. What were their problems with the government will be 
searched. Rhetorical mechanisms to mask the intrinsic antagonisms and to project 
them to government will be explored. The study will also evaluate hegemonic capacity 
of the Gezi Park protests. What kind of political subjectivity was formed during the 
protests and what it proposed to change in social fabric of Turkey will be searched. 
What was the meaning of the protests, what do the protesters offer to constitute the 
positivity of the social and to what extent it was successful will be asked. Whether the 
multiplicity in protests enrich the political space and have emancipatory potential and 
whether this is possible by exclusion of conservatives will be questioned.  
 
1.2. Method 
Discourse analytical approach deals with meaning and identities, therefore 
grasping and capturing the meaning is required for analysis. For this reason, 
observation of the protests or evaluating the results is not sufficient, rather an 
investigation into the protest discourse is necessary. In this study, I adopt a qualitative 
research method which includes conducting of in-depth interviews. I also refer to 
written sources, news and previously conducted surveys about the Gezi Park protests. 
The scope of this study is limited to the discourse of the protesters therefore only the 
persons who joined the protests have been interviewed. The semi-structured in-depth 
interviews are conducted with protesters. I assume the protest period started on 27 May 
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2013 and continued until the clearing of Gezi Park on 15 June 2013. I consider all the 
protests during the period in Gezi Park, in other parts of Istanbul and in other cities of 
Turkey, which should be assumed as a part of the Gezi Park events. People joined the 
protests by going to the park, by using social media or banging pots and pans to make 
noise. Therefore, among the interviewees there are ones who are from other cities and 
who joined by diverse methods. The interviews are conducted with protesters two 
years after the protests took place, between May 2015 and August 2015. In order to 
reflect the diversity of the protesters I interviewed protesters from different identity 
groups: Kemalist nationalists, professionals, anti-capitalist Muslims, leftists, Kurds, 
Alevis and gender based activists. By the interviews, I sought to understand the driving 
forces of the people to join the protests. Against what were they protesting? What were 
their problems with the government and what unsatisfied demands had they had during 
the rule of the government? What they aim by demonstrating and what they demand 
to establish through their struggle? Other than protests, I also investigate and analyze 
their ideas about Erdogan, the AK Party, conservatives, and Turkish politics in general. 
 
1.3. Literature on Gezi Park protests 
Hundreds of articles, books, surveys, commentaries, columns, theses and 
interviews were published on the Gezi Park events. Also, there are many visual 
materials such as magazines collecting photos of the protests, short films and 
documentaries. Many of the materials are descriptive and give the account of the 
course of the events or include the personal stories and experiences of the activists. 
There are also scholarly works analyzing the events with regards to media (Yilmaz, 
2013; Altinoz, 2014; Balikci, 2014; Bulduruc, 2014; Taneri, 2014; Tanis, 2014; 
Gunaydin, 2015; Kabas, 2015; Karkin et. al., 2015; Kilic, 2015; Nuran, 2015; Ozel 
and Deniz, 2015), architecture (Gul et. al, 2014), urbanization (Gokay and Sahin, 
2013; Gole, 2013; Sezer, 2013; Gogus, 2014; Ilter, 2014; Dorroll, 2015; Koyuncu 
2015), art (Firat, 2014; Tas and Tas, 2014), culture (Gurel, 2015), psychology 
(Kaptanoglu, 2013), gender (Bedir and Bedir, 2013; Batur, 2014; Canli and Umul, 
2015), environment and international relations (Oguzlu, 2013; Erdogan, 2014). There 
are some works that analyze the social and political dimensions. Here, I will evaluate 
these scholarly works and show where my thesis is situated and how it differs from 
the existing studies. 
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Starting with the surveys, there is one work by Konda (2013), which was 
conducted in Gezi Park with 4411 protesters on 6-7 June 2013 during the protests 
(Konda, 2013). The survey concludes that the average age of the participants are 
younger and the average education level of them are higher compared to average of 
Turkey. 45 percent of the protesters never joined a demonstration before. It is 
understood from the survey that most of the protesters were CHP supporters (41 %), 
and only a few of them were the AK Party supporters (0.3 %). 49.1 percent of the 
participant protesters said that they joined the protests because of the police violence 
and 19 percent said that they joined the protests because of cutting of trees. 14.2 
percent came to the park after hearing Prime Minister Erdogan’s statements, according 
to the survey.  The survey also found that most of the participants (34.1 %) protested 
for their liberties. Evaluating this survey, it can be seen that it is limited to the 
protesters in Gezi Park and it provides important demographic information about the 
protesters in the park. However, for the reasons and aims for protesting, the 
alternatives seem to be imposed.  For example, alternatives of answer to the question 
‘Why you are in the park?’ are:  for liberties, demand for rights, for peace and 
democracy and against dictatorship. Another research was published by SAMER 
(Strategical Research Center) which was conducted in December 2013 in Istanbul and 
Izmir with 3944 participants (Yoruk, 2014a). The survey asserts that there was over 
16 percent participation in Gezi protests in Istanbul, corresponding to almost 1.5 
million protesters. The research also argues that class is not an explanatory variable 
for the Gezi protesters. Because rates of different income groups in Gezi was close to 
that of general population. The survey also gives information regarding participation 
of Kurds into the Gezi protests. The rates of Kurds to total number of Gezi protesters, 
the research found out, was very close to the rate of Kurdish population to total 
population of Istanbul and Izmir. It is also understood that the Kurds who joined the 
Gezi protests were aligned themselves with the left and they were less pious and 
younger than the general population. In a different article which is based on the same 
SAMER research, Yoruk and Yuksel conclude that for the Gezi protesters rather they 
main triggers were cultural and political not economical (Yoruk and Yuksel, 2014). 
Another survey based research about the Gezi protests is made by Bilgic and Kafkasli 
(Bilgic and Kafkasli, 2013). They conducted the survey online, on Twitter, and they 
conclude that the protesters were young people protesting not only for the trees but 
also for their freedom and they demanded deliberative democracy. However, the 
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reliability of the survey seems rather weak. Because it was conducted online, and it 
was not mentioned how they overcome the restrictive conditions such as the repeating 
participation and the socio-cultural similarity of the respondents. Further, there is 
contextual manipulation and the alternatives are imposed upon respondents. For 
example, there is one question, ‘How do you define yourself?’ with 28 choices, and 
the choice “I am libertarian” gets the most of the votes. This method is applied for all 
questions regarding the reason of participation, demands and expectations.  
The Making of a Protest Movement in Turkey #occupygezi (2014) edited by 
Umut Ozkirimli is an example to the books written in the field. It mainly consists of a 
collection of articles published in jadaliyya.com. The foreword is written by Judith 
Butler. She emphasizes that today many states present securitarianism as a necessity 
for liberal democracy but securitarianism can make a state authoritarian as in the 
example of Turkey. According to her, Gezi is an experience of direct democracy that 
questioned the legitimacy of the state. In the Introduction, Ozkirimli writes that the 
Gezi protests were an opposition to the authoritarian tendencies of the AKP. He states 
they aim, not to analyze the dynamics of Gezi, but to name, direct and give a goal to 
this struggle. He explains that the spirit of Gezi is not a uniform identity but something 
that is continuously negotiated, tested and renewed. In the book, there are articles 
claiming that the government is institutionalizing neoliberalism (Igsiz, 2014), the AKP 
government relies upon the Gulenist idea of democratic authoritarianism (Tugal, 2014) 
and Gezi is a new horizontal politics that rejects hierarchy and organization (Gambetti, 
2014). Evaluating the book in general, most of the writers use post-structuralist 
theories and they deal with Gezi as something that has the potential of democracy and 
freedom against an authoritarian government. Most of the analysis focus on the 
government. Their evaluate Gezi as something that is leaderless, unorganized, 
horizontal and heterogeneous and dignify all these aspects of the protests rather than 
identifying the meaning of the protests. Another example is Direnisi Dusunmek (2013) 
edited by Volkan Celebi and Ahmet Soysal. The work consists of articles dealing with 
Gezi as something revolutionary that turns what previously was conceived as 
impossible into possible (Celebi and Soysal, 2013). The book includes letters by Jean-
Luc Nancy and Alain Badiou during the protests. Nancy argues that Gezi is a departure 
towards the ‘people’. Badiou states Gezi is an uprising including the students and 
intellectual but it should also include workers, officers and housewives in order to be 
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against capitalism. Letters of both are points to a potential in Gezi rather than analyzing 
the protests. 
Continuing with the articles, there are works that try to determine what the 
reasons of the protests were and what previous events lead to the Gezi Park protests 
(Celikkol, 2014; Yoruk, 2014b; Abbas, 2013). According to Celikkol, burning of the 
tents was shocking and unexpected act from the government and explained it as a 
dislocating act. Abbas says that protesters were opposing AK Party’s policy on 
neoliberalism, privatization, urbanization and authoritarianism. He adds that AK Party 
mishandled the process and it escalated the events. There are works that dignifies Gezi 
because there was a plurality and it does not represented by a universal identity and 
always in state of becoming. (Karayali and Yaka, 2014; Eken, 2014; Ors and Turan, 
2015) There is also a work by the Institute of Strategic Thinking that claims Gezi 
turned into an attempt for coup d’etat however analyses does not depend on a research 
data but columns and articles in the media (SDE, 2013).  
The existing studies on the Gezi protests mostly focuses on the reasons of the 
protests and the conditions that lead the emergence of the protests. They mostly 
analyze the protests as a reaction to “authoritarian” or “neoliberal policies” of the AK 
Party government. However, they do not investigate what change the protests offer in 
social relations. This study mainly will focus on what the Gezi protests offer in its 
multiplicity and will be grounded by a fieldwork. 
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CHAPTER II 
DISCOURSE THEORY 
 
In this chapter I will give an account of discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe 
by highlighting its relation with social movements. I will begin by examining 
foundations of their theory. Subsequently, I will investigate roots of their approach in 
Marxism, Foucault, Derrida and Lacan. Lastly, I will investigate their main concepts 
which are antagonism, subject, hegemony and the political. 
The discourse analytical theory of Laclau and Mouffe brings a new and 
different approach to the social. By discourse, they do not only refer to what is said or 
written but also refer to practices, institutions and social relations (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985, p. 109). They analyze the social as a discursive field a system of meaning 
wherein objects are positioned differentially and relationally. No discourse is stable, 
closed totality; yet established relations among elements of a discourse are always 
subject to change. Their main focus is on the constitution of the social as a discursive 
space and they assert that it is constituted through political struggles. In other words, 
in political struggles, they see a potential to transform social relations. 
For a discourse, limits are necessary in order to construct it as a totality and to 
differentiate it from others. What is beyond the limit is not something objective and 
positive but something negative: antagonism. Limit of a discourse shows itself as a 
negative reference to the antagonism. Antagonism shows the impossibility of final 
suture for a discourse and threatens the existence of a discourse (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985, p. 125). Similarly, the limit of the social is given within the social as something 
subverting itself, not allowing it to constitute a full presence (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985, p. 127). On the other hand, considering that all meanings and identities are 
relational, antagonism is needed for true construction of a discourse by showing 
exclusively what it is not. Some categories are excluded from a certain discourse to 
form the antagonism (Laclau, 1996a, p. 39). Through the antagonism, it becomes 
possible to distinguish a totality with regards to something external to it (Laclau, 1990, 
p. 21). Appealing to Zizek, this implicit negativity for a certain social formation is 
masked and projected to some figures that embody it (Zizek, 1989). Therefore, 
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antagonism becomes a constitutive outside that both threatens and affirms the 
existence of a discourse simultaneously. 
In dealing with the constitution of the social, the central category of Laclau and 
Mouffe is hegemony. This is the relation that a particular difference assumes the 
representation of an incommensurable totality i.e. discourse, society (Laclau, 2005a, 
p. 70). Hegemony is the situation through which the management of the positivity of 
the social is achieved (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 189). The political struggles are 
given in order to establish hegemony. 
 
2.1. Foundations 
The discourse analytical theory of Laclau and Mouffe rejects essentialist 
universalism. Essentialism refers to the presumption that the social is organized around 
certain principles (Sayyid and Zac, 1998). Laclau and Mouffe refuse the idea of 
underlying principles and assert that social reality is constructed through meanings and 
identities.  
Because Laclau and Mouffe analyze the social through discourse, some 
criticized them for being idealist (Geras, 1987; Woodiwis, 1990). However, they 
refuse the perception of discourse as mental and they affirm the material character of 
every discursive structure. Discourse is not purely linguistic phenomena but it is 
constituted by the articulation that “pierce the entire material density of the 
multifarious institutions, rituals and practices” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 109).  
According to theory of Laclau and Mouffe, rhetorical mechanisms assumed to 
constitute the anatomy of the social world (Laclau, 2005a, p. 110). Their adoption of 
discursivity allows the interpenetration of the categories, which have been excluded 
before, which can explain social relations, “Synonymy, metonymy, metaphor are not 
forms of thought that add a second sense to a primary, constitutive literality of social 
relations; instead, they are part of the primary terrain itself in which the social is 
constituted” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 110). 
 
2.2. Roots 
In this section I will investigate the roots of the discourse analytical theory of 
Laclau and Mouffe that resides in Marxist tradition, Derridean deconstruction and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
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2.2.1. Post Marxism 
In this section I will investigate the relation of Laclau and Mouffe with Marxist 
tradition. This will help to understand how they develop their theories regarding new 
social movements and new collective identities. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 
Laclau and Mouffe do a deconstruction of Marxist literature by evaluating their 
theories and the practices. They reject assumption of social division around class and 
assert that there are many social antagonisms belonging to contemporary societies 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). According to Laclau and Mouffe, socialism gives a 
centrality to working class, which does not provide meaningful framework to explain 
the social phenomena, especially after the emergence of new social movements. 
Starting with contributions of Gramsci, Laclau and Mouffe takes the concept 
of hegemony from him. Gramsci undertook a critique of economism in Marxism to 
develop this concept. He asserted that bourgeois hegemony is based on voluntary 
consent and in order to create a new hegemony there must be a struggle over not only 
economic forces but also political, ideological and cultural forces (Gramsci, 1971). 
However, according to Laclau and Mouffe, there are essentialist approaches in 
Gramsci’s thought since he assumes a single unifying principle for hegemonic 
formation and he has a naturalist conception of the economic space (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985, p. 69). Therefore, Laclau and Mouffe radicalize the concept of 
hegemony by asserting the plurality of political spaces and existence of antagonisms.  
Althusser formulates society as a ‘complex structured whole’ and asserts 
overdetermination of identity that assert fixing of identity is not possible and it is 
always determined by economy, politics, ideology and culture (Althusser, 1969). He 
uses the notion of overdetermination appealing to Freud and opens Marxism to 
psychoanalysis. However, Althusser retains the idea of determination in the last 
instance by the economy and this is criticized by Laclau and Mouffe (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985, p. 98). Laclau and Mouffe radicalize his idea of overdetermination by 
abandoning the priority given to economy and they also develop their theories further 
by applying to psychoanalysis. 
 
2.2.2. Derrida 
Some aspects of discourse analytical theory of Laclau and Mouffe resides in 
Derridean deconstruction. Their approaches of discursivity, anti-essentialism, 
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constitutive other, impossibility of the closure of the social, impossibility of fixing 
system of meanings and precarious character of every identity has its roots in Derrida. 
Derrida influenced by Saussure (1974) who asserted in his theory of 
signification that that language is a system of signification which is formed 
differentially and relationally. In addition, there is no necessary but purely arbitrary 
relation between the signifier and the signified (Saussure, 1974). However, Saussure 
ends up being structuralist and concludes that all differences constitute a linguistic 
structure, a closed totality. Derrida also says system of meaning is formed 
differentially and relationally, but he disapproves Saussure’s idea of closed totality 
(Derrida, 1967). He asserts that any system and any meaning is incomplete, there are 
other possibilities which are postponed. In constitution of meaning, he defines his 
concept of differance, which is combination of difference and deferral, and refers 
meaning is the result of play of differences and there are other possibilities that are 
suppressed and postponed. Derrida concludes that system of meanings has open, 
precarious character and they need an externality to be constructed: constitutive other. 
It is only by constitutive other, partial closure of the system becomes possible.  
Laclau and Mouffe follows Derrida and assert that “any discursive formation 
is never a fully sutured totality, it always has an open and contingent character” 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 106). They approve that every social identity has an open 
character: 
There is no social identity fully protected from a discursive exterior that 
deforms it and prevents it becoming fully sutured. Both the identities and 
the relations lose their necessary character. As a systematic structural 
ensemble, the relations are unable to absorb the identities; but as the 
identities are purely relational, this is but another way of saying that there 
is no identity which can be fully constituted. (...)The incomplete 
character of every totality necessarily leads us to abandon, as a terrain of 
analysis, the premise of 'society' as a sutured and self-defined totality. 
'Society' is not a valid object of discourse (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 
110-111). 
 
Laclau and Mouffe also apply Derrida’s ideas to the social and political field. 
After assuming open character of the social, they investigate constitution of the social 
field and assert antagonism as constitutive other. They also say that because the social 
has an open character it is always subject to subversion, change and transform. This is 
where the political struggles come into play, impossibility of closure of the social 
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becomes a possibility of new projects aiming reconstruction of social identities 
(Laclau, 1990).  
 
2.2.3. Lacanian psychoanalysis 
Discursive theory of Laclau and Mouffe have its roots in psychoanalytical 
approach of Lacan. They also appeal to works of contemporary Lacanian theorists 
Zizek and Copjec. Laclau says psychoanalysis do not only deal with ontology of the 
subject however describes the general field of ontology, then uses it to the field of 
social ontology (Laclau, 2005, p. 114). Lacanian real, nodal point, aspiration to 
fullness and objet petit a are important tools in Laclau and Mouffe’s approach. 
Lacan categorizes three order to describe psychoanalytical phenomena, 
symbolic order, imaginary order and the real. The symbolic order refers to set of 
differential signifiers, while the real emerges as what “resists symbolization 
absolutely” (Lacan, 1988, p. 66). The real is the impossible kernel that cannot be 
integrated into the symbolic order (Lacan, 1977). This Lacanian real is translated as 
antagonism in Laclau and Mouffe’s approach. The social field is founded on notion of 
antagonism, original ‘trauma’ that resists symbolic integration and prevents closure of 
the social field (Zizek, 1989, p. 5-6). 
In Lacanian psychoanalysis there are privileged points that quilt the signifying 
chain i.e. nodal points. Nodal points is “the signifier stops the otherwise endless 
movement of the signification” (Lacan, 1977). Nodal points produces the necessary 
illusion of a fixed meaning. Laclau and Mouffe adopts this concept and assert that 
nodal points fix the flow of differences and construct a center in constitution of a 
discourse: 
Even in order to differ, to subvert meaning, there has to be a meaning. If 
the social does not manage to fix itself in the intelligible and instituted 
forms of a society, the social only exists, however, as an effort to 
construct that impossible object. Any discourse is constituted as an 
attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of 
differences, to construct a center. We will call the privileged discursive 
points of this partial fixation, nodal points. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 
112). 
 
Laclau uses nodal point as interchangeably with object petit a (Laclau, 2005, 
p. 103). In Lacanian theory, object petit a is the partial object to which aspiration to 
the fullness i.e. jouissance is transferred. Aspiration to the fullness refers to mythical 
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wholeness of the mother/child dyad6 which is always aspired and to which a jouissance 
i.e. enjoyment is attached (Copjec, 2002, p. 36). Any unfulfilled demand, any 
privation, any lack both dislocates and evokes that fullness. Jouissance to the fullness 
is not lost after separating mother because traces of it transferred in objet petit a 
(Copjec, 2002). Copjec says about the nature of this relation that object petit a becomes 
itself a totality and source of enjoyment (Copjec, 2002). In this relation, objet petit a 
does not act as a representative of the inaccessible Thing but what Lacan defined as 
sublimation occurs: the elevation of an ordinary object to the dignity of the Thing 
(Copjec, 2002). Therefore, object petit a is substituted for the Thing. The logic of the 
objet petit a is identical with logic of hegemony in discourse theory, as Laclau puts: 
The mythical wholeness of the mother/child dyad corresponds to the 
unachieved fullness evoked — as its opposite — by the dislocations 
brought about by the unfulfilled demands. The aspiration to that fullness 
or wholeness does not, however, simply disappear; it is transferred to 
partial objects which are the objects of the drives. In political terms, that 
is exactly what I have called a hegemonic relation: a certain particularity 
which assumes the role of an impossible universality. Because the partial 
character of these objects does not result from a particular story but is 
inherent in the very structure of signification, Lacan's objet petit a is the 
key element in a social ontology. The whole is always going to be 
embodied by a part. In terms of our analysis: there is no universality 
which is not a hegemonic one (Laclau, 2005a, p. 115). 
 
As Zizek asserts, objet petit a embodying the whole and substituting the Thing 
is only possible retroactive effect of naming (Zizek, 1989). Similarly in the discursive 
theory, identities are grounded in the performative dimension of naming. What gives 
the unity of a discursive formation is the name of the nodal point i.e. objet petit a 
(Laclau, 2005a).  
Laclau asserts that this transition, naming of objet petit a that embodies the 
whole, portrays a ‘radical investment’. It is an investment because it belongs to the 
order of affect as in being in love, or feeling hatred and it constitutes itself only through 
the differential cathexes of a signifying chain (2005a, p. 110). Investment in the name 
of object petit a is a process in which the object is sublimated and idealized. 
“Investment in the object of love means that the narcissistic libido overflows on to the 
object. This can take various forms or show various degrees, their common 
                                                          
6 This has its roots in Lacanian primordial duality. “Psychoanalysis rewrites this mythical state as the 
primordial mother - child dyad, which supposedly contained all things and every happiness and to which 
the subject strives throughout life to return”(Copjec, 2002, p. 32). 
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denominator being the idealization of the object, which thus becomes immune to 
criticism.” (2005a, p. 55) 
In Laclau and Mouffe’s theory constitution of the social is possible only 
through the hegemonic logic, a part embodying the whole. During political struggles 
groups with unsatisfied demands get together and there established an equivalential 
chain among these demands. This chain of equivalence is signified by a demand that 
gains centrality i.e. popular demand. This popular demand functions as Lacanian 
master signifier, signifier without signified that represents the whole signifying chain. 
Laclau refers to this popular demand, which both represents and constitutes an 
equivalential chain, as empty signifier. The empty signifier “means that there is a place, 
within the system of signification, which is constitutively irrepresentable; in that sense 
it remains empty, but this is an emptiness which I can signify because we are dealing 
with a void within signification” (2005a, p.  105). Empty signifier is a void within 
signification because it is what constitutes that system as a totality, it embodies that 
mythical fullness in its own particularity. During popular struggles, naming this empty 
signifier is crucial that collective identities are constituted by the performative act of 
naming. 
 
2.3. Main concepts 
In this part I will investigate main concepts of Laclau and Mouffe which are 
antagonism, subject, hegemony and priority of the political. 
 
2.3.1. Antagonism 
Antagonism is a key concept in Laclau and Mouffe’s analysis of the social. 
Antagonism, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 128-129) argues, establishes itself as the limit 
of the social. It is a discursive form and ‘experience’ of vanity of deferring the 
‘transcendental signifieds’ (society et. al.), the final impossibility of any stable 
difference and of any ‘objectivity’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 122). Insofar as there 
is antagonism, no object can be full presence for itself; antagonism is a symbol of 
object’s non-being (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 125). If language is a system of 
differences, antagonism is a failure of difference (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 125). 
On the other hand, antagonism is also required for the constitution of an object, identity 
or discourse. Because all identity is relational, antagonism becomes a condition of 
existence and a constitutive other for an identity by showing exclusively what it is not 
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(Laclau, 1990). It becomes possible to distinguish a totality with regards to something 
external to it i.e. antagonism (Laclau, 1990, p. 21).  
There are variety of possible antagonisms in the social, many of them in 
opposition to one another. The chains of equivalence will vary radically according to 
which antagonism is involved (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 131). 
In order to understand the logic of antagonism, I will also make use of Zizek’s 
fantasy. He assumes Laclau and Mouffe’s notion of antagonism and take a step further 
to explain how antagonism is masked. He wrote: 
The notion of social fantasy is therefore a necessary counterpart to the 
concept of antagonism: fantasy is precisely the way the antagonistic 
fissure is masked. In other words, fantasy is a means for an ideology to 
take its own failure into account in advance. The thesis of Laclau and 
Mouffe that 'Society doesn't exist', that the Social is always an 
inconsistent field structured around a constitutive impossibility, 
traversed by a central 'antagonism' - this thesis implies that every process 
of identification conferring on us a fixed socio-symbolic identity is 
ultimately doomed to fail. The function of ideological fantasy is to mask 
this inconsistency, the fact that 'Society doesn't exist', and thus to 
compensate us for the failed identification. (Zizek, 1989, p. 142). 
 
He asserts that certain figures, in their positive presence, becomes 
representative of this impossibility (Zizek, 1989, p. 142). In this thesis by appealing to 
Lacanian distinction of real and symbolic, I will refer Laclau and Mouffe’s antagonism 
as real antagonism and Zizek’s fantasy as symbolic antagonism. 
 
2.3.2. Subject  
According to discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, the subject is neither the 
origin of social relations, nor a rational unified agent (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 
115). The subject is penetrated by overdetermination (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 
121).  
In his early writings, Laclau assumed subject as a complete entity that fills the 
gaps within the undecidable structure with one’s decisions. After Zizek’s critique and 
contributions, Laclau modified this conception of subject and approved there is a split 
implicit in the subject. Zizek states on subject and identity: 
[I]t is not the external enemy who is preventing me from achieving 
identity with myself, but every identity is already in itself blocked, 
marked by an impossibility, and the external enemy is simply the small 
piece, the rest of reality upon which we "project" or "externalize" this 
intrinsic, immanent impossibility' (Zizek, 2005, p. 252).  
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Later, Laclau wrote, “The negativity of the other which is preventing me from 
achieving my full identity with myself is just an externalization of my own auto-
negativity, of my self-hindering” (Laclau, 1990, p. 252-253). The antagonistic force 
in this way embodies the blockage of the full constitution of an identity. 
 
2.3.3. Hegemony 
Hegemony is the other central concept of Laclau and Mouffe. They take this 
concept from Gramsci and radicalize it. In their theory, hegemony is the political 
process of constituting empty signifier of a community. It is the operation in which 
“one difference -without ceasing to be a particular difference- assumes the 
representation of an incommensurable totality” (Laclau, 2005a, p. 70). Hegemony is 
basically metonymical relationship that “its effects always emerge from a surplus of 
meaning which results from an operation of displacement” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 
p. 141).  
Hegemonic struggles articulate particular demands of different groups to create 
chains of equivalence against antagonism (Laclau and Mouffe, 2005). Laclau refers to 
these particular demands as floating signifiers whose meaning is ‘suspended’ in a 
sense that their meaning is indeterminate between different equivalential frontiers 
(Laclau, 2005a, p. 131). Hegemony can only be achieved when the whole equivalential 
chain is represented by a particular demand which functions as an empty signifier. 
Laclau calls this particular demand which embodies that totality as popular demand. 
During popular struggles, naming the popular demand is crucial that collective 
identities are constituted by this performative act of naming. 
 
2.3.4. The priority of the political 
In Laclau and Mouffe’s theory there is an analytical distinction between the 
social and the political. They approach the social as a system of difference and 
“sedimented forms of objectivity” (Laclau, 1990: 33) which “never manages to 
constitute itself as an objective order” (1990, p. 18) and “an infinitude not reducible to 
any underlying unitary principle” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 139). They mean “an 
ensemble of empirically given agents” by a given social formation (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985, p. 143). The social is a non-sutured totality and has the character of 
openness, contingency, precariousness, relationality, differentiality, and plurality. 
“The social only exists as a partial effort for constructing society - that is, an objective 
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and closed system of differences”( Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 125). Beyond the 
social there is not a positive differentiation but something negative: antagonism 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 143). Antagonism constitutes the limit of the social and 
“final impossibility of any stable difference and any 'objectivity' (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985, p. 125). Antagonism is the case that “all the differential determinations of a pole 
have dissolved through their negative-equivalential reference to the other pole, each 
one of them shows exclusively what it is not”. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 128). 
Antagonism both threatens and affirms the existence of something simultaneously 
(Laclau, 1990, p. 19). “The moment of antagonism where the undecidable nature of 
the alternatives and their resolution through power relations becomes fully visible 
constitutes the field of the ‘political’” (Laclau, 1990, p. 35). Laclau and Mouffe 
conceive of the political “as having the status of an ontology of the social” (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985, p. xiv). The possibility of the political stems from the impossibility of 
society which can only represent itself through the production of empty signifiers as 
the signifiers of an absent totality (Laclau, 1996a, p. 44). Political aims at the 
constitution of the social and creation of social relations in a field of antagonisms. In 
their approach, the political have the ethical task of “transformation of a social relation 
which constructs a subject in a relationship of subordination” (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985, p.  153). Therefore, the political is both subversive of the existing order and 
constitutive of a new order. This distance between the ontic contents of politics and 
their ability to represent radical fullness is always present, but it becomes particularly 
visible in critical periods when radical shifts and conversions in the public mood are 
quite common (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p.  132). 
Laclau and Mouffe consider that the first of political problems is the production 
of ‘frontier effects’, the referential framework of separation and “the constitution of 
the very identities which will have to confront one another antagonistically” (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985, p. 134). The production of frontier effects is necessary in 
contemporary societies because there is no given or evident frontiers7 and division of 
the social into two antagonistic camps (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p.  134). After the 
                                                          
7 “In the present industrial societies, the very proliferation of widely differing points of rupture, the 
precarious character of all social identity, lead also to a blurring of the frontiers. In consequence, the 
constructed character of the demarcating lines is made more evident by the greater instability of the 
latter, and the displacement of the frontiers and internal divisions of the social become more radical. It 
is in this field and from this perspective that the neo-conservative project acquires all its hegemonic 
dimensions.” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p.  171). 
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democratic revolution8 and complexity and institutionalization due to mature 
capitalism there are “constant processes of displacement of the limits constructing 
social division”, multiplicity of antagonisms and “the essential instability of political 
spaces” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p.  151). Therefore, the political is aimed at the 
constitution of frontiers. Frontiers are constituted at a different level than simple 
referential entity of the agents i.e. the social (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p.  144). What 
makes them coincide is practice of articulation (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p.  144). 
Articulation is the practice of establishing a relationship among elements that modifies 
their identity as a result (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p.  105). Articulation implies that 
the identity of the elements is “never positive and closed in itself but is constituted as 
transition, relation and difference” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p.  95). The connection 
between elements is not fixed but there are articulations. Articulation is an attempt to 
a partial fixation, which also causes the dislocation of existing connections. Therefore, 
articulation challenges the existing established discourse and opens up the possibility 
of the constitution of a new one. Articulation corresponds to dialectic between 
differential and equivalential logics (Laclau, 2005a, p. 231). Differential logic refers 
to the relational and differential position of an element within a discursive formation. 
In other words, logic of difference refers to conceptual determination of an element 
considering that it can only be derived by its relation to other elements i.e. play of 
differences. On the other hand, equivalential logic is what constitutes the frontiers of 
a discursive formation by establishing an equivalential chain. The equivalential chain 
articulates different elements by their common reference to something external i.e. 
antagonism (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 127). The chain of equivalence is held 
together and fixated by nodal points and the chain is represented by an empty signifier. 
The logic of equivalence articulates elements in their reference to common enemies 
and it causes the elements to lose their positive differential determinations.  However, 
in order to be equivalent, elements must be different, “otherwise, there would be a 
simple identity” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 128). Articulation always works within 
                                                          
8 “This decisive mutation in the political imaginary of Western societies took place two hundred years 
ago and can be defined in these terms: the logic of equivalence was transformed into the fundamental 
instrument of production of the social . It is to designate this mutation that, taking an expression from 
de Tocqueville, we shall speak of 'democratic revolution' . With this we shall designate the end of a 
society of a hierarchic and inegalitarian type, ruled by a theological-political logic in which the social 
order had its foundation in divine will.” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 154-155). 
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this tension between differential and equivalential logics. What articulatory practices 
can mostly achieve is ‘hegemonic universality’.  
Laclau and Mouffe’s central category of political analysis is hegemony. 
Hegemony is a political relation that a certain particularity assumes the role of an 
impossible universality. Laclau and Mouffe radicalize Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony by asserting the plurality of political spaces and antagonisms. According to 
them political struggles aim at and can only be successful by establishing hegemony. 
Laclau uses ‘demand’ as a basic unit of social analysis in his analysis of 
political struggles, Demands have a nature that challenges a certain established order. 
He asserts that demand is in a peculiar relationship with the order: being both inside 
and outside of it (Laclau, 2005a). In a historical terrain where there is a proliferation 
of antagonisms and points of rupture, unsatisfied demands increase and political forms 
of social reaggregation are required. The emergence of the equivalential chain of 
unsatisfied demands forms the internal frontier of political spectrum (Laclau, 2005a, 
p. 74). “In an equivalential relation, demands share nothing positive, just the fact that 
they all remain unfulfilled. So there is a specific negativity which is inherent to the 
equivalential link” (Laclau, 2005a, p. 96). The articulation of these unsatisfied 
demands constitute a broader social subjectivity: representation by popular demands. 
Popular demands are what signify and unify the equivalential chain of unsatisfied 
demands. This is the point where condensation around a popular identity is started and 
the 'people' is constituted as a potential historical actor (Laclau, 2005a, p. 74). An 
internal antagonistic frontier separating the 'people' from power is formed. The popular 
demand represents fullness, which is constitutively absent (Laclau, 2005a, p. 96) and 
becomes the signifier of a wider universality (Laclau, 2005a, p. 95) i.e. populist 
identity. When the political mobilization reaches a higher level, the unification of these 
popular demands and turning them into a stable system of signification is required 
(Laclau, 2005a, p. 74). This is the point that hegemonic struggle starts. Hegemony 
refers to the universalization of a particular demand, in other words the naming of a 
popular demand and the carrying out a ‘political’ struggle to establish hegemony. 
When the universalization of a demand occurs, particularism is not eliminated: “as in 
all hegemonic formations, popular identities are always the points of 
tension/negotiation between universality and particularity” (Laclau, 2005a, p. 95). 
There is an internal split in both popular demands and particular demands in the chain. 
The popular demand while remaining particular also becomes the signifier of a 
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universality. Other demands of the equivalential chain are split between the 
particularism of their own demands and the popular signification imparted by their 
inscription within the chain (Laclau, 2005a, p. 95). In their theory, difference and 
equivalence are both antagonistic and constitutive of one another; there is tension and 
reflection between them (Laclau, 2005a, p. 120). 
Laclau analyzes popular struggles as a hegemonic political logic that aims at 
the constitution of collective identities i.e. the ‘people’. The emergence of the 'people' 
requires the passage from isolated, heterogeneous demands to a 'global' demand. This 
is achieved through the discursive formation of the equivalential chain and political 
frontiers against power as an antagonistic force (Laclau, 2005a, p.  110). The ‘global’ 
demand or popular demand is an empty signifier that articulates an ensemble of 
equivalential demands and constitutes the people. The name of the empty signifier 
“does not express the unity of the group, but becomes its ground” (Laclau, 2005a, p.  
231). Despite the construction of hegemony that starts from negativity, it can only be 
successful and consolidated “to the extent that it succeeds in constituting the positivity 
of the social” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p.  189). ‘People’ as a hegemonic subject 
presents two faces: rupture with an existing order and ‘ordering’ function (Laclau, 
1990, p. 122). Therefore, more than the equivalential displacement, a set of proposals 
for the positive organization of the social is necessary (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 
189). “If the demands …are presented purely as negative demands subversive of a 
certain order without being linked to any viable project for the reconstruction of 
specific areas of society their capacity to act hegemonically will be excluded from the 
outset” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 189). 
With their theory of hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe do not only analyze the 
social and the political but also offer an ethico-political project of radical democracy. 
Unlike Ranciere, Laclau thinks the possibility of politics does not always mean 
emancipatory politics. It might lead to fascist ways too. Because of this, considering 
the system of alternatives is important. Laclau’s choice from the alternatives is 
“redefining the project of the Left in terms of a radicalization of democracy” (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985, p. xv). Mouffe defines their project as: 
For us the radicalization of democracy requires the transformation of the 
existing power structures and the construction of a new hegemony. In our 
view, the building of a new hegemony implies the creation of a 'chain of 
equivalence' among the diversity of democratic struggles, old and new, 
in order to form a 'collective will', a 'we' of the radical democratic forces. 
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This can be done only by the determination of a 'they', the adversary that 
has to be defeated in order to make the new hegemony possible (Mouffe, 
2005, p.  53). 
  
25 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The data to study a social movement by virtue of discourse theory may best be 
collected through a qualitative research since the main focus of the discourse theory is 
constitution of meaning and identities. Accordingly, I tried to analyze the Gezi protests 
mainly by means of the empirical data I gathered through in-depth interviews. 
Needless to say that I also examined the literature on the Gezi Park protests. As a 
matter of fact, I conducted my interviews once I finished reading the written material, 
which includes the academic literature on Gezi movement and the news on the media. 
I also investigated the documents and announcements in the websites of the Taksim 
Solidarity, Taksim Platform, and Chamber of Architects Istanbul Buyukkent Branch. 
To these must be added the fact I made some participant observation during Gezi Park 
protests in 2013 and in its first anniversary. 
The scope of this study is limited to the discourse of the protesters, therefore 
only the persons who joined the protests were interviewed. Sixteen interviews with 
Gezi Park protesters were carried out. Fifteen interviews were conducted between 20 
May 2015 and 19 June 2015 and the last one was conducted on 10 August 2015 in 
Istanbul. As I mentioned earlier, I consider anyone who joined the protests by going 
to Gezi Park or other squares in other cities, by participating into the demonstrations 
on the streets of Istanbul and other cities, by using social media, or by banging pots 
and pans as protesters. Among the interviewees two protesters are from other cities. In 
fact both of them came to Gezi Park during the last days before the evacuation of the 
park. Some of the interviewees spent the day and night in Gezi Park, some visited after 
work every day, and some visited the park several times and were more active on social 
media. One person lost his eye during police intervention and spent the rest of the days 
in the hospital. One interviewee abandoned the protests while it continued. In fact, all 
of the interviewees, in a way, were in the Gezi Park between the dates where the 
protests started and ended: 27 May 2013- 15 June 2013. 
For the interviewees, not the most active, professional and educated members 
of organizations, but ordinary members were selected, since not all Gezi Park 
protesters were organized. A survey, conducted in the park with 4411 protesters during 
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the protests, shows that 45 percent of the protesters engaged in a public demonstration 
for the first time (Konda, 2013, p. 16). Additionally, 79 percent of the protesters were 
not members of a political party or a non-governmental organization (Konda, 2013, p. 
13). The survey only asks for membership, and this does not mean that they are not 
related to or have sympathy for any organization or party. Therefore, interviews used 
in this research were mostly conducted with those who were not active members of 
organizations or who had sympathy for some organizations. Several representatives of 
organizations were also interviewed. 
As criteria of the distribution, the diversity of the identities is given priority. 
Considering the studies, the news and my personal observation, I made seven 
categories: Kemalist nationalists, professionals, different Muslim groups, leftists, 
Alevis, Kurds, and gender based activists (LGBTT and feminists). The interviews 
include a minimum of two persons in each group and there are also intersections. 
Among Kemalist nationalists, there are interviewees who have sympathy for TGB 
(Youth Union of Turkey) and TKP (Communist Party of Turkey). Among the 
professionals, there are interviewees from academia, social media specialists and 
organizers. For this group I also will be using announcements and press releases of the 
Taksim Solidarity and Taksim Platform and existing interviews carried out with their 
founding members. Among the Muslim groups, there are interviewees from anti-
capitalist Muslims and from the Gulen community. Among the leftists, there are 
interviewees that are close to the Socialist Party of the Oppressed (Ezilenlerin 
Sosyalist Partisi, ESP), Federation of Democratic Peoples (Demokratik Halklar 
Federasyonu, DHF), Mucadele Birligi and the Revolutionary Socialist Workers Party 
(Devrimci Sosyalist Isci Partisi, DSIP). For interviewing the group of Alevis, I went 
to the Gazi neighborhood and interviewed persons who are Kurdish Alevis. Among 
the Kurds, in addition to the Kurdish Alevis, there is an interviewee who has sympathy 
for the Labour Party (Emek Partisi, EMEP) and the Peace and Democracy Party (Baris 
ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP). Among the gender-based activists, there are interviewees 
that have affinity to Istanbul Feminist Collective (Istanbul Feminist Kolektif, IFK), 
Socialist Feminist Collective (Sosyalist Feminist Kolektif, SFK), LGBT Blok, and 
KAOS GL. These were the groups that I could reach and at the same time limitations 
of the data of this study.  
I reached the interviewees by different methods: asking acquaintances, mailing 
organizations, asking the interviewees’ connections, going to the anniversary of the 
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protests, and going to Gazi neighborhood. I had difficulty in reaching Kemalist 
nationalists namely CHP youth organization members and TGB supporters. In the 
anniversary of Gezi, in Abbasaga Park, several women in Ilerici Kadinlar stand, 
refused to give interview and said they did not have time. 
After the people accepted to talk, I asked for a proper time and place from them 
and meetings were arranged. For me, conducting the interviews were easy and 
enjoyable. I did not have difficulties in communication. Most of the participants were 
willing to speak and some of the interviews lasted for hours. It should be noted that I 
did the interviews as a Muslim women wearing headscarf. My appearance might had 
an influence on the attitude of the interviewees. 
Some interviews were conducted in cafes, some in universities, and some in 
parks and some in the places of the interviewees. I carried out three interviews in the 
Gazi neighborhood where there is an Alevi population and leftist tendencies are 
predominant. During the Gezi Park protests, protests and clashes with the police within 
the neighborhood had happened. In the course of the evacuation of the park, groups 
departed from Gazi walking towards Taksim in order to support the protesters and 
clash with the police. I went to this neighborhood and asked people on the streets for 
interviews. All people I encountered were the participants in the protests. One young 
man at the entrance of one central avenue rejected to talk to me saying he does not 
know me and I might be a spy. He also added that by studying the Gezi Park protests, 
I am doing a good thing but he could not trust me. Another group in the DHF office 
said they could talk later because on that day they were busy with the discharging of 
their friends who had been arrested during the May Day protests. I interviewed one 
young man in a tent named Gazi Halk Meclisi on the central avenue. Another man said 
the tent was their police station where they solve their own problems. The existence 
of the tent gives clues as to the distrust towards the police and state, and marks the 
tension that can be traced back to the Gazi Events of 1995. I conducted another 
interview in the HDP promotion office. I also talked with a woman who works 
voluntarily in an independent library and cultural center.  
Interviews were conducted with the protesters with the guarantee that their 
names and any information disclosing their identities would not be used. Therefore, I 
will be using pseudonyms in the study. All of the interviews were conducted one-by-
one and were tape-recorded with the permission of the interviewees. The length of the 
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interviews are one hour in average that included minimum of half hour and maximum 
three hours. All interviews were transcribed for the analysis.  
I prepared for the questions before the meetings and I did not use any notes 
during the meetings. In the interviews, I asked the respondents to tell their stories of 
joining the Gezi Park protests such as when they joined the protests, how they 
protested, until when they continued, if they ever think about quitting. I also asked 
why they engaged in the protests, what their demands were, what were they opposing 
to, whom were they opposing to, what they expected from the protests and what they 
thought about the consequences.  
 
3.1. An introduction of the interviewees 
I will start by introducing the protesters I interviewed. The introduction will be 
done by giving an account of the socio-demographic characteristics, which includes 
information about gender, age, birthplace, level of education and occupation. Then, 
the affinities of the protesters with the organizations will be mentioned. Lastly, 
information regarding when they joined the protests, until when they continued to 
protest and how they protested will also be given. 
Umut is 28 years old; he is a man who was born in Kirikkale. He is doing his 
doctorate and is a research assistant in Political Sciences. He is close to the Gulen 
community and has sympathy for the Revolutionary Socialist Workers Party 
(Devrimci Sosyalist Isci Partisi, DSIP). He joined the protests on the 1 June. He had 
been in Gezi Park several times and he also used social media to support the protests 
until the end. 
Berke is 25 years old, he is gay, and he was born in Adana. He is a student in 
Political Sciences and also a LGBTI activist; he has affinities with the LGBT Blok and 
KAOS GL. He comes from an Alevi family. Berke joined the protests in Kugulu Park 
in Ankara in 31 May. He says he already knew the struggle of the Taksim Solidarity 
against the urban transformation plan a year prior to the Gezi Park protests, since he 
was in contact with his organized activist LGBTI friends who live in Taksim Tarlabasi. 
They were affected by the urban transformation plan and became active components 
of the Taksim Solidarity. Berke is not only a LGBTI activist but also he joins many 
protests against racism, nuclear plants, and the privatization of ports etc. On the same 
day, he joined the protest of Kurdish mothers, the remembrance of Metin Lokumcu, 
and then, he passed on to Kugulu Park and was surprised by the crowd. For the protests 
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in Ankara he says there was no unity, and different groups wanted to gather in different 
places. He was angry because of this, and decided to go to Istanbul. He had been in 
Gezi Park for three days before the evacuation of the park. 
Efe is 27 years old, and a Turkish socialist from Izmir. He is a master’s student 
in Cinema and Television Studies. He has affinity to the Federation of Democratic 
Peoples (Demokratik Halklar Federasyonu, DHF). His parents are also socialists. He 
had been following the Taksim Solidarity’s protests and concerts since 2012. He joined 
the protests after he saw the news on the Internet on 27 May that some trees in Gezi 
Park were cut down. He stayed in the park until the evacuation.  
Ayse is 39 years old, and she is a feminist who has sympathy for the Socialist 
Feminist Collective (Sosyalist Feminist Kolektif, SFK). She works as a teacher of 
mathematics and she has a master’s degree. She is from Konya and she comes from a 
conservative family. She had environmentalist friends joining the protests and she had 
been supporting the protests on twitter. She went to the park after the police burned 
the tents and sprayed pepper gas towards the faces of the people. After several day, 
she left the protests because she only wanted to protect Gezi Park whiled the protesters 
wanted to overthrow the government. 
Cagdas is 25 years old, and he is a student in Mechanical Engineering. He is 
also a Kemalist nationalist who is close to the Youth Union of Turkey (Turkiye 
Genclik Birligi, TGB). He is from Kayseri. He went to Gezi Park on 1 June and visited 
frequently until the evacuation of the park.  
Ali is 19 years old, he is a Kurdish Alevi man who is unemployed and quitted 
high school. He is from Sivas and he lives in the Gazi neighborhood.  
Onur is 55 years old, and he is a retired man. He is a Kurdish Alevi from Sivas 
and he lives in the Gazi neighborhood. He graduated from high school. He was a 
volunteer activist for the Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halklarin Demokratik Partisi, 
HDP)’s election campaign. He went to Gezi Park regularly until the evacuation. 
Cagla is 26 years old; she is a student in the Music Teaching department. She 
is a revolutionist and is close to the Mucadele Birligi. She is also a Kurdish Alevi from 
Sivas living in the Gazi neighborhood. She works in an independent library in the Gazi 
neighborhood voluntarily and spends some of her time with children by reading books. 
When the protests started, she was in Sivas with her family and she followed all the 
events on the Internet. Later, she came to Istanbul to join the protests on 14 June, the 
last day before the evacuation. 
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Gizem is 25 years old, she is a feminist and a social worker in Istanbul Feminist 
Collective (Istanbul Feminist Kolektif, IFK). She lives in Burgazada. She graduated 
from university, however, during the Gezi Park protests she was an undergraduate. 
Gizem says she had already been protesting before the Gezi Park protests because she 
had problems with the interventions in her living space, in the streets, in the city and 
in her way of living. She joined the Gezi protests in the first week of June with her 
organization. They stayed in the park until evacuation and their work continued with 
the forums. 
Aydin is 32 years old; he is an insurance agent from Izmir. He is a university 
graduate. He is a socialist and Kemalist nationalist close to the Communist Party of 
Turkey (Turkiye Komunist Partisi, TKP). Aydin had been following the activities of 
the Taksim Solidarity. He went to Gezi Park after work every day since the protests 
began, and he stayed in the park until the evacuation. 
Emre is 38 years old; he is a worker and an anti-capitalist Muslim. He is from 
Mersin and is graduated from high school. Emre visited Gezi Park on 28 May, after 
someone in the anti-capitalist Muslims’ weekly meetings told him what was 
happening. Later he, with his group, joined the protests permanently. They set up their 
tent in the park and they hung a banner stating, “All property belongs to Allah, be gone 
capital!”9 They also established a masjid. He and his group stayed in Gezi Park until 
the evacuation. 
Selin is 32 years old, and she is a social media expert and an anti-capitalist 
Muslim. She was born in Istanbul and has an associate degree in Green Housing. She 
was one of the organizers of the Abbasaga Forum. She introduces herself by stating 
she had known the organization structures in Turkey but had stayed away from them 
until the Gezi protests. Because she was behaving individually. She says, “We went to 
Gezi, one by one, as independent individuals who don’t know each other. Then, we 
returned united.”10 When the protests started she was writing about it on social media. 
On 31 May 2013, joined the protests and stayed in the park until the evacuation of the 
park. After the evacuation, her ‘resistance’ continued in the Abbasaga Park.  
Mehmet is 25 years old and he is an accountant. He is from Istanbul and he has 
an associate degree in Logistics. He became an anarchist in the period following his 
participation to the Gezi Park protests. He was a nationalist who was close to the 
                                                          
9 Mülk Allah’ındır, sermaye defol! 
10 Biz birbirimizi tanımayan bağımsızlar olarak gittik, bir bir gittik. Birleşerek döndük. 
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Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi, MHP) when he joined the 
Gezi protests. He stayed in the park until the evacuation and later, he attended the 
forums.  
Baris a 28 years old socialist from Malatya, graduated from marketing college 
and is unemployed. He spends most of his time with political activities of the Socialist 
Party of the Oppressed (Ezilenlerin Sosyalist Partisi, ESP). He had been following the 
Gezi Park protests on the media and he joined the park after several days. On 30 May, 
during a harsh police intervention, one of the tear gas canisters hit his face, damaged 
his nerves and caused him to lose his eye. Then, the days in the hospital started for 
him and he followed the protests from his bed. 
Eren is from Bursa and he is 25 years old. He is a Law student. His family 
belongs to the Gulen community and they raised him in that way too. After coming to 
Istanbul for university, he started to dislike the Gulen community and eventually he 
broke from them. He has sympathy for anti-capitalist Muslims. 
Talha is 28 years old, and he is a master’s student in Cultural Studies. He is 
from Adiyaman and he is Kurdish. During the Gezi Park protests he had sympathy and 
was close to the Labor Party (Emek Partisi, EMEP) and the Peace and Democracy 
Party (Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP).  
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CHAPTER IV 
A DISCURSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE GEZI PARK EVENTS 
 
In this chapter, I will mainly analyze the hegemonic capacity of the Gezi Park 
protests based on my interviews. In the first section, I will start by examining 
protesters’ reasons for participating in the Gezi Park protests. In the second section, I 
will investigate fundamental antagonisms among different groups that undermine any 
possible unity of the protesters. In the third section, I will scrutinize how the 
antagonistic frontier is defined during the Gezi Park protests and how the internal 
antagonisms were masked. In the fourth section, I will analyze the problems of the 
protesters with the government. In the last section, I will evaluate demands of the 
protesters and analyze if a name could be given to the Gezi Park protests. 
 
4.1. Why to take part in Gezi 
For the protesters’ reasons for participation in the Gezi Park protests, I 
identified four categories on the basis of interviews. Protesters joined the Gezi Park 
protests to oppose the police violence, the privatization of public areas, destruction of 
green areas and the ruling government. There are also those who joined the protests 
out of curiosity or following their friends without knowing what the protests were 
about. From the discourse analytical perspective of Laclau and Mouffe, times of crisis 
that temporality of the existing structure prevails and the structure fails to constitute 
meaning and identities is called moments of dislocation (1990, 47). However, because 
dislocation corresponds to displacement of an order in general and no such situation is 
occurred throughout the Gezi Park protests. Therefore, I prefer to refer the motives of 
protesters to join the protests as disappointment. All these aforementioned points of 
disappointment played an important role in articulating different groups in the Gezi 
protest movement. 
It is understood from my interviews that the police violence was the most 
disappointing factor for the Gezi Park protesters and it became a turning point for 
many protesters’ decision to join the protests. The burning of the tents of protesters, 
the intense use of tear gas and pepper spraying of the woman in red by the police have 
been symbols of the police violence. Baris (Socialist, 28) decided to join the protests 
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because the police intervened in the peaceful protests. After the tents were burned, he 
and his group arranged a press statement in Gezi Park with “an anti-fascist sensitivity 
against the police attack”.11 In a similar vein, Ayse (Feminist, 39) decided to join the 
protests after the police burned the tents and sprayed pepper gas towards the faces of 
the people. Cagdas (Kemalist nationalist, 25) was following the protests on social 
media and he decided to join the protests in Gezi Park after he saw disturbing scenes 
of the police attacking people on Twitter. Selin (Anti-capitalist Muslim, 32) also 
followed the protests on social media and supported them with her tweets. One day, 
while she was returning home she noticed an intense tear gas odor in Kabatas coming 
from Taksim. Then, she then decided to join the protests. “The violence performed by 
the police on us”, she says, “was what pulled most of us to the area”.12 Mehmet (Ex-
nationalist, 25) would despise the protesters at the beginning and he would tell them: 
“What’s up? Are you making a socialist revolution?”13 Later, however, he decided to 
join the protests because of the police violence. He was deeply affected by the picture 
of the woman in red, who became the symbol of Gezi because she did not run from 
the police. He states that he told to himself if she stayed and was not afraid, he himself 
would also resist the police.  
The interviews reveal that the second important disappointment for the 
protesters was to oppose the plan to build a shopping center on a public field which 
was used as a green area. Those protesters had an anti-capitalist motive in opposing 
the privatization. For example, Umut (Academician, 28) states that he got angry when 
Erdogan announced that despite the otherwise decision of the court the government 
would build the shopping center. It seems that Umut was fed up with having over a 
hundred shopping centers in Istanbul while there are not many big malls in city centers 
in Europe. So, he was against building a shopping center in the last green area in the 
middle of Istanbul. Similarly, Gizem (Socialist Feminist, 25) also joined the Gezi 
protests in order to oppose the privatization of public spaces and Aydin (Kemalist 
nationalist, 32) opposed the urban transformation and the privatization plans 
implemented by the government. Emre (Anti-capitalist Muslim, 38) also joined the 
protests in order to oppose the turning of a public area used by everyone into an area 
used for profit. Talha (Kurd, 28) decided to join the protests because he was annoyed 
                                                          
11 Polis saldırısına karşı antifaşist bir duyarlılık 
12 Polisin bize uyguladığı şiddet birçoğumuzu alana çeken şeydir. 
13 Zamanında çok gülüyordum. N’oluyor? Sosyalist devrim mi yapıyorsunuz!? 
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with the aim of building of a shopping center on a public field and the state violence 
coming into play in favor of private companies. 
Government’s disregard of protesters’ demand to protect Gezi Park have been 
the third important motive for the protesters to join the protests. The toppling of trees 
by the construction vehicles caused a disappointment for the protesters. Efe (Socialist, 
27), for instance, states that Taksim is his living space and when he saw the news on 
the Internet that some trees in the Gezi Park were cut down, he joined the protests to 
defend his living space. Onur (Kurdish Alevi, 55) states that he decided to join the 
protests after the unfortunate statements of the government that ignore people by 
declaring that they would destroy Gezi Park.  
The interviews I made indicate that the fourth important motive for the 
protesters to join the protests was the opposition to Erdogan and the government. For 
example Berke (Queer, Alevi, 25) joined Gezi protests to oppose the conservatism 
brought about by the government. In his own words: “The most important mission of 
the Gezi resistance was the search for a scream against new conservatism.”14 Cagdas 
(Kemalist nationalist, 25), who explained his participation into the protests in terms 
opposing the police violence, states that he also wanted to say “Enough!” against the 
existing policies of the government which “came to the point of strangling the 
people”15. Selin (Anti-capitalist Muslim, 32) also maintains that besides the police 
violence she was saying “enough” to the AK Party governance because she defends 
“as a Muslim individual, what AKP does is not Muslimhood”.16 When the protests 
started, Cagla (Socialist, 26) was in Sivas and she was following the events on the 
Internet to understand if they promised a revolution. According to her, at the 
beginning, most of the leftist organizations either reformist or opportunist or 
revolutionist considered this protest as a short term ‘Saturday protest’. But later she 
noticed her own organization, Mucadele Birligi, summoned into a revolt. They 
demanded on their website the abolishment of the government and its replacement 
with a temporary revolutionary government. “They were saying very further things”17 
that she got excited and thought a revolution would arrive. Then, she decided to go to 
Istanbul to be a part of the revolution. Because her family would not allow her to leave, 
                                                          
14 Gezi direnişinin en önemli misyonlarından biri o yeni muhafazakârlığa karşı bir çığlık arayışı olması. 
15 İnsanların boğazını sıkma noktasına gelmesi 
16 Ben Müslüman bir birey olarak AKP’nin yaptığının Müslümanlık olmadığını savunuyorum.   
17 Kitlelere o kadar ileri şeyler söylüyorlardı ki acayip heyecanlandım. 
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she sold her instrument, a Yamaha transverse flute, for 500 liras, although it was 
worthy of 2000 liras in order to join the Gezi Park protests. 
Lastly, there are the protesters who did not know what had been happening, 
and who joined the protests just by following their friends such as Ali (Alevi, 19) or 
out of curiosity such as Eren (Ex-Gulenist, 25). Regarding his reason of participation 
to the Gezi protests Eren says, “I, frankly speaking, wondered what was happening 
there. I didn’t go for the purpose of demonstration. I left from Kadikoy and went to 
the Gezi Park as if I went for a promenade.”18 After seeing the harsh police intervention 
he decided to stay. In fact, he was not expecting any police attack because there was 
nothing to intervene in; everyone was drunk and singing etc. Then he continued to stay 
to see what would happen and he wondered how violent the interventions can become. 
He says that it was worse than he could imagine. He explains his decision to stay as 
follows: “I had private reasons for being there. I was in a difficult situation. My 
relationship had ended and I was feeling empty. I went there because of that. But, of 
course the attitude of the government, disregarding people is also one reason of me 
being there.”19 Ali (Alevi), on the other hand, joined the protests with his friends and 
the second day they were taken under custody. He said:  
Behind bars, we had been already talking with friends and illuminating 
our consciousness that they are doing all these things there, it is wrong 
for us to wait around here. Then we went there with enthusiasm. Then 
we clashed with the police. Namely, it was like a kind of entertainment. 
It might also be troublesome. A lot of people got shot. Our friends got 
shot, too. Later the death of Berkin Elvan happened.20 
 
About why he joined the protests he stated:  
The policies of the government are against all those people, against their 
sitting. I am against that bars and pavyons (saloons) on the Taksim road. 
There is no such thing that everybody would be annoyed with [the cutting 
of] trees, one can also be annoyed with the pavyons. They go there, drink 
alcohol and go out screaming and yelling. People are uncomfortable with 
                                                          
18 Ben açıkçası merak ettim ne oluyordur orada diye. Herhangi bir eylem amacıyla gitmedim. 
Kadıköy’den çıktım normal gezmeye gider gibi gittim Gezi Parkı’na. 
19 Orada bulunmamın özel sebepleri vardı. Kendim kişisel olarak zor bir durumdaydım. Bir ilişkim 
bitmişti, kendimi boşlukta hissediyordum. O sebeple oraya gittim. Ama tabi iktidarın halkı yok sayan 
tutumu da benim orada bulunma sebebim. 
20 Gözaltından çıktıktan sonra tekrar eyleme katılmak için biz can atıyorduk. Zaten arkadaşlarla içerde 
konuşuyorduk, onlar orada onları yapıyorlar bunları yapıyorlar, bizim burada olmamız yanlış diye 
düşünerek bilincimizi aydınlatarak daha çok hevesle geldik oraya. Devam etmeye başladık. Polisle 
çatıştık. Yani bir nevi eğlence gibi bir şey diyebilirim sana. Zor da olabiliyordu. Birçok insan vuruldu. 
Bizim de arkadaşlarımız vuruldu. Sonra Berkin Elvan’ın ölmesi zaten denk geldi.  
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this, too. There cannot be a single reason. For me, what I consider as 
opponent is only them. It is a kind of corruption.21 
 
An overall assessment of all the interviews I made indicates that the police 
violence was the most important disappointment that motivated people to join the 
protests. The burning of the tents and the woman in red facing tear gas seem to have 
been important symbols of the police violence. Some protesters followed the events 
on social media and decided to participate into demonstrations after seeing the violent 
acts of the police. The opposition to the privatization of public areas to build a 
shopping center was the second important motive. The attempt to destroy the park had 
been another disappointment. Some protesters joined the protests after seeing the 
toppling of trees by the construction vehicles.  Some people participated in the protests 
to oppose to the government or for a possible revolution. Some protesters, like Eren, 
were in Gezi Park out of curiosity. It should also be noted that there are also people, 
like Ali, who did not know what had been happening and were there just by 
coincidence. He only joined the crowd and did not have any idea about the protests. It 
can even be said his ideas were imposed on him by his friends. Having not much idea 
about why he joined the protests, he was decisive until the point he was taken into 
custody for fighting against the police. 
 
4.2. Real antagonism in Gezi  
As explained in detail in the theory chapter, I follow the view that the final 
suture of any discourse/totality is impossible. Because the relations and differences 
among elements that constitute a discourse are contingent and always subject to 
change. Therefore there is no fully constituted discourse and existence of a discourse 
is always threatened. The experiences that prevents any discourse from fully 
constituting itself is called antagonism. Antagonism threatens the existence of a 
discourse by showing its contingencies and undermining its unity (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985, p. 125). I will refer to this internal antagonism as real antagonism, alluding to 
Lacanian real. During social movements a struggle is given to constitute a unity out of 
all different participant groups. Wide range of groups having different demands 
                                                          
21 Hükûmetin politikaları o kadar insana karşı, o kadar halkın oturmasına karşı. Mesela ben o Taksim 
yolundaki barlara, pavyonlara karşıyım. Millet sadece ağaçtan rahatsız olacak diye bir şey yok. 
Pavyondan da rahatsız olur. Gidiyorlar orada içki içiyorlar, çıkıyorlar bağırıyorlar, çağırıyorlar. İnsanlar 
bundan da rahatsız oluyor. Tek bir nedeni olamaz yani. Benim tek karşı gördüğüm onlar. Bir nevi 
yozlaşma diyebilirim yani. 
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participated in the Gezi Park protests. New relations are established among these 
groups that articulated them within ‘Gezi community’. However, there are also 
conflicts and contradictions among different groups that undermine any possible unity 
throughout the protests.  
In this section, I will analyze the particular situations that threaten existence of 
the Gezi community. Based on my fieldwork, conflicts among Kurds and Turkish 
nationalists, anti-capitalist Muslims and secularists, socialists and Kemalist 
nationalists, queer activists and sexists, football fans and feminists had been significant 
sources of real antagonism in the Gezi Park protests. They were disturbed by the 
participation of each other and there happened disputes, fights and harassments in the 
encounter of these groups. 
Gender based activists in the park, namely feminist and queer groups were 
disturbed by certain protestors who display sexist, homophobic and transphobic 
attitudes during the Gezi Park protests. Such attitudes raised difficulties for gender 
based activists to identify themselves with the Gezi community and they started their 
own struggle to remain articulated. To start with an example from Berke (Queer, Alevi, 
25), he thinks that not all the protestors were libertarian but among the protesters there 
were “sexist idiot people”22. Protesting in Kugulupark, he was disturbed by fans of 
Ankaragucu football club who chanted homophobic, transphobic, prostitute-phobic 
slogans. Together with LGBT groups in the park they reacted with their slogans that 
claim being a person from the LGBT or being a sex worker is not something of which 
to be ashamed. Ayse (Feminist, 39) and Efe (Socialist, 27) also felt discomfort with 
sexist slogans in the Gezi Park. Ayse maintains that the sexist language against 
Erdogan and his family bothered her a lot in the park. Gizem (Socialist Feminist, 25) 
also mentions a similar discomfort with a lot of sexist language use, she adds “We did 
a workshop called ‘Resist with insistence not by swearing’ in the feminist tent in Gezi. 
We did not approve a resistance by cursing the wife of then Prime Minister Tayyip 
Erdogan.”23 Gizem and her group covered the swear words on the walls with spray 
paint. She also says despite all these efforts they were not successful because the 
resistance was dominated by the slogans of football fans. For the sexual harassment 
                                                          
22 Cinsiyetçi hödük bir sürü insan 
23 Hatta biz bir küfür atölyesi, “küfürle değil inatla diren” diye bir atölye yaptık o zaman Gezi’de, 
feminist çadırı vardı orada yaptık. O zaman Başbakan olan Tayyip Erdoğan’ın eşine küfür etmek 
üzerinden direnmeyi tabi ki biz doğru bulmuyorduk. 
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incidents she says they self-organized in Gezi and volunteers patrolled during the 
night. Baris (Socialist, 28) states that there were groups who did not want the LGBT 
members in the Gezi Park and he struggled against them.  
Continuing with other sources of internal antagonism, some protesters seemed 
disturbed with the participation of Kemalist nationalists in the Gezi Park protests. 
Based on my interviews, these disturbances mostly stemmed from Kemalist 
nationalists’ efforts to dominate the protests and their attitude towards Kurds and anti-
capitalist Muslims. For instance, Talha (28), as a Kurd, was so much disturbed by the 
Kemalist nationalists’ domination that he thought to abandon the protests. When he 
went to the park, he expected to see heterogeneity that includes people from different 
sections who supports the environmental movement against violence. However what 
he saw was different: 
When I went there for the first time in the evening, it reminded me of the 
Republican Meetings.24 We saw this from the slogans. Secondly, it was 
[like a Republican Meeting] because the carried Turkish flags and 
Ataturk flags were directly rendered into a merely political message. 
Because there is such a situation. The people who faced the violence at 5 
o’clock in the morning on 30 May were the people who are not organized 
or are not involved in a political party so much or if involved, they are 
those who do not bring this to the forefront. While this was the case, 
seeing all this in the evening that is the very beginning the protests 
disturbed me. And in that night I asked myself this question. What am I 
in here for? I asked this question to myself time after time.25 
 
Talha returned to the park after seeing the news of the injured protesters and 
stayed in the park but he always had a hesitation. During the halays26 of Kurds in Gezi, 
he was upset to encounter many times that a Kemalist nationalist was coming and 
shouting: “You [Kurds] have no business here”27. Efe (Socialist, 27) also utters his 
discomfort with the Kemalist nationalists assaulting halays:  
                                                          
24 Republican Meetings were series of rallies that took place in Turkey in 2007 in support of secularism 
after the ruling AKP presented a presidential candidate whose wife has a headscarf.  
25 Fakat gittiğimde ilk akşam, bana biraz Cumhuriyet Mitingini anımsatır gibi oldu. Ki sloganlardan 
bunu gördük. İkincisi, taşınan o Türk bayraklarının, Atatürk bayraklarının doğrudan bir tamamen politik 
mesaj haline getirilmesinden kaynaklıydı bu durum. Çünkü şöyle bir durum var ortada. O 30 Mayıs saat 
5te bu şiddete maruz kalanları örgütlü olmayan ya da doğrudan herhangi bir siyasi bir partiye çok da 
fazla dâhil olmayan, dâhil olsa da bunu çok fazla ön plana atmayan insanlar olarak biliyorum ben. Böyle 
bir durum olunca o gece, o eylemlerin ilk başladığı gece bunları görmem bende fazlasıyla bir rahatsızlık 
uyandırdı. Ve o gece kendi kendime şu soruyu da sordum açıkçası. Benim burada ne işim var. Bu soruyu 
kendime defalarca sordum. 
26 Folk dance style in southeastern Anatolia in which dancers form a circle or a line while holding each 
other. 
27 Sizin burada işiniz yok 
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Our hevals [Kurdish expression which means friends] are performing the 
halay. Then Kemalist nationalists come and tease. Do you know how 
many fights we, the Turkish Left, intervened in and broke up? All right 
friends you [Kemalist nationalists] go away now and you [Kurds] 
continue the halay. But, at some places where we could not prevent 
fights, several kids from TGB stabbed several Kurds. Serious wounds 
occurred, on calves or such.  And really there is self-abnegation of 
Patriotic Youth28, they didn’t get into any incident. In fact they broke the 
world record by performing the halay since they came.29 
 
Baris (Socialist, 28) was also disturbed by the attitudes of the Kemalist 
nationalists in the park. He says there were attempts to trigger disputes claiming 
“There are no Kurds”30. He says it was the Kemalist nationalists who said ‘we are the 
soldiers of Mustafa Kemal’ and what they wanted to express with their claim was “we 
wish there were no Kurds”31. In a similar vein, Ayse (Feminist, 39) was bothered by 
the reactions of Kemalist nationalists towards Kurds. Cagla (Socialist, 26) was also 
disturbed by Kemalist nationalists forcing to remove Abdullah Ocalan flags in Gezi 
Park. It can be inferred from the interviews that Kemalist nationalists’ exclusionary 
attitude against Kurds not only prevented Kurds from identifying themselves with the 
Gezi community as an ideal totality but also bothered anti-nationalist protesters. 
Some protesters seemed annoyed by Kemalist nationalists’ attempts to 
dominate the protests. For instance Ayse (Feminist, 39) says: “What had disturbed me 
too much since the first day and that increased more and made me say ‘why am I here’ 
is: the soldiers of Mustafa Kemal. It felt like the air of a Republican Meeting. And they 
were too many.”32  
She thinks despite her friends and many others went Gezi Park as independent 
libertarians, Kemalist nationalists were the most represented group because they were 
organized. Similarly Efe (Socialist, 27) and Gizem (Socialist Feminist, 25), seemed 
disturbed by Kemalist nationalists’ hanging of Turkish and TGB flags everywhere. 
                                                          
28 YDG-H (Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement) is a youth organization founded by PKK 
(Kurdistan Workers’ Party) sympathizers in early 2013.  
29 Hevaller yoldaşlar halay çekiyor. İşte ulusalcılar geliyor sataşıyor tamam mı. Kaç defa kavga ayırdık 
biliyor musun. Türk solu olarak aralarına girip. Haydi arkadaş siz gidin, siz de halaya devam edin. Ki 
engel olamadığımız bazı yerlerde TGBli birkaç tane çocuk birkaç tane Kürdü bıçakladı zaten. Ciddi 
bıçaklanmalar yaşandı, baldırlardan falan. Orada gerçekten Yurtsever Gençliğin çok özverisi var, hiçbir 
olaya karışmadılar. Adamlar gerçekten dünya rekoru kırdılar, geldikleri andan itibaren halay çekiyorlar. 
30 Burada Kürtler yok 
31 Keşke Kürtler olmasa 
32 Ama beni çok rahatsız eden şey ilk günden itibaren hatta sonrasında çok daha fazla rahatsız edip niye 
buradayım dedirten şey: Mustafa Kemal’in askerleriydi. Bana bir Cumhuriyet Mitingi havası verdi. Ve 
onlar çok fazlaydı. 
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Other protesters who had difficulty in articulating within the Gezi community 
due to Kemalist nationalists’ reaction were anti-capitalist Muslims and women 
wearing headscarves. My interviewees gave accounts of such incidents they witnessed. 
Once the anti-capitalist Muslims entered the park, Efe (Socialist, 27) saddened to hear 
a Kemalist nationalist woman shouting “I don’t want these either.”33 He maintains that 
this Kemalist mentality should not have joined the Gezi Park protests and he was 
worried that this mentality would not want them, the socialists, in the park too. Ayse 
(Feminist, 39) thinks that women wearing headscarves were harassed everywhere 
during Gezi Park protests. She says that before the Kabatas incident, her sister who 
also wore a headscarf was stopped in her car in Bakirkoy, and some people hit her car 
and screamed “Go away AKP supporter women. No more right to live for you.”34  
On the other hand, Kemalist nationalists were somewhat disturbed by the 
Kurds. Among my interviewees Aydin (Kemalist nationalist, 32) maintained that the 
ones performing the halay in the park, implying the Kurds, annoyed him. Cagdas 
(Kemalist nationalist, 25) was unhappy with the Apo posters: 
In the first days of Gezi, the PKK flags and Apo posters disturbed me 
like everybody. Because we were standing there for unity and changing 
some things and it was a completely opposite move aimed at dividing 
people, creating dissidence and separating the mass.35 
 
Some protesters had difficulty in articulating within the Gezi community due 
to language of the protests which they deem secular and distant from regular people. 
Emre (Anti-capitalist Muslim, 38) says the way of the resistance in the park was very 
far away from the sociology of the people in Turkey especially from the conservative 
sector e.g. they were playing the guitar or piano. He thinks it could be baglama instead 
or folk songs which would seem more real and would not be marginalized. He also 
criticizes the protesters who, in a clear contrast with claiming a revolution, do not 
understand people of Turkey in general and insult the conservative AK Party 
constituent. As anti-capitalist Muslims, in order to remain articulated in the Gezi 
community, they organized the Friday Prayers and celebrated the Kandil night (a holy 
night) in the park. He says such activities got a significant support and many protesters 
wanted to get to know them.  He also thinks that some others pragmatically used their 
                                                          
33 “Ben bunları da istemiyorum ki.” 
34 “AKPli teyzeler çıkın, bundan sonra size hayat hakkı yok.” 
35 Gezi’nin ilk günlerinde PKK bayraklarının açılması, Apo posterlerinin açılması herkes gibi beni de 
rahatsız etti. Çünkü biz orada birlik için, hep beraber bir şeyleri değiştirmek için bulunurken tam tersine 
insanları bölmeye, fikir ayrılığı yaratmaya, kitleyi ayırmaya yönelik bir hareketti o. 
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existence in the park against the government. Mehmet (Ex-nationalist, 25) was also 
disturbed by some protesters’ propaganda in the park insulting conservatives. He 
maintains that although they aimed at making revolution, “Instead of understanding 
AKP supporters, they [protesters] ridiculed that “They say huloog, they say this and 
that”.”36 
As can be seen in the examples portrayed above, there were irreconcilable 
disputes and conflicts among different sections, which would undermine any possible 
unity between the protesters. Feminist and queer activists were disturbed by the sexist 
protesters and sexist cursing stemming from domination of football fans over slogans. 
There were some protesters who do not want LGBT activists. Kemalist nationalists’ 
reaction against Kurds and anti-capitalist Muslims threatened these groups’ 
articulation within the Gezi community. Some protesters were disturbed that protests 
had a secular character in general and there was a tendency to insult conservatives. 
During the protests, there happened provocations, disputes, harassments and fights that 
go far to stabbings among different groups. All these conflicts indicates real 
antagonism in the Gezi Park protests and they undermine the constitution of Gezi 
community. 
 
4.3. Symbolic antagonism in Gezi: the government 
Despite all the disputes, different groups stayed together in Gezi Park and the 
protests continued. This association was only possible by masking internal 
antagonisms and referring them to the excluded meanings and identities. I will refer to 
these excluded meanings and identities as symbolic antagonism because signifying the 
antagonism is the starting point for the constitution of a totality by drawing the 
frontiers. Laclau asserts that in the social movements, the power is discursively 
constructed as antagonistic force against the people i.e. emergent totality (Laclau, 
2005a, p. 110). This study claims that in the Gezi Park discourse, the government was 
constituted as symbolic antagonism of the Gezi community. In this section based on 
my fieldwork, I will analyze against what the protesters struggled against and how it 
helped to constitute a Gezi community. 
It is understood from my fieldwork that the Gezi community is formed by 
drawing an antagonistic frontier against the government. Protesters can be analyzed in 
                                                          
36 AKPlileri anlamak yerine “Hülöğ dedi, şunu dedi, bunu dedi” diye dalga geçtiler. 
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three groups according to how they defined what they are against. First, many 
interviewees maintained that they are protesting against the government. Second, some 
protesters struggled against broader phenomena, namely capitalism or patriarchy. 
However they deemed the government capitalist or patriarchal. Third, some 
interviewees were disturbed that the protests turned anti-government. 
Starting with the first group, among them there are the ones who wanted to oust 
the government and there are also those who only wanted the government to take a 
step back. Berke (Queer, Alevi, 25) maintains that Gezi was something against the 
government and he himself participated in the protests to overthrow the government. 
Ali (Alevi, 19) verbalizes that he wanted the AK Party to denounce the government. 
Onur (Kurdish Alevi, 55) sees the Gezi protests as an uprising challenging the 
government: 
In fact the Gezi event in Taksim was a popular uprising. Why was it a 
popular uprising? It was a civil demonstration and an important 
resistance of people who no longer endure the oppressions and 
dictatorship, it went further challenging the government. It was a huge 
resistance. If a revolution was not achieved in that period, believe me, it 
is because of the military and other factors. If it were in Europe, the 
government would already be toppled and a lot of people would be 
punished. Because the people are oppressed by the guns and killed by 
sticks. 37  
 
Aydin (Kemalist nationalist, 32) says government should resign because during 
such great demonstrations governments resign in Europe and in other democratic 
societies. However the AK Party government would never take a step back, he thinks.  
When Cagdas (Kemalist nationalist, 25) joined the protests, he did not want the 
government to resign. However, in thrill of the protests, he found himself gathering 
people behind him to raid the Prime Minister's Office in Dolmabahce. He would not 
stop until the people asked why they were walking towards Dolmabahce and he did 
not have any answer. Despite Cagdas states that it was a moment of furor during the 
protests, the attempt to raid Dolmabahce amounts to a desire to oust the Prime 
Minister.  
                                                          
37 Aslında Taksim’deki Gezi olayı bir halk ayaklanmasıydı. Neden bir halk ayaklanmasıydı? Bu kadar 
sıkıştırmaya, diktatörlüğe tahammülü kalmayan insanların, hükûmeti yıkmaya gidecek sivil bir eylem 
yapacak kadar önemli bir direnişiydi. Cok büyük bir direnişti, bu dönem eğer bir devrim yapılmadıysa 
inanın ki, askeriye ve diğer unsurlar sebebiyledir. Avrupa’da olsaydı çoktan hükûmet yıkılırdı ve birçok 
insan da ceza alırdı. Cünkü halka zulüm yapıldı silahlarla, insanlar öldürüldü sopalarla. 
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Mehmet (Ex-nationalist, 25) states that by joining the protests he only wanted 
the government to take a step back, not to resign. However, he does not oppose the 
idea of overthrowing the government, “The ones overthrowing the government [in the 
history] were the people, our predecessors. Are they traitors? They overthrew the 
government because of oppression. This time it is not about race, religion or sect. It is 
really about humanity and consciousness.”38  
Continuing with the interviewees who protested against the government 
without expecting a resignation, Eren (Ex-Gulenist, 25) is an example of them. Umut 
(Academician, 28) is another example who expected the government, which he deem 
was democratic at the beginning but took an authoritarian turn later, to question itself. 
Selin (Anti-capitalist Muslim, 32) says she protested against Tayyip Erdogan being 
the single man. Talha (Kurd, 28) says he was protesting against the arbitrary state 
violence that became evident again. He talks of a turn where the AK Party came to 
defend the rights of the oppressed but evolved into neo-Kemalism and started 
oppressing its opponents. He also adds he did not want the government to resign and 
he was troubled by the ones in Gezi who wanted to overthrow the government in order 
to restore Kemalism instead of neo-Kemalism.  
Second, some feminist and socialist protesters define designate their enemy as 
capitalism or patriarchy. Some socialists pursued a revolution out of Gezi Park protests 
and they think ousting the government is a precondition for it. Cagla (Socialist, 26) is 
among them who expects a revolution, which is not restricted to the ruling party, but 
the parliamentary system in general. Baris (Socialist, 28) is also a socialist who thinks 
a revolution could arrive after an uprising like Gezi. When he is asked about what he 
opposed in Gezi Park, he says:  
There it is reified as the AKP government for me. For me the AKP 
government is the ‘order’ there. It is the power at the end of the day, the 
one which executes, conducts, determines all these. Therefore I am 
actually an AKP opponent too. But mine is not merely an opposition to 
AKP, I was opposing other previous governments too. For me, this order 
must change altogether, with all its dirt.39 
 
                                                          
38 Hükûmeti yıkan halktı, atalarımızdı. Onlar vatan haini miydi? Baskıdan yıktılar. Bu seferki ırk, 
mezhep, din üzerine değil. Hakikaten insanlık, vicdan üzerine olur. 
39 AKP hükûmeti orada benim için cisimleşiyor. Benim için AKP hükûmeti orada “düzen”.  İktidar 
sonuçta, bütün bunların uygulayıcısı, yürütücüsü, karar alıcısı. Dolayısıyla ben de AKP karşıtıyım 
aslında. Ama benimki kuru bir AKP karşıtlığı değil, bundan önceki diğer iktidarların da karşıtıydım. 
Benim için bu düzenin topyekûn değişmesi gerekiyor, bütün pislikleriyle birlikte. 
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 Efe (27) is another socialist who considers the government as an agent of 
bourgeois democracy and he wanted resignation of the government and walked 
towards Dolmabahce. He thinks if Erdogan had made his mass go out to the streets 
this might have led to a civil war after which they can walk towards revolution. As a 
socialist feminist Gizem (25) maintains that she was protesting against patriarchy and 
capitalism and she thinks the government represents both. She says: “Gezi was 
something more extensive that cannot be reduced to opposition to the government. It 
was more of a rebellion against the neoliberal transformation itself and the role of the 
government in this”.40 Besides holding the government responsible for neoliberal 
transformation, she also states that government adopts a patriarchal language and 
implements policies restricting women. 
Lastly, some protesters were frustrated that protests became anti-government. 
Emre (Anti-capitalist Muslim, 38) is an example to them who thinks Gezi Park protests 
should oppose capitalism and the owning of property by a single class but it mostly 
turned into a protest against the government. For him this demand that can be 
compromised but cannot be the single aim. He maintains that the struggle must be 
directed against capitalism that occupies each place.  He believes that the protests were 
degraded to the level of party politics while their real opposition should have been the 
parliamentary democracy driven by the financing of the capital. He was annoyed with 
the groups trying to get supporters for their political parties in Gezi Park. Ayse 
(Feminist, 39) is another example who joined the protests only to oppose destruction 
of Gezi Park. She left the protests when she noticed that the only agenda of the 
protesters was the resignation of the government. 
According to my field work, antagonistic frontier during the Gezi Park protests 
was formed against the government. Opposition against the government created an 
equivalential relation among different groups in the park. Many of the interviewed 
protesters directly opposed the government. They had different levels of enmity, some 
of them expected a change in policies and others wanted to overthrow. Some 
interviewees considered themselves a part of more global anti-capitalist or anti-
patriarchal struggles however they deemed the government in the service of capitalism 
and patriarchy. Some interviewees who do not designate the government as their 
enemy were unhappy that protests turned anti-government. Yet all of the 16 
                                                          
40 Gezi biraz daha kapsamlı bir şeydi, hükûmet karşıtlığına indirgenemeyecek kadar. Biraz daha 
neoliberal dönüşümün kendisine ve hükûmetin bundaki rolüne bir isyan gibi bir şeydi. 
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interviewees approve that protests were basically against the government. Laclau 
anticipates that during popular struggles the frontier is less determinate and the identity 
of the enemy is not obvious, they depend on a process of political construction. 
(Laclau, 2005a, p. 86) At this point, I may assert that the Gezi Park protests had a 
different characteristic that antagonistic pole, the government, was relatively 
determinate and stable.  
Having defined the antagonistic pole of the Gezi Park protests, it is now time 
to explain the ways in which this antagonistic pole worked. There have been three 
main operations: First, some signifiers gained centrality and metonymically 
represented the government. Second, internal antagonisms within the Gezi protests 
were masked and projected to an outside, i.e. the government. Third, by the drawing 
of the frontiers separating inside from outside, Gezi community is constituted and 
sublimated. These operations will be analyzed in the following sections. 
 
4.3.1. Erdogan as master signifier 
In discursive construction of the enemy, some privileged signifiers “condense 
in themselves the signification of a whole antagonistic camp” (Laclau, 2005a, p. 87). 
These privileged signifiers functions as a master signifier that embodies the enemy.  
According to my fieldwork, ‘Erdogan’ functioned as a master signifier that 
metonymically represented the antagonistic pole in the Gezi Park discourse. 
How Erdogan embodied the enemy of Gezi community is visible in Aydin 
(Kemalist nationalist, 32)’s thought. He thinks after millions of people took to the 
streets against his government, Erdogan not only should resign but also should commit 
suicide. However, he says Erdogan would cling to his armchair further. Berke (Queer, 
Alevi, 25) is of the opinion that only one common ground for all protesters is their 
anger against Erdogan. Selin (Anti-capitalist Muslim, 32) joined the protests because 
she opposed to Erdogan. Efe (Socialist, 27) maintains that Erdogan is a dictator and 
should resign during protests. Umut (Academician, 28) says he along with his friends 
were in the protests because “We had some criticism for the government, especially 
for the personality of Tayyip Erdogan.”41 Ali (Alevi, 19) was protesting against 
Erdogan’s “exploitation of people”. Onur (Kurdish Alevi, 55) refers to Erdogan’s 
governance indirectly when he says Gezi was a resistance against dictatorship. 
                                                          
41 Hükûmete karşı, özelliklede Tayyip Erdoğan’ın şahsına eleştirilerimiz vardı. 
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Similarly Baris (Socialist, 28) implies him when he says fascist dictatorship is in rule 
in Turkey.  
In my observations in Gezi Park, there were cartoons of Erdogan and writings 
on the placards and on the walls that swear Erdogan. I also witnessed that the protesters 
were jumping, beating out and screaming “Jump! Jump! If you don’t jump you are 
supporter of Tayyip!”42 During Gezi Park protests there happened also burning of 
placards with pictures of Erdogan (IHA, 2013).  
All these examples shows that signifier of Erdogan had been highly invested 
in the Gezi Park protest discourse. It turned into a master signifier that embodies 
antagonism of Gezi community. 
 
4.3.2. Masking antagonistic fissure of Gezi 
Antagonistic fissure in Gezi Park, in other words, conflicts and contradictions 
among different groups were masked and projected to the government. This is the 
process defined by Zizek as fantasy (Zizek, 1989). Fantasy functions to mask and to 
compensate the inconsistency implicit in any social formation. Protesters projected the 
implicit negativity for the formation of Gezi community to the government and it had 
turned into a figure that embodies this impossibility. In this section, I will analyze the 
tactics used by protesters to mask real antagonism of Gezi community. Protesters 
prioritized the evil of the government and remained within the movement despite the 
groups to who they oppose, neglected the problems they encountered in Gezi Park and 
blamed the government for the conflicts during protests.   
To begin with protesters who gave precedence to opposition to the government 
and remained in the Gezi Park protests despite the existence of the people whom they 
oppose, Berke (Queer, Alevi, 25) is an example to them. He is aware of the fact that 
not all of the protesters were libertarian and there were also ‘sexist idiots’ whom he 
cannot agree as a queer activist but he bore with them because he only wanted to 
overthrow the government: 
My greatest demand was overthrowing the government, but this did not 
happen. I wanted a lot. I still want this. Because Gezi was something 
against the government. I also know this. There were people who came 
there with zero environmental consciousness or there were a lot of sexist 
idiot people, who have only one common point that is the anger against 
Tayyip Erdogan. Even there were people I encountered who said this: “I 
                                                          
42 “Zıpla! Zıpla! Zıplamayan Tayyipçi!” See some examples Akpinar (2013), Karabiber (2013), 
Occupygezi (2013).  
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am for AKP, until now I’ve voted for AKP. Today, if the leader is 
changed, Arinc may come or Abdullah Gul may come to lead again; I 
will vote again. But I will not vote for this man.”43 
 
Gizem (Socialist Feminist, 25) was another example who never thought of 
leaving Gezi Park despite she and her group could not prevent the use of a sexist 
language in the protests. She was annoyed that that some protesters in the park were 
resisting by cursing the wife of Erdogan and the slogans were sexist because football 
fans were dominating the slogans. Her group, Socialist Feminist Collective, organized 
a workshop against the sexist language but she thinks it was not successful. Other than 
the sexist people she also tolerated Kemalist nationalists during protests: “For me, as 
I define myself as a person against nationalism in Turkey, it was little bit difficult to 
stay together with the TGB, Turkish flags and all. But we tolerated each other. Not 
understanding but tolerating.”44  
Similarly, Efe (Socialist, 27) utters his fear of Kemalist nationalists as follows: 
“I knew that if the revolution occurred, firstly they would shoot me. Because I belong 
to a lower class than them, besides I am a socialist. They are Kemalist nationalists and 
so on”45. He also criticizes the mass in general for lacking class consciousness. 
However, despite all these inconveniences when I asked if he thought about giving up 
the protests he said: “No, not really.”46 
Some Kurdish protesters remained in the protests despite that they were 
bothered with the attitudes of Kemalist nationalists. For instance, Talha (Kurd, 28) was 
uncomfortable with the Kemalist nationalists and he hesitated to join the protests. 
Police violence had been a priority for him and he decided to join the protests on 1 
June 2013 after seeing the news on the social media about the injured and murdered 
protesters. It is interesting that there were no deaths yet in the days he joined. But it is 
also true that there was a propaganda on social media which exaggerated the violence 
                                                          
43 En büyük talebim hükûmetin devrilmesiydi, olmadı. Çok istiyordum. Hala da istiyorum. Çünkü Gezi 
hükûmet karşıtı bir şeydi. Şeyi de biliyorum yani. Oraya gelip de çevre bilinci sıfır olan veya cinsiyetçi 
hödük bir sürü insanın da tek ortak noktası, Gezi’ye gelenlerin yüzde yüz ortak noktası Tayyip 
Erdoğan’a olan kızgınlıktı. Hatta şey diyenler bile oldu. Ben şeyle bile karşılaştım: “AKPliyim, şimdiye 
kadar hep AKP’ye oy verdim. Eğer bugün bu lider değişsin Arınç gelsin ya da Abdullah Gül tekrar 
gelsin partinin başına yine oy veririm. Ama bu adama oy vermem.” 
44 Benim için, ben Türkiye’deki milliyetçiliğe karşı duran bir insan olarak kendimi tanımlıyorum, 
mesela TGB ile Türk bayraklarıyla ve o halle de birlikte durmak birazcık zordu ama birbirimizi biraz 
tolere ettik. Anlamak değil, tolere etmek. 
45 Şeyi biliyordum, devrim olsaydı bu insanlar ilk başta bana sıkacaklardı. Cünkü ben sınıf olarak 
onlardan düşük bir sınıftayım, hem de ben sosyalistim. Onlar ulusalcı vesaire. 
46 Hayır [düşündüğüm] olmadı. Gerçekten. 
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in the demonstrations by means of sharing fake photos of death and injured as if they 
were taken in Gezi Park.  
Some protesters believed that the government was responsible for the conflicts 
that occurred within the park and for the ones stoning the police. For instance, 
according to Umut (Academician, 28), if there were any conflict within the park it 
must be related to the MIT (National Intelligence Organization) and this is a 
provocation. He also thinks that it is possible that some leftist high-school students 
smashed the windows of local shops with the energy of the youth, an act he deem 
unimportant. Aydin (Kemalist nationalist, 32) holds the undercover police responsible 
for the conflicts in the park: “The state is very much interested and wise in sowing 
seeds of discord. I assume that obviously there were undercover policemen who 
introduce themselves as TGB supporters to infiltrate TGB and later they say they 
support BDP and cause quarrels or they do the opposite. Or there were obviously 
undercover policemen who said “Let’s go, stone”. The state knows dispersion methods 
well and mercilessly set people against each other.”47 
Some Gezi Park protesters swept the problems they encountered aside. For 
example, Baris (Socialist, 28) was annoyed with the Kemalist nationalists who did not 
want the Kurds and some narrow-minded protesters who opposed LGBT members 
however he thinks they were not effective at all and the mass did not allow such 
exclusionary attitude. Cagla (Socialist, 26) was disturbed with the ones who did not 
want Ocalan flag and had the Turkish flag [Kemalist nationalists]. However she 
endured them in pursuit of revolution: “We should not have any problems with the 
flag and those who believe in that idea sincerely. After all, we will achieve a revolution 
together with them.”48 She thinks disagreements are normal when there is a riot 
including all the colors and she prefers to emphasize the photograph of the two people 
running hand in hand and one having a BDP flag and the other a Turkish flag with an 
Ataturk figure. Cagdas (Kemalist nationalist, 25) was unhappy with the PKK flags and 
he deem those who hang that flags are separatist. He relieved after the park was cleared 
                                                          
47 Devlet nifak tohumu sokma konusunda çok ilgili ve bilgili. Atıyorum TGB’liyim deyip TGB’lilerin 
içine girip BDP’liyim ben deyip olay çıkartabilen ya da tam tersini yapan sivil polislerin olduğu aşikâr. 
Ya da “Hadi gelin taş atalım” diyen sivil polislerin olduğu aşikâr. Dağıtma yöntemlerini iyi biliyor 
devlet ve insanları acımasızca birbirine kırdırabiliyor. 
48 Bizim bayrakla da o düşünceye samimi bir şekilde inanan insanlarla da aslında bir sorunumuz 
olmamalı. Onlarla birlikte yapacağız devrimi zaten. 
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of all flags and political signs except the Turkish flag and he thought they no longer 
pose a problem.  
Lastly, it should also be noted that, there are also protesters like Ayse 
(Feminist, 39) who abandoned the protests after encountering the protesters that she 
could not condone, especially Kemalist nationalists. She also regrets for joining the 
protests in the first place.  
Opposing groups in Gezi Park managed to stay together by drawing an 
antagonistic frontier against the government and projecting the antagonistic fissure to 
the government. The government turned into something that threatens the unity of Gezi 
community and at the same time what constitutes their unity by showing what they are 
not. The protesters transferred an aspiration to a fullness to the constituted Gezi 
community as will be analyzed the next section. 
 
4.3.3. Sublimation of Gezi 
Gezi Park protesters who are disappointed by the government, whose demands 
were not fulfilled by the government came together on the ground of their antagonistic 
relation to the government. Unfulfilled demands evoked an aspiration to a fullness 
which contains everything. Protesters transferred that aspiration to the constituted Gezi 
community. This transfer is only possible by elevating constituted totality to the 
dignity of the ‘thing’ through idealization and sublimation. Masking real antagonism 
of Gezi facilitated this sublimation and protesters further attributed a perfection to the 
Gezi community which will be examined in this section. 
Some protesters considered Gezi as something unimpeachable. For example, 
Berke (Queer, Alevi, 25) says “There is no bad criticism we could make about Gezi. I 
am a person who criticizes everything. But really even I cannot find anything. Because 
it was such a peaceful thing above politics.”49 Efe (Socialist, 27) thinks everybody was 
living in the park in solidarity and nobody was committing crimes. He says “We tasted 
statelessness, we tasted policelessness. I think this is very important. There is no police 
no security, but nothing was stolen, nobody was got harassed.”50 
                                                          
49 Gezi’yle ilgili yapabileceğimiz kötü hiçbir eleştiri yok. Ben böyle otu b.ku eleştiren bir insanım. 
Gerçekten ben dahi bulamıyorum. Çünkü böyle o kadar barışçı o kadar siyasetler üstü bir şeydi ki. 
50 Biz devletsizliği tattık ya biz polissizliği tattık. Bence bu çok önemli bir şey. Polis yok güvenlik yok, 
kimse kapkaça tacize uğramadı. 
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Some protesters idealize Gezi as a model of perfect place that they struggle to 
establish. For instance Baris (Socialist, 28) says “Gezi remained as something pure. 
Because there was will to collective ownership, collective production, common use, 
reading and debating together. Those who want, miss and struggle to establish another 
world are the ones who colored Gezi.”51 Aydin (Kemalist nationalist, 32), as a 
communist, deems Gezi as example of commune. He maintains that in Gezi Park 
everybody was helping each other, doing whatever needs to be done, sharing their 
foods and clothes and establishing their own library and medical room. He thinks that 
the decisions in Gezi were taken with the consensus of 100 percent after different ideas 
were discussed. Emre (Anti-capitalist Muslim, 38) attributes an excellence to Gezi 
based on Islamic teachings: “In Gezi, what we see in Qur’an was experienced. The 
ones who never read Qur’an does not know it but because of their characteristics 
coming from creation, because of their fitrahs [innate inclination] they noticed and 
experienced a thing that they long for.”52 Onur (Kurdish Alevi, 55) thinks that Gezi 
was a great popular uprising uniting all people of Turkey. He goes so far as to claim 
there were AK Party tents in Gezi Park: “There were AKP supporters too. All parties 
were there, we saw. MHP, CHP, AKP, HDP tents stood side by side. Socialists 
protected their praying Muslim brothers from gas by encircling them. What a beautiful 
thing it was, uniting all people.”53 
In conclusion, the protesters sublimated Gezi community by considering it as 
pure, ideal and peaceful. Some of them attributed a perfection that they aspire to make 
real in their life to Gezi. 
 
4.4. What is the matter with the government? 
The Gezi Park protests have a general character of opposition to the 
government as it has been explained in the preceding part. This fact brings upon the 
questions as to what problems the protesters had with the government. In order to 
understand this antagonistic relationship in detail, I asked the protesters what disturbed 
                                                          
51 Gezi ‘temiz’ bir şey olarak kaldı. Çünkü orada ortak mülkiyet, birlikte üretme, birlikte kullanma, 
birlikte okuma, tartışma iradesi var. Geziye rengini verenler başka bir dünyayı isteyen, özleyen, 
kurulması için mücadele verenler. 
52 Gezi’de bizim Kur’an’da gördüğümüz, ama hiç Kur’an’la haşır neşir olmamış insanların bilmediği 
ama yaradılışından gelen özelliklerden dolayı, fıtratlarından dolayı, bir bilinç olarak farkında oldukları, 
özlemini duydukları bir şey yaşandı. 
53 Orada AKP’li de vardı. Orada bütün partiler vardı, biz gördük. MHP, CHP, AKP, HDP çadırları vardı 
yan yana. Oradaki Müslüman kardeşler namaz kılarken, sosyalistler gaz gelmesin diye etraflarına 
çember oluşturdu. Ne güzel bir şeydi bu, halkı birleştirmek. 
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them with the rule of AK Party government. I also searched if their opinions changed 
in any way about the AK Party government since its emergence in 2002 and if there 
were any moments of rupture in their views.  
It is understood from my interviews that some of the protesters are disturbed 
with the AK Party since it came into power and their problems are related to anti-
Kemalism, neoliberalism or conservatism. Some interviewees see an authoritarian turn 
in the AK Party line. They are the ones who were hopeful about the AK Party at the 
beginning but at some point they were disappointed with its policies. Some 
interviewees relate their daily problems with the government and some others seem to 
have some fantastic convictions about AK Party. I will analyze the disturbance with 
the conservatism of AK Party at the end of this section. Since many interviewees 
maintain that the government is intervening their way of life in a conservative manner, 
I will scrutinize the issue of ‘way of life’ in a subsection.  
Protesters such as Berke (Queer, Alevi, 25) regards the AK Party as anti-
Kemalist and was never hopeful about the AK Party. He criticizes some leftist groups 
such as the DSIP for supporting the AK Party during the 2010 referendum by means 
of saying “Not Enough But Yes”54. “I said no because the new constitution would not 
be more democratic. I am sure about it.”55 He warns that all the events are an illusion 
and people are too naive in trusting the AK party.  He utters his discomfort with the 
anti-Kemalist discourse of the referendum period as follows: 
There were people saying, “I hate the Kemalists so much that the AK 
Party is better”. How come you infer this? They are not as bad as you 
thought. Kemalists are not as bad as you knew; please do not consider 
them in single way anymore. They are not simply elitists. There are 
people not like that but ordinary secular Sunnis and Alevis. On the one 
side of polarization there are ones who becomes more conservative and 
on the other side there are ones who cling to Kemalism.56  
 
Cagdas (Kemalist nationalist, 25) was also disturbed by the government for 
being disrespectful to Kemalist values. He states “I am disturbed by the government’s 
efforts to discredit the heroes of the republic who hold an important place in in the 
                                                          
54 Yetmez Ama Evet 
55 Hayır dedim çünkü yerine gelecek anayasa daha demokratik olmayacak. Ben bundan eminim. 
56 Şey diyenler oldu: “Kemalistlerden o kadar nefret ediyorum ki gene Ak Parti daha iyi ya.” Ben de 
pardon hani nasıl bunun çıkarımını yapabiliyorsun diyordum. Kemalistler bu kadar da bildiğiniz gibi 
kötü insanlar değiller, lütfen artık Kemalistleri bu kadar tekil okumayın. Kemalizme tutunanları sadece 
elitist olarak görmemek lazım. Öyle olmayan sıradan seküler Sunniler ve Aleviler var. Kutuplaşmanın 
bir tarafında muhafazakârlaşanlar bir tarafta Kemalizme sarılanlar. 
52 
 
anti-imperialist struggle during the war of independence.” 57 referring to Erdogan’s 
expression of ‘two drunkards’ which are discussed as he meant Ataturk and Inonu. He 
maintains that the government is directed, even commanded by imperialist powers and 
as a result Turkey is having conflicts with its neighbors.  
Some protesters define their problem with the government as neoliberalism. 
For instance Emre (Anti-capitalist Muslim, 38) considers the AK Party as a 
conservative neoliberal party. He is very annoyed that the AK Party articulated the 
conservatives to capitalism. He also thinks that the government adopted a domination 
process similar to Kemalism and subdues anyone who is not from their side. Gizem 
(Socialist feminist, 25) is also disturbed by the neoliberal policies of the government 
which include urban transformation and gentrification. 
Some protesters are disappointed with the government and they see an 
authoritarian or Kemalist turn in the policies. For instance Umut (Academician, 28) is 
an ex-voter of the AK Party and now he is annoyed with the party for taking an 
authoritative stance. He thinks the constant increase of votes gave the government too 
much self-confidence that they made mistakes. He says:  
During the protests the authoritarian personality of Tayyip Erdogan 
relapsed the most. Before, especially before 2011, we knew Tayyip 
Erdogan as a person who was more reconciliatory, and that negotiates 
with his circle, and has wise elder brothers and intelligent people around 
him. But, for the first time during the Gezi Park protests with the attitude, 
“this is my word, how come my word is not applied” he revealed his 
authoritarian nature. He used an incredibly angry, nervous and offensive 
language of violence.58 
 
Efe (Socialist, 27) had been hopeful about the AK Party at the beginning. He 
is of the opinion that Erdogan made young people believe him when he was on Genc 
Bakis before 2002 elections. He expected that things would change, however, later he 
noticed all that was said was only for show and Erdogan turned into a dictator. Talha 
(Kurd, 28) was also disappointed with the AK Party. He maintains that the party came 
to power and made a pledge to defend the rights of the oppressed but it evolved into a 
                                                          
57 Hükûmetin ülkenin kurtuluş savaşında verdiği anti-emperyalist mücadelede önemli yere sahip 
kahramanlarını itibarsızlaştırma çabalarından rahatsızım. 
58 Tayyip Erdoğan’ın otoriter kişiliği orada ilk defa o kadar nüksetti. Ondan önce, hele hele 2011 den 
önce Tayyip Erdoğan’ı daha uzlaşmacı, etrafıyla istişare eden, yanında akıl sahibi ağabeyleri ve âkil 
insanlar olan bir insan olarak biliyorduk. Ama ilk defa Gezi Parkı eylemlerinde “dediğim dedik, benim 
dediğim nasıl olmaz” düşüncesiyle o otoriter yönünü orada ortaya çıkartmış oldu. Zaten inanılmaz 
sinirli, gergin, hakaretler eden bir şiddet dili kullandı. 
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neo-Kemalist government that oppress its opponents. For him, KCK (Kurdistan 
Communities Union) arrests and neoliberal policies had marked breaking points.  
Some protesters relate their daily problems with the government. For instance, 
Cagla (Socialist, 25) lists her problems with the government as subcontracting, 
unemployment and difficulties of university graduates in finding work. In a similar 
vein, Ali (Alevi, 19) relates his daily problems to the Erdogan. He maintains that 
Erdogan exploits people. Then he defines the exploitation as the government on one 
hand, provides, but on the other takes back what it provided by different means. He 
thinks the money from everything goes to state via taxes, expensive cost of travel and 
constant price increases in electricity and natural gas. Such examples show that 
interviewees see Gezi protests as a way of expressing their very daily problems. These 
show enormous investments made in the signifiers of Erdogan and Gezi. They became 
nodal points in which vast range of heterogeneous issues were quilted.  
Some interviewees seemed to have some fantastic convictions about the AK 
Party, which reveals that one of the motives of the Gezi protests was an ungrounded 
fear or anxiety about the future. Ali (Alevi, 19) is a specific example who assessed the 
AK Party on quirky grounds. One of the disturbances he felt was, as aforementioned, 
the existence of the bars and saloons in Taksim, and the drunk people making too much 
noise. He also states his anxiety about the future as follows: 
There is a constitution made by Ataturk. It has a specific year [Current 
Constitution of Turkey was made in 1982 under military junta]. In 2023, 
this constitution will end and a cancellation agreement will come [There 
is no such agreement]. If the AK Party stays as the government, if 
Erdogan continues leading, he will make his own constitution. I believe 
there will also be a curfew in 2023. There will be famine in 2025. I 
believe this. Because the AK Party is in power, and nothing will be done. 
After that date if there is any wealth in the market, Erdogan will continue 
exploitation. He will put forth enquiries; make people become more 
destitute. This is so.59  
 
If the disturbances of the interviewees with the government are considered 
according to their identities, the role of antagonism as constitutive other is very much 
                                                          
59 Şimdi Atatürk’ün koyduğu bir anayasa var. Bu anayasanın belirli bir yılı da var. 2023’te bu anayasa 
sona erecek. Fesh anlaşması gelecek. İktidarda Ak Parti olduğu sürece, Erdoğan devam ettikçe başta bu 
sefer kendi anayasasını kendi koymaya başlayacak. Ben şuna inanıyorum ki 2023’te sokağa çıkma 
yasağı da olacak. 2025’te de kıtlık olacak. Ben buna inanıyorum. Ak Parti iktidarda olduğundan dolayı 
yine hiçbir şey olmayacak. 2023ten sonra zenginlik zaten piyasaya çıkmaya başladıktan sonra Erdoğan 
sömürüye geri devam edecek. Tahkikler çıkaracak, insanları kendine daha çok muhtaç etmeye devam 
ettirecek. Yani budur. 
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visible. It constitutes the identity by a negative reference, by showing what it is not. In 
the discourse of Gezi Park protesters, the government functions as such and each 
identity group in the park attribute the government different characteristics opposite to 
their identity. According to socialists the government is capitalist, for feminists it is 
patriarchal, for Alevis it is Sunni, for anti-capitalist Muslims it is capitalist and 
Kemalist, similarly for Kurds it is Kemalist and for Kemalists it is anti-Kemalist. 
Protesters linked both daily and global problems to the government. Some protesters 
had ungrounded convictions about the government that they worry about their future. 
Some protesters’ problem with the AK Party is conservatism. For instance, 
Berke (Queer, Alevi, 25) has a secularist worldview and he maintains that the country 
is becoming conservative and there is a potential danger of Sharia. He states his trouble 
with the AK Party government as follows: 
Because this government is a religious government, it interprets 
everything with religion. And with its policies it pulled the accent of the 
politics over religion. Therefore, other dissident political parties also 
justify themselves with religion. Look we are Muslim, too. Look at a lot 
of statements of Demirtas, he always says I am also Muslim and so forth. 
Was the politics in Turkey like that before? We are even obliged to justify 
ourselves with religion when we refer to the LGBT rights and women 
rights.60 
 
He states that he has a fear of Sharia inherited from his father. On the night that 
the votes were counted and AK Party came to power in 2002, his father was drinking 
with his friends and saying “This is the night that we are over.” 61 When his mother 
objected and said it might be better because they are Muslims and fear God, his father 
replied “You don’t have them pegged, I do. Tomorrow they will take revenge. We as 
Alevis, what harm did we do to this country? But they will firstly hunt us. We will 
suffer with torment.” 62 He thinks that what his father said has come true. He thinks 
that all Sunnis watched the Madimak massacre in cold blood during the conservative 
government of Erbakan and Ciller. He believes that the AK Party follows the mentality 
                                                          
60 Bu hükûmet dindar bir hükûmet olduğu için her şeyi din üzerinden yorumlayan bir hükûmet. Ve 
ülkedeki siyasetin eksenini de hep yaptığı politikalarla dinin üzerine çekti. Haliyle diğer muhalif partiler 
de hep kendilerini din üzerinden aklıyorlar. Bakın biz de Müslümanız falan. Demirtaş’ın birçok 
açıklamasına bak adam hep böyle ben de Müslümanım falan. Daha önce böyle miydi Türkiye’de siyaset. 
Biz LGBT haklarından, kadın haklarından bahsederken bile kendimizi din üzerinden aklamak zorunda 
bırakılıyoruz. 
61 “Bu gece bittiğimiz gece.” 
62 “Asıl ciğerini sen bilmiyorsun, ben bunların ciğerini biliyorum. Bunlar yarın bürgün hepimizden çok 
ağır intikam alacak. Bizim mesela, bizden kasıt Aleviler, ne zararımız oldu bu ülkeye. Ama ilk bizi 
avlayacaklar. En büyük acısı bizden çıkacak.” 
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of perpetrators of Madimak. He thinks that currently in the country, conservatives have 
all the power and are abusing the country.  
Aydin (Kemalist nationalist, 32) is also disturbed by the conservative 
government and states that the government only takes decisions representing its 
conservative grassroots not the whole country. Onur (Kurdish Alevi, 55) states that he 
is annoyed with the conservative government because it says “one language, one 
religion, one sect”.63 Gizem (Socialist feminist, 25) thinks that this government 
implements patriarchal state logic in a conservative manner. She explains her trouble 
with the government as follows: 
I, as a feminist, have diverse problems with the government. Mainly, how 
to be a woman is defined by the existing family policies of the 
government. Not only this government but also previous ones defined it 
as well, this government is defining it in a conservative manner. But it 
also decides how conservative women should be. Even if you are 
conservative you might not be “that woman” actually.64 
 
Many interviewees say that the government intervenes in their way of life and 
they consider it is related to the conservatism of the government. In the following 
subsection, I will investigate the issue of ‘way of life’ by appealing to Zizek. 
 
4.4.1. Government as thief of enjoyment 
Zizek deals with the way of life in his Tarrying with the Negative (Zizek, 1993). 
He asserts that the way of life is the way a community organizes and experiences its 
enjoyment (Zizek, 1993, p. 201). As explained in theory chapter, enjoyment is the 
aspiration to an impossible fullness, a ‘thing’. Enjoyment has the same hegemonic 
logic of ‘we’ that it holds a given community together. While the ‘thing’ cannot be 
reduced to the way of life, the existence of the ‘thing’ is experienced through 
ambiguous way of life of ‘us’ (Ogut, 2010, p. 93). The Other threatens the ‘thing’ 
which appears as something only ‘we’ can reach, as “what gives plenitude and vivacity 
to our life” and as something the Other cannot conceive (Zizek, 1993, p. 201). The 
Other of ‘us’ appears as something that subverts ‘our’ enjoyment and threatens ‘our’ 
way of life. Zizek names this menace to our way of life presented by the Other as “theft 
                                                          
63 Tek dil, tek din, tek mezhep 
64 Feminist olarak benim hükûmetle çeşitli dertlerim var. Temel olarak da hükûmetin mevcut aile 
politikalarıyla nasıl kadın olacağımızın tanımlanıyor olması. Bunu sadece bu hükûmet değil başka 
hükûmetler de tanımlayıp durdu, bu hükûmet de muhafazakâr bir şekilde tanımlıyor. Ama muhafazakâr 
kadınların da nasıl olması gerektiğini tanımlıyor. O yüzden muhafazakâr da olsan aslında “o kadın” 
olamayabilirsin.  
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of enjoyment”. The ‘Other’ here conceptualized by Zizek corresponds to antagonism 
in Laclau’s approach, specifically to ‘symbolic antagonism’ in my analysis. Later 
Zizek asserts that ‘we’ hate the Other in its very being because it essentially steals our 
own enjoyment (Zizek, 1993, p. 203). According to him, this is the general formula of 
racism. However, he asserts, there is a paradox that the Other is the Other in our 
interior, it is the inner antagonism inherent in any community (Zizek, 1993, p. 203). 
The ‘Other’ here corresponds to real antagonism in my analysis. “What we conceal by 
imputing to the Other the theft of enjoyment is the traumatic fact that we never 
possessed what was allegedly stolen from us: the lack is originary, enjoyment 
constitutes itself as ‘stolen’”(Zizek, 1993, p. 203). Therefore, considering the symbolic 
antagonism as thief of enjoyment is a way of concealing the originary lack, i.e. real 
antagonism, impossibility of any totality. In this way symbolic antagonism embodies 
the innermost split of totality and at the same time prevents that totality from achieving 
full identity with itself. 
According to my fieldwork, for the Gezi Park protesters, the government 
appears as something that threatens their way of life. Among the threats to their way 
of life, the issues of alcohol, sexual liberties and abortion come to the forefront. Putting 
forward these elements of enjoyment to be stolen is related to conservatism of the 
government. This theft of enjoyment is mostly defined by their fears of Islam 
considering that Muslims are supposed not to consume alcohol, not to have abortion 
except for strictly defined cases and not to have sexual relationship outside marriage. 
By designating the government as thief of enjoyment protesters able to constitute that 
enjoyment as an aspiration to an unachieved fullness i.e. Gezi community. 
Berke (Queer, Alevi, 25) is an example who maintains that the government 
intervenes in his way of life. He states that due to new conservatism brought by the 
AK Party government that young people are accused of kissing in the metro lines, 
holding hands in parks. Aydin (Kemalist nationalist, 32) states that his way of life is 
being interfered by the government. He describes this interference as destruction of 
bars and cafes to which he used to go in Taksim. Cagdas (Kemalist nationalist, 25) 
thinks that this government intervenes in his private life too much. When he is asked 
about these interventions, he says “For example, the ban of alcohol, the restraints of 
the government against abortion.”65 Eren (25, ex-Gulenist) thinks the government does 
                                                          
65 Örneğin alkol yasağı, kürtaj hakkındaki hükûmetin uygulamaları. 
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not let people breathe and does not leave them any space to live in. He asks to the 
government “I was saying that the alcohol I drink should not annoy you, my sexual 
life should not annoy you.”66 Efe (Socialist, 27) states that what disturbs him the most 
about the AK Party government is the intervention in his life. He specifies the events 
that disturbed him as Tarlabasi and Sulukule urban transformations, the destruction of 
Emek Cinema and Inci Pastry Shop, the restrictions on alcohol sales, the increase in 
prices of alcohol and cigarettes, the closing of Taksim on mayday and the banning of 
marches on Istiklal Avenue. He thinks that all these practices of the government are 
direct intervention to his life:  
I keep referring to alcohol but it is not only alcohol. It is a direct 
intervention in your life. Yes, you don’t die if you don’t drink, you don’t 
die if you don’t walk around, you don’t die if you don’t go out. But there 
is an intervention in your living space. You cannot breathe. You cannot 
go out and shout with three people. You cannot use your most natural 
right, you cannot criticize. All these [problems] amass on top of other 
and finally exploded in Gezi.67  
 
Similarly, Baris (Socialist, 28) also complains about intervention of the 
government in every field of people’s life. He says “People fell into a situation that 
they cannot breathe in any field of life.68 Gizem (Socialist Feminist, 25) says that the 
government is meddling in their different ways of lives. Selin (Anti-capitalist Muslim, 
32) thinks that because the AK Party is in rule, conservatives are too offensive against 
others and they intervene other people’s lives. She gives the example of her Christian 
friends whose child was baptized at night because they feared from the reactions of 
their conservative neighbors. Given that one of their pro-AK Party neighbor once said 
“What was baptism? You must circumcise the child. If you don’t, I will abduct the 
child and do.”69 She thinks that what the AK Party practices is not Muslimhood and 
neither atheists can live atheism and nor minorities can practice their religion under 
the AK Party rule. 
All these examples show that the government appeared as something that 
threatened the way of life of Gezi Park protesters. In other words, government 
                                                          
66 Ben diyordum ki benim içtiğim alkol seni rahatsız etmesin, benim cinsel hayatım seni rahatsız 
etmesin. 
67 Hep alkole bağlıyorum ama aslında bunlar sadece alkol değil. Senin hayatına birebir müdahale. Evet, 
onu yapmazsan ölmezsin. İçmezsen ölmezsin, takılmazsan ölmezsin, sokağa çıkmazsan ölmezsin. Ama 
senin yaşam alanına müdahale var. Nefes alamıyorsun. Üç kişi sokağa çıkıp bağıramıyorsun. En doğal 
hakkını kullanamıyorsun, eleştiri yapamıyorsun. Bunların hepsi birikiyor birikiyor, Gezi’de patladı. 
68 İnsanlar artık hayatın her alanında nefes alamaz duruma geldiler. 
69 “Vaftiz de neymiş, sünnet ettirin çocuğu, siz fark etmezsiniz ben kaçırıp yaptırırım.” 
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intervened in the way they experienced their enjoyment as an unachieved fullness. In 
this way, Gezi community is constituted around a stolen enjoyment. Its impossibility 
as a fullness is concealed by designating the government as a thief. 
 
4.5. Naming Gezi: failure  
In discourse analytical theory ‘demand’ is the basic unit of analysis. Any 
political movement or program starts with negativity i.e. aggregation of unsatisfied 
demands against an antagonism, but it can be successful only when it achieves to 
construct something positive i.e. establish hegemony. A social movement may become 
hegemonic when a social subjectivity is constituted around a popular demand. A 
popular demand is what articulates all unsatisfied particular demands in an 
equivalential chain against antagonism. Articulation is an operation that changes 
identities of particular demands and they are identified with the popular demand. In 
this way, popular demand assumes the representation of an incommensurable totality. 
It can only embody such totality by turning into an empty signifier: something 
unrepresentable within totality as a differential position because it deals with the very 
constitution of that totality. Empty signifier, on the other hand, can be represented by 
a name. According to discourse theory, act of naming is at the very heart of a popular 
demand that its name grounds unity of the totality. In other words, popular movements 
can become hegemonic if heterogeneous demands crystallize in a unified collective 
will through a name. It is only through that crystallization, the ‘people’ is constituted 
as an historical actor that has potential to challenge the existing order and to 
reconstitute the social by transforming the existing power relations. To show how 
naming the popular demand brings about a possibility of change in the social order, 
Laclau gives the example of Russian Revolution in 1917. ‘Bread, peace and land’ 
became the popular demands and turned into “the names of a universality that 
transcended their actual particular contents” (Laclau, 1990, p. 97). All Russian 
grievances and social demands including empty terms of ‘justice’ and ‘freedom’ were 
invested into those three demands. If a name could not be given to the aggregation of 
unsatisfied particular demands against antagonism, it is not possible to constitute a 
totalizing horizon and this aggregation will only be a vague solidarity. 
Considering the demands and the aims of the protesters based on my fieldwork, 
it can be asserted that during Gezi Park protests almost unlimited particular demands 
had been inscribed in an equivalential chain against the government. However, 
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transition to a popular demand could not been achieved throughout the protests and 
the consolidation could not go beyond negativity. The protection of Gezi Park had 
been the most spelled out demand throughout the protests, however it could not 
become a popular demand. A popular demand is what universally represents all other 
particular demands in the chain of equivalence. In other words, particular demands 
must be identified with the popular demand and this operation may necessitate 
compromise or sacrifice of the requests involved in those demands. However, demand 
to protect Gezi Park could not gain such a universal position that most of the protesters 
refused to confine their struggle only to protection of Gezi park and they prioritized 
their different particular demands. Considering the name of ‘Gezi’ itself, it could not 
function as an empty signifier representing mythical fullness for two reasons. First the 
name of Gezi was restricted by its conceptual determination that prevents it from 
having a performative function. By the conceptual determination I mean that Gezi is 
already a name of place, a park. Despite the name of the popular demand gains a 
universal empty character, it does not entirely lose its particular conceptual dimension. 
Second, there is an operation to empty ‘Gezi’, however, I claim based on my fieldwork 
that the name of ‘Gezi’ did not function to constitute something positive but only took 
the meaning of being against the government. In other words, it functioned similar to 
the master signifier of ‘Erdogan’ in reverse and represented the equivalential chain in 
its negativity. Laclau discusses a case in which the empty signifier becomes entirely 
empty and equivalentially articulates contradictory contents which do not cohere with 
each other (Laclau, 1990, p. 217). He evaluated it as an extreme situation in which, in 
Freudian terms, the only link between the brothers is love for the father/leader. He 
assesses that in such a situation constituted unity is extremely fragile and the 
antagonism between contradictory demands can burst at any moment. “A love for the 
leader which does not crystallize in any form of institutional regularity -in 
psychoanalytic terms: an ego ideal which is not partially internalized by ordinary egos- 
can result only in fleeting popular identities” (Laclau, 1990, p. 217). I argue that what 
happened in Gezi is the other extreme situation: the link between protesters is hate for 
the leader. Other than this difference, it displays the same characteristics anticipated 
by Laclau.  
In this section, I will analyze hegemonic capacity of the Gezi Park protests in 
details. First, I will scrutinize the demands of the initiative that organized the protests 
in the first place, Taksim Solidarity, based on written materials. Later, I will analyze 
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the characteristics of the unity in Gezi based on my interviewees’ answers to what are 
their demands and aims by protesting. 
In March 2012, upon the call of the Chamber of Architects Istanbul Buyukkent 
Branch, Taksim Solidarity was formed as an initiative that included a wide range of 
participators: political parties, chambers of professionals, different environmentalist, 
feminist, and queer organizations and regional associations as well as Taksim Platform 
and Taksim Gezi Parki Dernegi. The initiative penned petitions and organized protests 
and concerts against the project of building of an old barrack in Gezi Park. They also 
brought lawsuits and organized marches and press briefings in order to protect Gezi 
Park. 
Despite their campaign against the project, the municipality started on the 
construction work and vehicles entered Gezi Park on 27 May 2013. A sit-in was 
organized at Gezi Park with the support of above-mentioned organizations to prevent 
vehicles from destroying the green area. In the beginning, the demands of those who 
gathered were limited to the protection of the Gezi Park. However, after the protests 
turned into massive demonstrations and assumed an anti-governmental character, 
components of the Taksim Solidarity increased further and their discourse changed 
accordingly. They articulated demand to protect Gezi Park with other demands of the 
protesters in the park. In a very short period of time, discourse of the Taksim Solidarity 
turned anti-government. On 3 June 2013, the Taksim Solidarity issued a press release 
stating that, “The common voice that raises from all of the squares of Turkey says: 
‘government, resign’. We will strengthen this voice! The meaning of this outcry is 
unequivocal!” 70 (Taksim Dayanismasi, 2013).  
The Taksim Solidarity had two meetings with government representatives. In 
their meeting on 5 June, they put their main demands as the protection of Gezi Park, 
the ending of police violence, the resignation of the governors and police 
commissioners of Istanbul and Ankara, and the release of the detained protesters. They 
also added:  
The content of this reaction is an objection against the third bridge, third 
airport, the Kanalistanbul project, Ataturk Forest Farm, hydroelectric 
power plants and all pillaging of our ecological values and against the 
draft law of Protecting Nature and Biological Diversity. It is also an 
opposition to the politics of war regarding our country and our region and 
a demand for peace. Sensitivities of our Alevi citizens, right demands of 
                                                          
70 Tüm Türkiye’nin meydanlarından yükselen ortak ses “hükümet istifa” olmuştur. Bu sesi büyüteceğiz! 
Bu haykırışın anlamı açıktır!  
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victims of urban transformation, voice raising against conservative 
masculine policies that controls bodies of women, a resistance against 
crackdown on universities, jurisdiction and artists, demands against 
seizing rights of all workers especially workers of Turkish Airlines, a 
struggle against discrimination regarding sexual orientation and gender 
and a request for removing the obstacles that prevents citizens from 
reaching right to education and health (Taksim Dayanismasi, 2013).71 
 
This list of demands put forth by Taksim Solidarity represents that protecting 
the park was not the name of the struggle that prevails over other particular demands, 
however vast range of particular demands along with protecting Gezi Park were all 
articulated in a chain of equivalence which is established against the government.  
On 14 June 2013, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with a committee 
consisting of the representatives of the Taksim Solidarity and some celebrities. In the 
meeting, Erdogan wanted the protests to come to an end and protesters to leave Gezi 
Park and said otherwise the police would intervene to evacuate. After the meeting, 
Halit Ergenc, an actor, conveyed the results of the meeting with the prime minister in 
the following words: “[The members of the cabinet] repeated that they would respect 
the decision of the court. If the court cancels the project they will concur and protect 
Gezi Park. If, however, the court approves the project they said that they would have 
a plebiscite concerning the Gezi Park project.” (“Halit Ergenc Basbakanla gorusmeyi 
anlatti,” 2013). After the same meeting the Taksim Solidarity secretary-general Tayfun 
Kahraman also stated the government would abide by the decision of the people and 
the outrageous violence of the security forces would be investigated (“Basbakan'la 
yaptiklari o gorusmeyi anlattilar,” 2013). He added that the prime minister said 
clearing of the park is necessary and he would return to Gezi Park to discuss and 
evaluate the situation. However, protesters did not leave Gezi Park and the Taksim 
Solidarity announced that the protests would continue (Taksim Dayanismasi, 2013). 
In conclusion, Taksim Solidarity was established to protect Gezi Park and to 
oppose the urban design projects in Taksim. It conducted various protests to express 
                                                          
71 Yükselen bu tepkinin içeriğinin; “başta 3. Köprü, 3. Havaalanı, Kanal İstanbul, AOC ve HES'ler 
olmak üzere ekolojik değerlerimizin talanına ve güncel olarak Tabiatı ve Biyolojik Ceşitliliği Koruma 
Kanunu Tasarısına ilişkin itirazların, ülkemize ve bölgemize ilişkin savaş siyasetine karşı duruşun ve 
barış talebinin, alevi yurttaşlarımızın hassasiyetlerinin, kentsel dönüşüm mağdurlarının haklı 
taleplerinin, kadınların bedenleri üzerinde denetim kuran muhafazakar erkek politikalarına karşı 
yükselen sesin, üniversite, yargı ve sanatçılar üzerindeki baskılara karşı direncin, başta Türk Hava Yolu 
işçileri olmak üzere tüm emekçilerin hak gasplarına karşı taleplerinin, tüm cinsel yönelim ve cinsiyet 
kimliği ayrımcılığına karşı mücadelenin, yurttaşların eğitim ve sağlık hakkına ulaşımının önündeki tüm 
engellerin kaldırılması istemleri” olduğunu iktidar sahiplerine iletmek istiyoruz. 
http://taksimdayanisma.org/turkiye-cumhuriyeti-hukumeti-ve-kamuoyuna 
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these demands before Gezi Park protests erupt. However, after the Gezi protests joined 
by the masses, the protest discourse gained an anti-governmental stance where these 
organizations could no longer continue with limited demands. They got articulated 
with the dominant Gezi Park discourse and uttered demands varying from cancellation 
of the third bridge project to ending crackdown on artists and changing the 
international policy of Turkey. In this transition, demand to protect Gezi Park lost its 
centrality and the Solidarity even demanded resignation of the government. 
Continuing with my fieldwork, protection of Gezi Park could not gain 
centrality when my interviewees’ demands are considered. They maintain that their 
struggle is far greater than Gezi Park. For example, when Baris (Socialist, 28) from 
the Socialist Party of the Oppressed was asked about his demands, he replies: 
A section having certain environmental conscience was leading. I joined 
due to anti-fascist responsibility against police attack. I didn’t have a 
special demand there. I wasn’t very aware of the issue. I didn’t have 
environmental conscience. I was acknowledging the struggle as right but, 
frankly speaking, I wasn’t standing in any place of it. In fact, it became 
an illumination for us when experiencing. I don’t think the issue was only 
three trees. There was an anger accumulated in all sections of society. All 
sections came together, the sections feeling anger against the system and 
the sections reacting against the AKP united in the conjuncture of events. 
It was a common broad front.72 
 
Cagdas (Kemalist nationalist, 25) maintains that protecting the park was 
important however he had greater wishes for the country by joining the protests. Efe 
(Socialist, 27) says during the Gezi Park protests his demand was only to protect Gezi 
Park. However, as the conversation became more in-depth, he reveals that he was in 
favor of a possible revolution out of Gezi protests and he presents many other demands 
to the government. Onur (Kurdish Alevi, 55) states his demands as follows: 
“Unconditionally that project must be renounced. An apology must be released for the 
killed people and condolences should be given to their families. These people should 
not be declared as terrorists.”73 On the other hand, he also says Gezi demanded to 
                                                          
72 Öncülüğü belli bir çevre duyarlılığı olan kesimler yapıyordu. Bendeki oradaki polis saldırısına karşı 
antifaşist bir duyarlılıktı. Orada çok özel bir talebim yoktu. Meselenin çok farkında da değildim. Çevre 
duyarlılığı olan bir insan değildim. Mücadeleyi haklı buluyordum ama çok bir yerinde durmuyordum 
açıkçası. Bizim için de bir aydınlanma oldu aslında o pratiği yaşarken. Ben de meselenin sadece 3 ağaç 
olduğunu düşünmüyorum. Toplumun bütün kesimlerinde biriken bir öfke vardı. Toplumun sisteme öfke 
duyan bütün kesimleriyle, konjonktürel olarak AKP’ye tepki duyan diğer kesimlerinin bir araya 
gelmesiydi aslında. Ortak geniş bir cepheydi.  
73 Kayıtsız, şartsız o projeden vazgeçilmeliydi. Öldürülen insanlar için özür dilenmeliydi, ailelerine 
taziyede bulunmalıydı. Bu insanları terörist ilan etmemeliydi. 
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topple the government and ending the dictatorship. Gizem (Socialist Feminist, 25) was 
not simply satisfied with the protection of the park, and she gives voice to her demands 
based on her feminist and socialist background: 
One demand was, of course, the maintenance of Gezi Park as a park; it 
was an urgent demand at that moment however this resistance, which 
expanded to every district of Turkey, had a lot of different demands. I 
think every section there had diversified demands. For me, really, the 
issue was the need for change in the system of justice, which was based 
totally on protecting men and absolving men.74 
 
Ayse (Feminist, 39) is an example who limited her demand to the protection of 
Gezi Park but she quit protesting because she thought other protesters wanted to topple 
the government. She states her demand as follows: 
I wanted to make the government hear that people living in the city have 
something to say about urbanization. My aim was purely and simply 
standing there against the urbanization policies of the government. Yes, 
you cannot transform Gezi Park without asking people living there. You 
don’t have to cut down the trees there.75 
 
She felt very uncomfortable by the attitude of the participants who aimed to 
topple the government: 
I was saying that I don’t want to overthrow the government. My aim is 
very limited, I want to protect Gezi Park. Abolishing the state, changing 
the government, I didn’t know what; I didn’t have such goals. I have no 
such goal of swearing at Tayyip. I got very annoyed by seeing they were 
also swearing at Muslims. They turned the discourse into a narrow goal 
of toppling the government and animosity against Tayyip Erdogan. If 
they didn’t, it would be a plausible demonstration; it would be a beautiful 
demonstration I mean. They turned it into this. I am angry with them. It 
could be a good thing. To my surprise, everybody had an agenda. I 
learned this. I will never participate in large-scale social movements. I 
can only be involved in minimal protests that have a specific purpose. I 
can only be involved in something with limited issues and of which the 
limits are drawn very well.  But I never will be involved in a protest 
without limits, this turned out to be a great lesson for me.76 
                                                          
74 Bir talep tabi ki Gezi Parkı’nın park olarak kalması, o andaki aciliyetli talepti ama Türkiye’nin her 
yerine yayılan bu direnişin tabi ki bir sürü farklı farklı talepleri vardı. Sanırım oradaki her kesimin de 
farklı farklı talepleri vardı. Mesele benim için gerçekten tamamen erkekleri korumaya, erkekleri 
aklamaya dayalı adalet sisteminin değişmesi. 
75 Şehirleşmede şehirde yaşayanların da sözünün olduğunu hükûmete duyurmak istiyordum. Benim 
amacım sadece ve sadece hükûmetin şehirleşme politikalarına karşı bir duruş olarak orada olmaktı. 
Evet, bir Gezi Parkı’nı sen burada yaşayan insanlara sormadan daha başka bir şeye dönüştüremezsin. 
Ya da oradaki ağaçları kesmene gerek yok.  
76 Ben diyordum ki ben hükûmeti düşürmek istemiyorum ki. Benim amacım çok sınırlı, Gezi Parkı’nı 
korumak istiyorum. Devleti yıkmak, hükûmeti değiştirmek bilmemne gibi hiç öyle bir amacım yoktu. 
Tayyip’e küfretmek gibi hiçbir amacım yoktu. Ve orada Müslümanlara da küfredildiğini falan da 
görmek beni çok rahatsız etti. Söylemi dar bir kalıba hükûmeti düşürmeye ve Tayyip Erdoğan’a 
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Ayse stopped protesting because the general demand of the protests did not 
correspond to her own demands which are far more limited. She even regrets her 
participation and decided to never join protests of which the aim is not predetermined. 
She says she does not want the government to resign despite its mistakes. As Laclau 
indicated in his theory, this uncertainty is always implicit in popular movements. The 
direction of a movement cannot be controlled and it always evolves into something 
else with different articulations and disarticulations. In this way, Ayse was 
disarticulated when the protest discourse became anti-government.  
According to my fieldwork, Gezi Park protests articulated wide range of 
unsatisfied demands in an equivalential chain against the government. Depending on 
their different backgrounds, my interviewees uttered different demands. For example, 
Efe (27) as a socialist demanded from these from government: 
Urban policies should be changed. The third bridge should not be built. 
Urban transformation projects must be renounced. Clear. Because it is 
not urban transformation but urban destruction. You cannot remove the 
working class but you can relieve them. You will do very simple things. 
You will give good union rights, everyone should have a union. The state 
should remove its own syndical networks. Subcontracting must be 
revoked. Minimum wage must be increased, we shouldn’t be exploited 
further. You should change the constitution immediately. You should 
give the Kurds their right to be educated [in their own language]. In 
addition, as my personal demand inner-city transformation should be 
free.77 
 
Baris (28), as another socialist, believes that democratic revolution is the first 
step of revolution towards socialism and he considers Gezi as a democratic front. He 
says that these democratic demands united the people in Gezi: 
Removal of the Council of Higher Education for the university youth, 
dismissal of subcontracting system and assured job for the workers. An 
also pulling of minimum wage at a level of earning humanely living. 
Regarding women, we live in a time too much femicide committed, we 
face with a system that aims at confining women to home. The system 
                                                          
düşmanlığına dönüştürmeselerdi bence mantıklı bir eylem olacaktı, güzel bir eylem olacaktı yani. Buna 
dönüştürdüler. Onlara da kızgınım. Yani iyi bir şey olabilirdi. Ama herkesin ajandası varmış. Ben bunu 
öğrendim. Bir daha büyük toplumsal hareketlerin içerisine asla girmem. Minimal küçük eylemlerde 
bulunabilirim belli bir amaca binaen. Sınırlı sorunlu, sınırları çok iyi çizilmiş bir şeyin içerisinde 
olabilirim. Ama sınırları çizilmemiş bir eylemin içerisinde asla olmam yani, bu bana büyük ders oldu. 
77 Kent politikalarının değişmesi lazım. Üçüncü köprünün olmaması lazım. Kentsel dönüşüm 
politikalarından artık vazgeçilmesi lazım. Net. Çünkü kentsel dönüşüm değil kentsel öldürme politikası 
güdüyorlar. İşçi sınıfını kaldıramazsın ama biraz daha rahatlatabilirsin. Çok basit şeyler yapacaksın. 
Adam akıllı sendikalar, sendikal haklar vereceksin, herkes sendikalı olacak. Devletin sendikal ağlarını 
kaldırması lazım. Taşeronu kaldıracaksın. Asgari ücretin artması lazım, daha fazla sömürülmememiz 
lazım Anayasayı değiştireceksin, derhal. Kürtlere eğitim hakkı vereceksin. Bir de ek olarak kendi 
talebim şehir içi ulaşımda paralar kaldırılmalı. 
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decides on and impose how many child to have. Similar things for 
LGBTs. Political demands of Kurds, Armenians are obvious. Alevis have 
demands of cemevi.78 
 
Aydin (Kemalist nationalist, 32) comes from a communist background and he 
desires a state to which all property belongs: 
Equality for all, for whomsoever. All the goods, property and everything 
must belong to the state. They should become the means of the state and 
ownership must be stripped completely. We produce an incredible 
amount of high capital within this area by the contribution of everybody 
and we can share it equally. There must be equality in the salary you 
receive, and in the tax you pay and in all of your lives. This is what the 
Communist Party says. At least, the opinions and the theory that I set my 
heart on say this.79 
 
He believes in revolution and does not trust the results of the ballot box: 
I don’t have any democratic expectation from the ballot box, I never had. 
I, a person who believes in revolution, know that revolution never arrives 
through the ballot box. Revolutions don’t arrive by voting like lambs and 
cheering. Under normal democratic conditions, I don’t have any 
expectations from this country and I don’t believe that something will 
happen. Nothing will change. Similar people, derivatives will come. It 
will say this instead, I will say something more severe, and each party 
will change methods in their own way. By such methods, this system will 
go on. They push people to unhappiness, I am unhappy.80 
 
Aydin gave meanings to Gezi protests by articulating it with his communist 
ideals. He thinks Gezi was an experience of small commune where everybody shared 
goods and tasks. He says, “Those assemblies [in Gezi] were places where suggested 
                                                          
78 Üniversiteli gençler açısından YÖK’ün ortadan kaldırılması. İşçiler açısından, taşeron sisteminin 
ortadan kaldırılması, güvenceli iş. Asgari ücretin insanca yaşanabilir seviyeye çekilmesi, artan iş 
kazalarının önüne geçilmesi. Kadınlar açısından, kadın cinayetlerinin çok fazla işlendiği bir 
dönemdeyiz şu anda. Kadınları daha fazla eve kapatmayı amaçlayan bir sistemle karşı karşıyayız. Kaç 
çocuk yapacağını salık veren, bunu dayatan doğurmayacağına karar veren bir sistem var. LGBT’ler 
açısından da benzer şeyler. Kürtlerin, Ermenilerin zaten politik talepleri ortada. Alevilerin cem evleri 
talepleri var mesela. 
79 Herkes için, kim olursa olsun eşitlik. Bütün malın, mülkün, her şeyin devlete ait olması. Devletin araç 
gereçleri olması, mülkiyetin tamamen kaldırılması. Hepimizin katkısıyla inanılmaz yüksek bir sermaye 
üretiyoruz bu coğrafya içerisinde ve bunu eşit bir şekilde paylaşabiliriz. Aldığın maaşta da eşitlik olması 
gerekiyor, verdiğinde de eşitlik olması gerekiyor, yaşamında da eşitlik olması gerekiyor. Komünist Parti 
bunu söylüyor. En azından benim inandığım benim yoluna baş koyduğum fikirler ya da teori bunu 
söylüyor. 
80 Demokratik olarak sandıktan bir beklentim yok benim, hiçbir zaman olmadı. Ben devrime inanan bir 
insan olarak biliyorum ki devrim hiçbir zaman sandıkta olmaz. Paşa paşa oy verip de aman ne güzel 
diye devrim olmaz. Normal demokratik şartlar altında bir beklentim yok bu ülkede ve olacağına da 
inanmıyorum zaten. Hiçbir şey değişmeyecek. Benzerleri gelecek, türevleri gelecek. Öyle demeyecek 
böyle diyecek, daha sertini söyleyecek, her parti kendine göre yöntemler değiştirecek. O yöntemlerle 
bir şekilde bu saçma sapan sistem devam ediyor olacak. Çok mutsuzluğa sevk ediyorlar artık insanları, 
mutsuzum. 
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ideas were discussed, why something needs to be done is negotiated and the decisions 
were taken with unanimity.”81 He thinks that all objectors would be persuaded and 
agree with the decisions in the park. However he did not expect a revolution from 
Gezi. “Revolution only winked at Gezi. It gave hope, it motivated and excited us, but 
it was obvious that a revolution would not arrive from there.”82 According to him, the 
revolution has its own stages including a guerilla fight: 
The event begins with resistance and civil disobedience. After that it 
changes dimension and leads to taking up arms. It should have large 
organizations within itself, there must be areas, channels and resources 
where you can declare your autonomy. And after one point, you come to 
a position that you can clash with your opponent. Because the state is 
very powerful, states are very powerful against their people. A revolution 
cannot be made by standing against three TOMAs in Gezi, there is no 
such world. The state has minimum ten thousand tanks at present, and it 
takes only three minutes for it to get there and kill you by crushing. You 
cannot resist physically. If someone or some party was expecting this, 
alas. First, you need to take the hills by means of guerilla fight, like the 
PKK reality. It is certain that such a thing would not arise from there 
(Gezi). But it is true that it (revolution) winked there. Because the mass 
did not hesitate, resisted what they regard as wrong and stand together 
against its opponent. They put their inner conflicts aside and opposed.83 
 
Aydin demanded cancellation of the Gezi Park project as well as ending of 
projects of the third bridge and the third airport. In addition, he has other goals, such 
as the protection of nature, the prevention of the climate change. He states his demands 
as follows: 
My word is rejection of intervention in way of lives of people in many 
ways. Turning to the nature much more. It is not a matter of accepting or 
not, there are scientific realities. As long as concrete increased and green 
decreased in the world, we upset the balance of the nature. We are 
burning a lot of things irreversibly. Now we get cold in Istanbul and sit 
with our coats in June. Why? Because there is no nature anymore, no 
                                                          
81 O meclisler bir fikir ortaya atıldığı zaman tartışılan, neden yapılması gerektiğinin tartışılıp oy 
birliğiyle kararlar alınan yerlerdi. 
82 Gezi’de devrim sadece göz kırptı. Umutlandırdı, heveslendirdi, heyecanlandırdı ama oradan bir 
devrimin çıkmayacağı çok barizdi. 
83 Önce olay direnmeyle başlıyor, sivil itaatsizlikle başlıyor. Sonra artık boyut değiştirerek biraz daha 
silahlanmaya gitmeli. Kendi içerisinde büyük örgütlenmeleri olmalı, özerkliğini iddia edebileceğin 
alanların olmalı, kanalların olmalı, kaynakların olmalı. Ve bir yerden sonra artık karşı tarafla 
çatışabilecek pozisyona gelinmeli. Çünkü devlet çok güçlü, devletler halklarına karşı çok güçlü. Gezi’de 
üç tane TOMAnın karşısında durarak devrim yapılmazdı, öyle bir dünya yok. Devletin şu anda sahip 
olduğu minimum on bin tane tankı vardır, üç dakikasını alır oraya tankla girmesi, seni orada ezerek 
öldürmesi. Fiziken karşılayamazsın. Eğer bunu bekleyen bir taraf ya da kişi vardıysa yazık. Zaten gerilla 
usulü dağa çıkman gerekiyor en başta, PKK gerçeği gibi. Öyle bir şeyin oradan çıkmayacağı kesin de 
ama göz kırptığı doğru. Çünkü sözünü söylemekten esirgemeyen kitle, karşı tarafta yanlış olduğunu 
düşündüğü şeye hep beraber başkaldırdı ve birlikte durdu. Kendi iç kavgalarını rafa kaldırıp karşı 
durabildi.  
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trees, no green, no air. It rains and causes flood this time, causes hail 
another time. We really already harmed nature until the degree that cause 
climate change. When you build the third bridge and the third airport, 
you dry the ponds that kills lives of the all birds there. After five years 
I’m sorry but you cannot say we changed the nature irreversibly let’s 
restore, remove concrete and rebuild the ponds. A lot of things have no 
comeback.84 
 
In the park, he also voiced all his ideals without a hope for change: “I spoke 
out there, I said everything I wanted to say. Were the ones I spoke to able to change 
things that I wanted to change? No, they weren’t. But anyhow I could say, it was a 
beautiful environment for me.”85 Aydin puts forward many demands by protesting, 
however he does not consider the Gezi community as something that may bring about 
change. This indicates that his articulation with the protest discourse was rather weak.  
Emre says (38) ideal system that he wants to establish is best described in anti-
capitalist Muslims’ slogan: “All property belongs to Allah. There is no authority other 
than Him.”86 According to him, in such an order there is neither exploitation nor 
competition; everybody produces based on needs and shares justly. Emre considered 
the Gezi Park protests as a way of spreading their message and he explains his group’s 
demands as follows:  
It was, in specificity of there, giving a general message. Standing against 
the capital that obtains any place it wills, commodifies any place it wills 
and restrains people to purchase from these places. At the same time it 
determines what to buy and where to buy things. It [our aim by 
protesting] was taking a stand against the capital, not only against the 
government but against the system.87  
 
                                                          
84 Benim sözüm gerçekten insanların hayat tarzlarına müdahale edilmemesi, bu birçok yönden böyle. 
Gerçekten daha fazla doğaya dönülmesi, kabul edeyim veya etmeyeyim diye bir şey değil, bilimsel bir 
takım gerçekler vardır. Dünyada beton arttıkça yeşil azaldıkça tabiatın dengesini bozuyoruz. Birçok 
şeyi artık geri dönüşümsüz şekilde yakıyoruz. Artık İstanbul’da Haziran ayında montla oturur 
pozisyondayız, gayet üşüyoruz. Neden, çünkü artık gerçekten doğa yok, ağaç yok, yeşil yok, hava yok.  
Yağmur yağıyor, bir yağdığında sel yapıyor, bir yağdığında dolu yapıyor. Artık gerçekten iklimi 
değiştirecek kadar doğaya zarar vermeye başladık. Üçüncü köprüyü yaparken, ya da üçüncü 
havalimanını yaparken siz oradaki bütün kuşların yaşamını öldürecek seviyede onlarca gölet 
kurutuyorsunuz. Beş sene sonra burada, kusura bakmayınız, doğayı geri dönüşümsüz şekilde 
değiştirdik, hadi burayı geri yapalım dediğinizde ortadaki betonu kaldıramazsınız, tekrar o göletleri inşa 
edemezsiniz.  Çok şeyin artık geri dönüşümü yok. 
85 Ben orada söylemek istediğim her şeyi söyledim. Söylediğim insanlar benim değişmesini istediğim 
şeyleri değiştirmeye muktedir miydi? Hayır, değildi. Ama ben yine de söyleyebildim, benim için güzel 
bir ortamdı. 
86 Mülk Allah’ındır ve O’ndan başka otorite yoktur. 
87 Oranın özelinde, bir genel mesaj vermekti.  Yani kapitalizmin istediği her yeri elde edebilmesi, 
istediği her yeri metalaştırabilmesi ve insanların satın alma gücünü belirlerken buralara hapsetmesi aynı 
zamanda, neyi, ne kadara ve nereden alabileceğini belirlemesine bir karşı duruştu. Yani sermaye karşıtı, 
sadece iktidar karşıtı değil, sistem karşıtı bir duruştu. Yani sermaye karşıtı, sadece iktidar karşıtı değil, 
sistem karşıtı bir duruştu. 
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Cagdas (Kemalist nationalist, 25) demands freedom which is, he thought, 
threatened by the government: 
My demand, the one I shared with people is the demand for freedom. In 
other words, I thought my freedoms are restricted too much, my private 
life is being intervened in too much. I wanted to say ‘that’s enough!’  A 
step back must be taken on these issues.88  
 
Gizem (Socialist Feminist, 25) demanded ending of capitalist security and 
urban transformation policies. She also wanted to change the patriarchal language and 
policies of the government: 
The change should spread to the language of the government and turn it 
into something that pays attention to the equality of women and men and 
to the rights of women to live, as they wish. In line with this, turning the 
streets into places that women feel safe inside without any need of 
security precautions. This means getting out of the perception of the city 
and living where security corresponds to police, armor, shields, more 
cameras, more surveillance; and transcending a perception of life where 
we see each other as security. Our cities are places with more surveillance 
cameras, more shopping centers and security staff of shopping centers. 
We want to change them into places where we share together and take 
responsibility equally. Stopping of our public spaces being places that 
are taken away from us, that are changed and transformed by owners of 
capital, government and government related capital. This was my main 
problem. That is enough that our homes are being transformed, people 
are displaced, but we cannot not able to say anything.89 
 
Umut (Academician, 28) demanded these from the government: cancellation 
of construction plans in Gezi Park, solution for traffic congestion in Istanbul and caring 
for nature and environment sensitively. 
                                                          
88 İnsanlarla paylaştığım talebim özgürlük talebimdi. Yani özgürlüklerimin çok fazla kısıtlandığını, özel 
hayatıma çok fazla müdahale edildiğini düşündüm. Bu konuda ‘yeter artık’, bunlarda geri adım atılması 
lazım demek istedim. 
89 Aynı zamanda iktidarın diline değişimin sirayet etmesi ve kadın-erkek eşitliğini gözeten bir yerden, 
kadınların istedikleri gibi yaşama hakkını gözeten bir yerden konuşmasıydı. Bununla doğru orantılı 
olarak da sokakların, kadınların kendilerini içerisinde güvenlik tedbirlerine gerek olmadan güvende 
hissettikleri yerlere dönüşebilmesiydi. Yani güvenlik denen şeyin polis, zırh, kalkan, daha fazla kamera, 
daha fazla gözetim olduğu bir şehir ve yaşama anlayışından çıkıp, biraz birbirimizi güvenlik olarak 
görebileceğimiz bir yaşam anlayışına geçebilmek. Kentlerimizin böyle daha çok mobese kamerası, daha 
çok AVM ve AVM’lerin özel güvenlik görevlileri bilmemne olan yerler olmaktan çıkıp, hep beraber 
paylaştığımız, sorumluluğunun hepimizin üzerine düştüğü yerlere dönüştürebilmekti. Yani devamlı 
olarak bu kamusal alanlarımızın birileri tarafından sermaye sahipleri de olabilir, iktidar da olabilir, 
iktidarla ilişkisi olan sermaye de olabilir, onlar tarafından değiştirilen dönüştürülen, elimizden alınan 
yerler olmaktan çıkmasıydı. Temel derdim buydu benim. Yeter artık yani evlerimiz dönüştürülüyor 
bizim bunda sözümüz yok, insanlar yerlerinden ediliyorlar. 
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As I mentioned earlier, Ali (Alevi, 19) demanded bars on the Taksim road to 
be closed while important majority of Gezi Park protesters were against any restriction 
on alcohol consumption imposed by the government.  
All these examples reveal that the protest discourse succeeded in articulating 
vast range of demands in an equivalential chain. However there was lack of coherence 
among different demands and the links among them were weak. Protesters did not 
make concessions from particularity of their demands in favor of protecting the park, 
instead each group emphasized its own goal. Thus, protesters’ identification with the 
Gezi community on a positive ground could not have been achieved. 
Unifying principle in Gezi Park protests had been antagonism to the 
government. The name of ‘Gezi’ turned into a signifier of that antagonism. In my 
fieldwork, protesters’ designation of their demand or their goal as something negative 
indicates that the unity in Gezi Park could not go beyond the negativity.  
Some protesters mainly demanded the fall of the government. Berke (Queer, 
Alevi, 25), Ali (Alevi, 19), Cagdas (Kemalist nationalist, 25) and Onur (Kurdish Alevi, 
55) are among them. As mentioned earlier, Berke maintains that his major demand 
was toppling of the government. This aim made his articulation in the protests possible 
that he endured too many ‘thugs’. When asked about his demands, Ali replies that “I 
wanted the AK Party to quit government.”90 Cagdas thinks the protests happened 
because the main oppositional party did not oppose the government: 
I believe that it taught to supposedly oppositional parties how to oppose 
the ruling party. Somewhat, Gezi was that sort of thing. Real opposition 
that cannot be engendered in the parliament was created by the people 
themselves.91  
 
He says he aimed to prevent the oppressive government from going so far and 
he did not expect to overthrow the government. However he acted differently when he 
gathered people to raid the Prime Minister’s Office in Dolmabahce. He stopped when 
some other protesters asked their aim in walking to the Office and he had no answer. 
Later he thinks he got carried away at that moment. Despite his level of opposition is 
indeterminate, his articulation in the protests based on anti-governmental stance of the 
protests.  
                                                          
90 Ben Ak Parti’nin iktidardan çekilmesini istiyordum. 
91 Baştaki iktidar partisine muhalefet etmesi gereken partilerin muhalefeti nasıl etmesi gerektiği 
konusunda da öğretici olduğuna inanıyorum. Biraz da Gezi böyle bir şeydi. Mecliste yaratılamayan 
muhalefeti, gerçek muhalefeti halkın kendinin yaratmasıydı. 
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Onur (Kurdish Alevi, 55) says no one would continue to protest if Erdogan 
gave up the project, however, his stubbornness give an edge to anger. He deems Gezi 
as an unorganized grassroots movement that go further to demand resignation of the 
government. He thinks the government could not be toppled because political parties 
did not support the protests: “None of the parties supported them unconditionally. If 
they had supported, the government would be overthrown. None of the organizations 
came to prominence, otherwise this power (of the protests) would break down.”92 His 
comment on lack of any prominent organization corresponds to Gezi Park protests’ 
failure to constitute a popular demand. In this way, only ground for all contradictory 
groups had been their opposition to the government. 
Some protesters demanded the government to take a step back. Selin (Anti-
capitalist Muslim, 32), Eren (Ex-Gulenist, 25), Umut (Academician, 28) and Aydin 
(Kemalist nationalist, 32) are among them. Selin states that her goal was protesting 
against the AKP rule and the emergent one man regime of Tayyip Erdogan. For Eren, 
Gezi had been a way of criticizing the conservative government and the Gulenist 
environment he grew up. He does not seem to have any proper demand: “Frankly, I 
was there with wonder. I was there without having my own demands rather I thought 
those who had demands are rightful.”93 Umut wanted the government to question itself 
and retreat from authoritarianism. However, he maintains that Erdogan did not take a 
step back and provoked the protesters by insulting them. He thinks Gezi united people 
against the mistakes of the government. Aydin (Kemalist nationalist, 32) wanted to 
oppose the oppressive government. He voices anger at the government:  
Stop and listen once, look that much scientist are working here. Let’s find 
a reasonable way together and make things. Do not go that much 
headstrong, do not meddle in people that much. Do not oppress that 
much. Unfortunately, we are recently discussing the topics of those many 
countries, cultures and societies gone through and passed 50 years ago. 
We come from 50 maybe 100 years behind.94 
 
Demand to end police violence functioned as another negative ground 
considering that some protesters deemed it as their only aim. Some others maintained 
                                                          
92 Hiçbir parti bunlara kayıtsız şartsız destek vermedi. Verseydi zaten hükûmet yıkılırdı. Hiçbir örgüt 
ön plana çıkmadı, çıksaydı zaten bu güç kırılırdı. 
93 Bir merakla orada bulundum açıkçası. Daha çok talepleri olan biri olarak değil ama talepleri olan 
kişilerin haklı olduğunu düşünerek oradaydım ben. 
94 Bir dur, dinle, bak bu kadar bilim insanı çalışıyor burada. Hep beraber gel bir akıl yöntemini bulalım 
da yapalım bir şeyleri. Bu kadar dikine gitme kafanın, bu kadar karışma insanlara, bu kadar baskı 
yapma. Birçok ülkenin, kültürün ya da toplumun bundan 50 sene önce yaşayıp geçtiği konuları biz daha 
maalesef yeni konuşuyoruz. 50 yıl, belki 100 yıl geriden geliyoruz. 
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that the source of unity in Gezi Park was opposition to the police. For instance, 
Mehmet’s (Ex-nationalist, 25) sole demand was an end to the police violence. Talha 
(Kurd, 28) was in the protests to oppose the state violence. Gizem (Socialist Feminist, 
25) thinks what united the people in Gezi was the opposition to the police brutality: 
There was essentially a unity against police violence, this is very 
important. One of our demands was as to this police violence. We wanted 
the prohibition of the police exercising this much violence at the entrance 
[to the park], for instance, we wanted the police not to use so much tear 
gas, we all wanted this. A lot of sections, having no close contact with 
each other, opposed the police violence and the oppression of their rights 
to object by the state. Really, there was cooperation at this point, 
certainly. All people together saw that the state and its use of violence 
were not something absolute, unconditional. 95 
 
Some socialists in Gezi demanded a revolution and they think it necessitates 
toppling of the government. Cagla (Socialist, 26), Efe (Socialist, 27) and Baris 
(Socialist, 28) are examples of them. Efe thinks Turkey is ruled by bourgeois 
democracy and oligarchy. He aims to establish socialism which can only be brought 
by a revolution. Despite he did not join the Gezi Park protests for a revolution, he 
changed his mind during the protests and expected a revolution. His perspective even 
runs the risk of a civil war: “Either he [Erdogan] would wither the crowd or his men 
would go out. Those who had night sticks already went out. If they had more weapons 
there would be a civil war in this country. If there were an outbreak of civil war, we 
might walk towards the revolution. There is no revolution without blood.”96  
Despite his passion for revolution, Efe does not agree with the people in Gezi. 
He was disappointed with the absence of workers. He expected all labor unions to go 
on strike and to join the protests. Then, it would be possible to stop the governors 
directly by ending the production. Further, he does not trust the protesters and fear if 
the revolution arrives by means of them:  
Ok, we didn’t take the road of the revolution, we didn’t want to make a 
revolution. But after a point we were scared, personally I was scared. 
Because, man, I hope the revolution would not arrive by mistake. 
                                                          
95 Orada en temelde polis şiddetinin karşısında bir birlik vardı, önemli bir şey yani. Oradaki 
taleplerimizden bir tanesi de polisin bu şiddetine dairdi. Girişte polisin bu denli şiddet uygulamasının, 
mesela biber gazı kullanılmasının yasaklanmasını istiyorduk biz, hep beraber istiyorduk. Genel olarak 
birbiriyle daha önce pek dirsek teması olmayan çok farklı kesim, polis şiddeti ve devletin kendilerinin 
itiraz etme hakkını baskılama haline karşı çıktı. Gerçekten burada bir ortaklaşma kesinlikle oldu yani. 
İnsanlar hep beraber şunu da gördüler devlet ve onun tekelindeki bu şiddet kayıtsız, şartsız bir şey değil. 
96 Ya kitleyi sindirecekti ya da işte adamları sokağa çıkacaktı. Eli sopalılar çıktı zaten. Onların daha 
fazla silahı olsaydı bu ülkede iç savaş olacaktı bence. İç savaş olsaydı belki devrime yürürdük. Kansız 
devrim olmaz. 
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Because it (Gezi protests) was not a class based thing and people from 
various classes and sections were there. I knew that if the revolution were 
achieved, those people would shoot me first. Because I belong to a lower 
class and also I am a socialist. They are Kemalist nationalists etc.97 
 
He describes a moment of fear as:  
At one point I was scared. We were walking towards the Prime Ministry 
from Dolmabahce. At one point I said: Ah, where are we going? I was 
looking around, slogans were shouted, “Soldier don’t sleep, protect your 
people!” Boy, what business would a soldier have there? Why are you 
still trusting him? We were walking towards the Prime Ministry and the 
crowd was a strange crowd. Everyone was there except revolutionists. 
Everyone was there. From nationalist to I don’t know what, everyone 
was there. And we walked along them. At one point I honestly questioned 
myself, all right. Where are we going? What is going to happen?98 
 
Efe fears the potential fraction that might capture the actual revolution was the 
Kemalist nationalists. He thinks they came to Gezi part-time when there were no 
clashes and they showed off. He says “They are the ones who were absent in the other 
protests [than Gezi]. They are still absent, we are a handful of people on the streets.”99 
He states that his demands would not be represented if the revolution happened: 
Something would slip from my hand. For instance, it happened in Egypt. 
At the beginning the revolutionists went out to the streets, all right. Later 
the Muslim Brotherhood came and seized it. Revolution evolved to 
elsewhere. This is the same thing. It would slip from my hand and go 
away, seriously. But I didn’t want it to slip because I clashed there. I 
stayed up all night there, I slept there and I woke up there. I was even 
about to die there.100  
 
To conclude, Efe hoped that his dream of revolution might arrive during the 
protests if the government is overthrown. However, he does not trust the crow and 
                                                          
97 Tamam devrim için yola çıkmadık, devrim yapmak da istemiyorduk. Ama bir yerden sonra korktuk, 
kendi adıma korktum. Lan yanlışlıkla devrim olmaz herhalde diye. Çünkü sınıfsal bir şey olmadığı için 
ve birçok sınıftan kesimden kimseler orada olduğu için. Şeyi biliyordum devrim olsaydı bu insanlar ilk 
başta bana sıkacaklardı. Çünkü ben sınıf olarak onlardan düşük bir sınıftayım, hem de ben sosyalistim. 
Onlar ulusalcı vesaire cart curt.  
98 Ya bir noktada korktum. Dolmabahçe’den Başbakanlığa yürüyoruz. Bir noktada şey dedim: Abi 
nereye gidiyoruz yaa? Etrafıma bakıyorum, “Asker uyuma, halkına sahip çık!” diye sloganlar atılıyor. 
Oğlum askerin ne işi var orada. Niye ona güveniyorsun ki hala? Bir noktada başbakanlığa doğru 
yürüyoruz ve kitle acayip bir kitle. Kitlede devrimci dışında herkes var. Herkes var. Milliyetçisinden 
tut bilmem nesine kadar herkes orada. Ve onlarla beraber yürüyoruz. Bir noktada gerçekten kendimi 
sorguladım tamam mı. Nereye gidiyoruz? Ne olacak? 
99 Onlar diğer eylemlerde yoktular, hala yoklar. Sokakta biz ne yazık ki bir avuç insan olarak kaldık. 
100 Ya elimden bir şeyler kayardı. Mesela Mısır’da bu oldu ya. İlk başta devrimciler sokağa çıktı, tamam 
mı. Ondan sonra Müslüman Kardeşler geldi buna el koydu. Devrim başka bir yere evirildi. Aynı şey. 
Elimden kayıp giderdi, ciddi anlamda. Ama elimden kayıp gitmesini istemezdim çünkü ben orada 
çatıştım. Orada sabahladım, orada kalktım, orada yattım. Neredeyse ölüyordum. 
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doubts that Kemalists may sacrifice socialists. He also thinks the results of a possible 
seizure of power. His account reveals that his articulation with Gezi community was 
weak and based on negative grounds rather than a common horizon. 
Cagla (26) is another socialist who aimed at revolution during the protests. She 
was very excited about the demands of her organization, Mucadele Birligi, and 
sacrificed her instrument to arrive at Gezi Park: 
I was browsing our website, they were making a call for revolt as you 
know. They stated their demands, the underdog demands their own rule. 
The government to be abolished, a temporary revolutionary government 
to replace, troops and the army to deliver weapons, the people’s 
assemblies to be instituted etc. They were saying very further things that 
I get very much excited.101 
 
After getting to Gezi Park, she was disappointed with the demands of other 
organizations: 
Many (socialist) organizations couldn’t see the revolt as a revolt. Think 
of a huge armed organization demanding the ban of tear gas and the 
resignation of the governor. You say you will start a revolution, this is a 
fascist country; you will mess up the government, power and everything 
of this country and replace this. There is a revolt, 5-6 million people are 
out in the streets saying “government resign” and these people are 
unorganized. Think of that instead of taking them forward, you say the 
resignation of the governor is enough when they are saying “government 
resign”. They attempted to take (people) back as much as possible. From 
the TMMOB (Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects) 
to the Taksim Solidarity and fifty thousand organizations etc. all looked 
when it will [the protests] end and we will get off. Yet we might take 
them forward, it was in our hands.102 
 
Similar to Efe (Socialist, 27), Cagla awaits a revolution and no other gain 
would please her. She considers ballot box as evil and condemns the groups who call 
for political representation. She thinks masses do not prefer the way of revolution 
                                                          
101 Bizim siteye bakıyorum, bildiğin ayaklanma çağrısı yapıyor. İşte güçsüzlerin hükûmet talebi, 
taleplerini ortaya dökmüşler. İktidarın derhal feshini, yerine geçici devrim hükûmetini, asker ve 
ordunun derhal silahlarını teslim etmesini, halk meclislerinin oluşmasını vs vs. Kitlelere o kadar ileri 
şeyler söylüyorlardı ki acayip heyecanlandım. 
102 Ayaklanmaya ayaklanma gözüyle bakamadı birçok örgüt.  Yani düşünsenize koskoca silahlı örgüt 
talep olarak; gaz bombası yasaklansın, vali istifa etsin gibi şeyler yazmıştı. Sen diyorsun ki ben devrim 
yapacağım, bu ülke faşist bir ülke artık diyorsun, ben bu ülkenin hükûmetini, iktidarını, her şeyini darma 
duman edeceğim yerine şunu koyacağım diyorsun. Ayaklanma çıkıyor, yaklaşık olarak 5-6 milyon kişi 
sokağa dökülüyor “hükûmet istifa” diyerek ve bu insanlar örgütsüz. Düşünün yani sen onları ileri bir 
şeye götürmek yerine, onlar “hükûmet istifa” diyor sen vali istifa etsin yeter diyorsun. Olabildiğince 
geri çekmeye çalıştılar. TMOBB’undan tutun Taksim Dayanışması’ndan elli bin tane örgütünden vs. 
hepsi ne zaman bitecek diye kurtulalım gözüyle baktılar. Oysaki onları daha ileri taşıyabilirdik, aslında 
bu bizim elimizdeydi. 
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because there is death at the end. She says they try easier ways including the ballot 
box and they may prefer revolution when there is no other choice. She maintains that 
the mass in Gezi Park is in the service of revolution unconsciously: “Though they 
didn’t go out on the streets for revolution, but to hug trees, to protest the banning of 
alcohol etc; what they were doing serves the revolution. Maybe they were doing this 
consciously maybe unconsciously.”103 However, she thinks the protests failed to 
provide grounds for a revolution: 
If the TOMAs were not brought from Diyarbakir, and a lot of other things 
could not be done, there might be more progress. We might not arrive at 
a revolution but we could gain more experience. Because this is a very 
serious war, a civil war is more serious than trench warfare. Think of it, 
you will get on the same bus, eat at the same table with the enemy you 
are fighting; but when the time arrives you will fire bullets to each other. 
It is not an easy thing. People’s arrival of this consciousness is also not 
easy. As long as the state oppresses and when people oppose with a 
higher consciousness and higher will, solely then some things can 
happen.104 
 
As it is visible in her comments, she considers the oppression of the state as a 
way of increasing people’s consciousness. In a sense, she desires the oppression of the 
state because it would contribute to the arrival of the revolution.  
Baris (Socialist, 28) pursues socialism in general: “My struggle is for 
establishing socialism. I endeavor to create an order in which labor-capital 
contradiction is abolished. I am ready to pay any kind of price for this.”105 He thinks 
socialism can only be obtained through revolution and Gezi had a revolutionary 
potential to change existing order: 
We have thought of revolution and we think it will arrive by the way of 
popular uprising. Coming together of the crowds that generally do not 
meet up, make us think such a moment can arrive. I thought it can be a 
proper ground to change the order. My personal demand and also demand 
of our organization in general was resignation of the government with all 
                                                          
103 Devrim yapmak için sokağa çıkmasa bile, ağaca sarılmak için, içkisi yasaklandığı için vs. sokağa 
çıkmış bile olsa; yaptıkları şey devrime hizmet ediyordu. Bunu belki bilinçli belki bilinçsiz yapıyorlardı. 
104 Diyarbakır’dan TOMAlar gelmeseydi, başka birçok şeyler yapılamasaydı, çok daha ilerleyebilirdi. 
Yine devrime varamayabilirdik ama daha çok tecrübe edinebilirdik. Cünkü çok ciddi bir savaş bu, iç 
savaş cephe savaşından daha ciddi bir savaştır. Düşünün yani karşında savaştığın insanlarla aynı otobüse 
bineceksin, aynı masada yemek yiyeceksin belki ama, yerine geldiğin zaman da karşı karşıya kurşun 
sıkacaksın birbirine. Yani bu kolay bir şey değil. İnsanların bu bilince ulaşması da kolay değil. Devlet 
baskı uyguladıkça, kişiler de o şiddete karşı daha yüksek bir bilinç, daha yüksek bir irade ile karşı 
koydukları zaman, ancak o zaman bir şeyler olabiliyor işte. 
105 Ama benim yürüttüğüm mücadele sosyalizmi kurmak. Emek-sermaye çelişkisinin ortadan kalktığı 
bir düzeni yaratmaya çalışıyorum ve bunun için de her türlü bedeli ödemeye hazırım zaten. 
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ministers. In particular it was remaining of Gezi Park as park again, 
starting of a prosecution against police who harmed people.106 
 
He thought idea of a revolution could be compromised with different groups 
of protesters in Gezi: 
An anti-imperialist, democratic revolution is something that can be 
realized by the widest oppressed section of the society. People 
demanding democracy who may not be socialist, who can be a liberal but 
stands at a point that supports the change at that moment. It (Gezi) was 
important to consolidate that widest community. Later on, Taksim 
Solidarity was established. Despite the Solidarity didn’t have such a 
perspective, communists and liberals united there under definite 
demands. No one imposed upon their substantial demand or said this will 
happen that won’t happen. If someone said, it is solved in discussions or 
in practices there. So, if the government would resign, a solidarity 
including representatives of all sections could be established and a joint 
demand could be determined for later.107 
 
He says that his organization, the ESP, was not taking the lead in the Gezi 
protests because it did not have such an organizational power. “If there was a 
communist system directing the masses during the period of Gezi, the process could 
be taken forward to revolution. However it (ESP) unfortunately didn’t have that 
power.”108 He thinks socialist organizations had an important role in confronting the 
police because they had experience of building barricades against the police. However, 
he thinks they could not lead the movement in general; it developed spontaneously and 
ended within the limits drawn by the Taksim Solidarity. He says about the Solidarity:  
Taksim Solidarity was not a leader [initiative] that can provide radical 
change. It stands in a local position and does not have an objective such 
as changing Turkey. It is impossible, it is against its nature. It is a quite 
different means. A communist party is necessary to do so. In order to 
                                                          
106 Devrim düşüncemiz var onun da halk ayaklanması yoluyla gerçekleşeceğini düşünüyoruz. Cok fazla 
bir araya gelmeyen kalabalıkların bir araya gelmesi, öylesi bir anın olabileceğini düşündürdü. Düzeni 
değiştirmek için uygun bir zemin olabileceğini düşündüm. Benim kişisel talebim de, örgütümüzün 
talebi de geniş anlamda Hükûmetin bütün bakanlarıyla birlikte istifa etmesiydi. Daha dar anlamda ise 
Gezi Parkı’nın tekrar park olarak kalması, insanları yaralayan polislerle ilgili soruşturma 
yürütülmesiydi.  
107 Antiemperyalist demokratik bir devrim, toplumun en geniş ezilen kesimiyle olabilecek bir şey. 
Demokrasi isteğinde olan insanlar sosyalist olmayabilir, liberal olabilir; ama o anda o değişimi 
destekleyecek bir yerde durur. O en geniş çevreyi toplamak açısından önemliydi. Sonrasında Taksim 
Dayanışma kuruldu. Dayanışmanın öyle bir perspektifi olmasa da komünistlerle liberaller orada belli 
talepler altında birleştiler. Kimse bizim ağırlıklı talebimiz bu diyerek dayatmada bulunmadı ya da bu 
olmayacak bu olacak demedi. Dediyse de oradaki tartışma içinde ya da pratik içinde bunlar çözüldü. 
Dolayısıyla hükûmet istifa etseydi de, bütün kesimlerin temsilciler düzeyinde de olsa bulunduğu bir 
dayanışma kurulup, ortak bir talep belirlenebilirdi sonrası için. 
108 Komünist bir önder olsaydı Gezi döneminde, kitleleri peşinden sürükleyen, süreci devrime kadar 
bile götürebilirdi. Ama ne yazık ki o güçte değildi. 
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make radical change, a populist, democratic, powerful organization is 
necessary.109 
 
He says there was no communist unity in Gezi, however there was a democratic 
one. He thinks a revolution takes place in two stages: first a democratic revolution, 
second a socialist one. A democratic revolution is necessary against fascist 
dictatorships: “This is not only related to the AKP, but to the Republic. Now a fascist 
dictatorship is ruling.”110 He thinks the labor - capital contradiction is covered by other 
political contradictions such as Alevi - Sunni, Turk - Kurd, woman - man. He 
maintains these contradictions must be eliminated by forming the widest democratic 
front as the one that took place in Gezi. He states that a socialist revolution is the 
second stage, struggle for the demands of the working class can be given after political 
contradictions are solved. He thinks the widest democratic front had been 
spontaneously formed in Gezi and the angry masses even demanded the resignation of 
the government. According to the report of the Ministry of Interior, he says, the state 
came to an inoperative situation during Gezi. “If this state became inoperative, if there 
hadn’t been a leader gap, it might have ended with revolution.”111  
He says now the ESP, as an active component of the HDP, foresees a 
democratic struggle.  He states that a democratic front in Gezi has not been developed 
by will and now his organization works to constitute that front in Gezi actively and 
voluntarily. 
On the basis of the above, it can be concluded that Baris’ aim by protesting 
mainly remained in negative grounds. He expected a revolution to arrive in the wake 
of the protests and he thought the toppling of the government would solve political 
problems.  
Emre (Anti-capitalist Muslim, 38) adopts a class-based perspective and he 
aimed to oppose capitalism by participating the Gezi Park protests. However, he thinks 
the protesters were from the middle class and they wanted to oppose the AK Party 
government rather than the capitalism: 
                                                          
109 Taksim Dayanışması radikal bir değişikliği sağlayabilecek bir önder değildi. Yerel bir yerde duruyor 
aslında. Türkiye’yi değiştirelim gibi bir amacı yok. Olmaz da, kendi doğasına aykırı. Bambaşka bir araç 
o. Onu yapmak için komünist bir parti gerekir. Radikal bir değişiklik sağlamaya yönelik kitleye önderlik 
edebilmesi için halkçı, demokratik, güçlü bir örgütün olması gerekiyor. 
110 Sadece AKP’yle değil, Cumhuriyetle ilgili bir şey. Şu anda faşist diktatörlük hâkim. 
111 Eğer bu devlet işleyemez duruma geliyorsa, gerçekten orada önder boşluğu olmasaymış, devrime 
kadar gidermiş. 
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Gezi was a middle class revolt. They were engineers, doctors and ones 
who have good positions in companies. They earn 3-4000 liras or more 
salaries and they were there because of their identities and freedom. Their 
expectations were not class-driven or related to economy. They were 
there with reactions of “Don’t fight with our identities”, “Don’t mess too 
much with our freedom of drinking”, “Leave us an area”. I cannot call it 
[the Gezi Park protests] a class-based revolt. When we look from outside, 
Gezi has a general character of opposition to the AKP. After some time, 
it assumed that language. It was what we never wanted here.112 
 
He was disturbed that protests turned anti-government and some people wanted 
to profit from Gezi in favor of the other political parties such as the BDP and the CHP. 
He was against such attempts because he thinks capitalism cannot be overcome 
through representative democracy: “In a place where representative democracy 
remains, it is impossible for a party to become the government unless it is financed by 
capital or itself becomes capital. This means that you have to articulate with the 
capital.”113 He says “Representative democracy is ‘opium’. A Muslim strives to gain 
consent of even the last man. If 99 persons out of 100 agreed and 1 has reservations, 
the consent of that single man is needed.”114 He thinks Muslims in Turkey were 
mistaken when they quit saying “Voting means committing shirk [Associating partners 
with God]”115 and they voted for Erbakan and later for the AK Party. According to 
him this canalized Muslims into a system of exploitation and articulated them with 
capitalism.  
Considering Emre’s account in general, he articulated with the Gezi protests in 
order to oppose capitalism which basically has a negative character. He was disturbed 
and his articulation was weakened when the protests turned anti-government. 
However, he continued to stay in the park and unwillingly became a part of another 
negativity. 
                                                          
112 Gezi büyük çoğunlukta bir orta sınıf kalkışmasıydı. Yani şirketlerde yönetici pozisyonunda olanlar, 
mühendis, doktorlar, maaşı 3-4000 lira belki daha fazla olan, asgari ücretli işçi gibi standartları olmayan 
insanların; yalnızca aidiyetleri ve özgürlük beklentileri üzerinden orada olmasının etkisi var. Yani 
sınıfsal bir beklenti değil de, ekonomi politikalarından değil de, “bizim aidiyetlerimizle uğraşma”, 
“bizim içme özgürlüğümüze çok fazla bulaşma”, “bize alan bırak” gibi tepkilerle oradaydılar. Sınıfsal 
temeli olan bir kalkışma diyemeyeceğim. Gezi’nin aslında genel karakteristiği, dışarıdan bakıldığında 
sadece bir AKP karşıtlığı söz konusuymuş gibi duruyor. Bir süre sonra aslında o dile de büründü. Burada 
hiç istemediğimiz bir şeydi. 
113 Temsili demokrasinin sürdüğü yerde bir partinin iktidar olabilmesi, sermaye tarafından finanse 
edilmesi yahut kendisinin sermayeleşmesi dışında mümkün değil. Bu sizin sermayeyle eklemlenmek 
zorunda olmanız anlamına geliyor. 
114 Temsili demokrasinin ‘afyon’ olduğunu düşünüyoruz. Müslüman son kişinin dahi rızasını almaya 
çalışır. 100 kişiden 99’u razı olmuşsa ve 1 kişinin çekinceleri varsa, onunla bile rızalaşmalı. 
115 “Oy vermek şirktir” 
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In conclusion, during the Gezi Park protests, an equivalential chain is 
established among different groups, organizations and the non-organized people based 
on their antagonistic relation with the government. Almost unlimited unsatisfied 
demands of protesters were inscribed in this equivalential chain. However, my study 
reveals that the protest movement failed to constitute a popular demand representing 
this chain. Therefore the protests could not achieve to start a hegemonic construction 
which requires a political subjectivity around a popular demand. The unity in Gezi 
Park could not go beyond a vague solidarity among protesters against the government.  
Opponents of the system such as socialists, anti-capitalists; groups having 
problems with the government policies such as environmentalists, feminists, queers, 
Kurds and Alevis and the political opponents of AK Party such as Kemalist nationalists 
got together in the park. Socialists employed elements from the leftist ideology and 
constructed a new discourse that deems the government as capitalist. Most of the 
socialists pursued a revolution and wanted to seize the power. Kemalist nationalists 
employed ideas from the values of the republic and they designated the government as 
a threat to those values in their discourse. Some protesters aimed to oppose the 
government on different issues. Different and even contradictory demands were 
inscribed in the equivalential chain against the government. Protesters present 
demands about the issues ranging from transportation fees, traffic, urban 
transformation, labor rights, and women’s rights to international politics. Amongst all 
of the demands, the protection of Gezi Park became prominent. However, it did not 
turn into a popular demand. Because the protesters, primarily the Taksim Solidarity, 
refused to identify with the demand to protect Gezi Park. Each group prioritized their 
own particular demands and they wanted something more than protecting the park. 
Gezi could not be the name of that something more, aspired fullness. Conceptual 
determination of ‘Gezi’, name of a park, precluded it from turning to a name of a 
political horizon. Rather, ‘Gezi’ acquired meaning of being against the government. 
Instead of demanding to establish something positive, many protesters’ main goal of 
had been toppling of the government or making the government draw back or stopping 
the police violence. Therefore the protests remained on a negative ground and failed 
to constitute a collective identity around a popular demand.  
In conclusion, the Gezi Park protests were successful in establishing an 
equivalential chain to which wide range of particular demands were inscribed. The 
protest movement mobilized millions for a couple of weeks on the streets of so many 
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cities in Turkey. However, a name could not be given to the Gezi struggle and it failed 
to offer anything to transform social relations. 
  
80 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this study has been to analyze the hegemonic struggle of the Gezi 
Park protests which was the largest protest movement in the history of Turkey. For 
this purpose, this study began by developing a theoretical framework for the analysis 
of the Gezi Park protests. The protests were joined by groups with multiple identity 
groups including socialists, feminists, queers, ethnic groups and nationalists; therefore 
it displayed characteristics of new social movements. To develop a theoretical 
framework for this study, I used discourse analytical theory of Laclau and Mouffe. 
Instead of other social movement theories, I preferred their discourse theory because 
their approach avoids essentialism and provides the advantage of using rhetorical 
devices to analyze the social space. They assert that a discursive space is a system of 
meaning wherein elements are positioned differentially and relationally. Discourse is 
not purely linguistic phenomena but has a material character including institutions, 
rituals and practices. The social is analyzed as a discursive space which has a 
contingent, relational, differential and heterogeneous character. Beyond the social 
there is not a positive differentiation but a negativity: antagonism. 
Laclau and Mouffe are mostly interested in the constitution of the social, which 
corresponds to the political. The political has the status of an ontology of the social. It 
constitutes the social through articulatory and hegemonic practices. This constitutive 
role corresponds to creation, reproduction and transformation of social relations. They 
approach new social movements as having political potential. In the social movements, 
groups with particular unfulfilled demands get together and establish an equivalential 
link. There is an internal antagonism in this aggregation that there are conflicts and 
contradictions among elements. However, this internal antagonism is masked and 
projected to an outside i.e. antagonistic pole. A social movement can enter into a 
hegemonic struggle if a positive construction follows from antagonism. This positive 
construction corresponds to unification of all unfulfilled demands in the equivalential 
chain around a popular demand. In this way popular demand starts representing an 
unachievable fullness, it turns into a part embodying the whole. This embodiment is 
only possible by naming the popular demand. Name becomes ground of the constituted 
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totality and it turns into a collective identity of different groups in the movement. It is 
only after naming, a social movement can enter into a hegemonic struggle, challenges 
the existing order and transforms social relations. 
The Gezi Park protests turned into a social movement that was unique in its 
multiplicity in the history of Turkey. The protests were joined by Kemalist nationalists, 
feminists, queer groups, Kurds, socialists, football fans, and anti-capitalist Muslims. 
Due to this multiplicity the protests had a significant political potential. The aim of 
this study has been to analyze the hegemonic capacity of the Gezi Park protests and 
what they offered as an alternative to existing order. 
The Gezi Park protests have been the subject of a number of studies. 
Considering the works that analyze the social and political dimensions of the protests, 
most of the studies dignify pluralistic, egalitarian, horizontally organized character. 
However, these approaches overlook the antagonistic dimension in the protests. There 
are also some other works that analyze the reasons of the protests and they mainly 
focus on activities of the AK Party government. This study aimed at analyzing the 
political capacity of the Gezi Park protests itself. 
This study primarily used in-depth interviews as the basis for analyzing Gezi 
Park discourse. Sixteen semi-structured in-depth interviews with Gezi Park protesters 
were carried out with interviewees from diverse identity groups: Kemalist nationalists, 
professionals, different Muslim groups, leftists, Alevis, Kurds and queers. Questions 
were asked to understand why they engaged in the protests, what they were opposing, 
what they expected from the protests, what their demands were and what their aims 
were. 
The empirical study showed that there were irreconcilable disagreements and 
conflicts among the protesters. There were controversies between Kemalist 
nationalists and Kurds, feminists and football fans, Kemalist nationalists and anti-
capitalist Muslims, and queers and homophobes that undermined any possible unity in 
the park. Despite all their disputes, different groups stayed together in Gezi Park and 
the protests continued. This association was only possible by masking internal 
antagonisms and by referring them to an antagonistic pole. It is by negative reference 
to the antagonistic pole that a totality manages to signify itself. 
To determine how the antagonistic frontier was defined during Gezi Park 
protests, interviewees were asked about what they were protesting against. Almost all 
of the answers were centered on opposition to the government. Some of the 
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interviewees wanted to overthrow the government, some others opposed certain 
policies of the government. Socialists were against capitalism and they assumed the 
government to be a representative of capitalism. Some socialists wanted to seize power 
and make a revolution. Feminists were against patriarchy and for them this state and 
especially the AK Party government represents patriarchy. Anti-capitalist Muslims 
also thought that Gezi was something against the government. Some of them had no 
problems with this situation while some were bothered because according to them 
capitalism should have been the primary target. Despite the fact that some protesters 
did not want the government to resign, they were aware and approved that the protests 
were against the government. Some protesters quit the protests thinking that it only 
aimed to force the government to resign. It can be concluded that antagonistic frontier 
of Gezi community is drawn by excluding the government. Laclau asserts that an 
antagonistic frontier might be continuously changed and redefined during the process. 
However, during Gezi Park protests, after the government was designated as the 
symbolic antagonism, this frontier remained relatively stable. All conflicting groups 
in the park managed to stay together by projecting their internal antagonisms to the 
government. 
The protesters were also asked about their problems with the government. 
Interestingly, most of them felt their way of life to be under threat. The issue of way 
of life is analyzed by appealing to Zizek’s conceptualization of “thief of enjoyment”. 
He asserts that enjoyment is aspiration to unachieved fullness and it holds a given 
community together. The way of life is the way of organizing the enjoyment. The other 
of any community i.e. symbolic antagonism always appears as thief that subverts their 
enjoyment and threatens their way of life. Besides, the theft of enjoyment is the process 
of concealing the fact that the community is constituted around a lack and an 
antagonism inherent in any community. The community never possesses the allegedly 
stolen enjoyment but the enjoyment constitutes itself as stolen. Therefore considering 
the symbolic antagonism as thief of enjoyment is a way of concealing the originary 
fissure i.e. impossibility of any totality. For the Gezi community, the government 
appears as something that threatens their way of life. Restrictions on abortion and 
alcohol were prominent fears described by the protesters and these can be related to 
conservatism of the government. 
While the inner conflicts in Gezi Park are masked and projected to the 
government, the limits are drawn between inside i.e. Gezi community and outside. The 
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protesters transferred their aspiration to an unachieved fullness to Gezi community. 
The protesters sublimated and idealized Gezi by attributing a perfection. They 
considered Gezi as a unique, ideal, pure, good, beautiful and extraordinary place. Some 
socialist protesters think it was an example of a commune where everybody was 
helping each other. Some anti-capitalist Muslims considered that a solidarity described 
in Qur’an was experienced in Gezi. 
The aspiration to totality brought about by unfulfilled demands, which is well 
explained in psychoanalysis, is transferred onto partial objects. In this way, a certain 
particularity assumes the role of an impossible universality. This is the logic of 
hegemony: a popular demand which signifies all unsatisfied demands becomes an 
empty signifier i.e. the name of an impossible totality. The name of the popular 
demand starts giving identity and establishing hegemony. Therefore, any political 
construction starts from negativity, i.e. antagonism, but can only be successful to the 
point that it establishes hegemony. The hegemonic struggle can only be conducted 
through the constitutive act of naming. There is a tension between the particularity of 
different demands and popular demand that articulates them all. Particular demands 
should retreat from their particularities for negotiation, otherwise hegemonic 
articulation would be impossible. Hegemonic construction is possible with this 
unification around popular demand and must turn into a stable system of signification. 
This also corresponds to the fact that a set of proposals for the positive organization of 
the social must be made. If the name of the popular demand cannot be given, the result 
would only be pure solidarity against an antagonistic pole. 
In this study, the demands of the Gezi Park protesters are analyzed in order to 
investigate the hegemonic capacity of the Gezi Park protests. While protecting the park 
remained at the forefront, it could not turn into a popular demand because almost none 
of the protesters identified with this demand and they always said there was more to 
it. Even the initiative that carried out different demonstrations and campaigns to 
protect the Gezi Park long before massive protests, Taksim Solidarity, was not 
satisfied with the demand of protecting the park. After the protests, Taksim Solidarity 
turned into a platform with many components, including organizations of feminists, 
socialists, queers, environmentalists, health-care providers, etc., as well as different 
labor unions. A week after the protests started, Taksim Solidarity issued a press release 
that called on government to resign. The Solidarity also negotiated with the 
government. During the negotiations, Taksim Solidarity stated not only its demands 
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regarding the park, but also demands to ensure maintenance of the protests and almost 
twenty other extra demands that included objections to the third airport project, to the 
masculine policies of the government, to the foreign policy of Turkey and to policies 
interfering with sensitivities of Alevi citizens. During the protests Taksim Solidarity 
made many public statements, starting with reference to protecting the park and its 
importance, the statements related the police violence to general cruelty of the 
government and all other dissatisfactions with the government were articulated. Before 
the evacuation of the park, Taksim Solidarity entered a second negotiation, this time 
with the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Despite his guarantee to protect the 
park until the court decision or offered plebiscite, they decided to continue protesting. 
Therefore, Taksim Solidarity itself did not view the goal of the protests merely as 
protecting the Gezi Park but put forward many other demands at the same time. 
Empirical research carried out within the scope of this study also shows that 
popular demand was not defined by the protesters as protecting Gezi Park. Some of 
them stated that they joined not only for the trees. Some others said their aim in joining 
the protests was protecting Gezi Park, however they added that their demands were 
not restricted to that goal. Some of them said they joined to topple the government and 
some socialists expected a revolution. One interviewee was disturbed because she only 
wanted to protect the park but the protesters had further aims and they wanted the 
government to resign. Eventually she quit protesting. 
When the demands of the protesters in general are examined, most of the 
socialists expected there would be revolution. One of them was unhappy with the 
attempts that channel the protests into the ballot box. She hoped that a government of 
people’s assemblies will arrive after the revolution. Another of them was not expecting 
a revolution because it was not an armed struggle, he only expected the resignation of 
responsible government members. One socialist was expecting social democracy to 
arrive after the revolution but noted that there was lack of working class involvement 
in the protests. Another socialist considered the class differences in the park to be 
unimportant because he believed the first the democratic revolution, like in Gezi, 
would arrive and that later a class based revolution would be possible. Feminists 
demanded that the government change its policies regarding women. Kurds were 
against state violence. Kemalist nationalists were demanding resignation of the 
government. Anti-capitalist Muslims were not happy that the Gezi Park protests took 
on a character of opposition to the government because they were against the capitalist 
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system in general. During the Gezi Park protests, an anti-governmental stance brought 
solidarity among many different groups. However, the naming of a hegemonic demand 
was not achieved. Each group prioritized their own particular demands. 
Although the Gezi Park protests had the political capacity to reconstitute the 
social order due to their ability to bring different groups together, they could not enter 
into a hegemonic struggle. The equivalential articulation of different demands never 
went beyond a vague feeling of solidarity against the government because they did not 
crystallize in a particular popular demand. Therefore, a name could not be given to the 
protests and this equivalential articulation could not be turned into a collective identity. 
The name of Gezi turned into a signifier that took the meaning of being against the 
government. Opposition to the government became both a condition of possibility and 
impossibility for the protests. Popularization occurred after the antagonistic pole was 
defined as the government, however, it could not be possible to offer a foundation for 
the demands of these different groups. Because transition to a popular demand could 
not be achieved and the protests could not go beyond negativity. 
In conclusion, the Gezi Park protests were successful in mobilizing millions 
for several weeks in almost all cities in Turkey. The protests displayed an 
unprecedented multiplicity considering the participating groups. Gezi Park remained 
untouched, as a result of the protests. However, a name could not be given to the 
protests and they failed to offer anything to transform social relations and to constitute 
positivity of the social.  
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